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POLICY SUMMARY
This monograph examines the relationship between labor unions and the
economic performance and behavior of U.S. firms. A model of union rentseeking is developed in which unions capture a share of the quasi-rents that
make up the normal return to investment in long-lived capital and research and
development (R&D). In response to union rent-seeking, firms adjust their in
vestment in vulnerable tangible and intangible capital. In order to examine em
pirically union effects on firm performance, a survey was conducted to collect
information on the extent of collective bargaining coverage among publicly trad
ed manufacturing firms. Data from the union survey are matched with firm
and industry data to form a large panel data set of firms for the 1968-1980 period.
These data permit a relatively detailed examination of the relationship of
unionization with firm profitability and market value, investment in physical
capital and R&D, productivity, and productivity growth.
Firm-level union coverage is found to vary substantially both across and within
industries. Evidence is provided showing that companies with extensive
unionization had lower rates of profit, market value, capital investment, and
R&D investment than did similar nonunion firms and those firms with limited
collective bargaining coverage. Returns to physical capital and R&D and the
disequilibrium returns associated with demand shifts, rather than monopoly
profits associated with market structure, appear to provide the primary sources
for union gains. Although union-nonunion differences in profitability and in
vestment are large on average, there is substantial variability in estimated union
effects across industries. Econometric evidence on productivity and produc
tivity growth differences between union and nonunion companies is fragile and
allows few clear-cut inferences to be drawn. The recent contraction in the size
of the union sector, it is argued, resulted in part from the long-run response
by firms to union rent-seeking, and was inevitable given the relatively poor
profit performance, diminished market value, and low investment by unioniz
ed companies during the 1970s.
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Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a substantial decline in the
relative importance of labor unions and of manufacturing production
in the United States. Over this same period, a marked slowdown in ag
gregate wage and productivity growth drew increased attention from
policymakers and economists. Only recently have researchers focused
attention on the effects of labor unions on economic performance and
examined the relationship between economic performance and declin
ing union membership. This study analyzes in detail union effects on
profitability, investment behavior, productivity, and productivity growth
during the 1970s, based on new evidence collected on union member
ship at the firm level.
The decline in U.S. unionization has been greeted with unrestrained
glee by many business groups and with grave concern (often coupled
with resignation) by union supporters. The extent of the union decline
is evinced by statistics on union membership and representation elec
tions. Union density, measured by the percentage of nonagricultural
employment comprised of union members, fell from 30 percent in 1970,
to 23 percent in 1980, and to 17 percent by 1987 (19 percent were covered
by collective bargaining agreements during 1987).! The survey of publicly
traded U.S. manufacturing companies conducted for this study (see
chapter 3) finds that among 452 companies providing information for
both 1977 and 1987, collective bargaining coverage declined from 30.5
percent in 1977 to 25.0 percent in 1987. Current Population Survey (CPS)
data on individual manufacturing sector workers in 1987 indicates that
24.7 percent were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1989, table 684). Data on new union organizing
reveal a similar pattern over time, the ratio of union representation elec
tions and new workers organized to total employment both falling sharply
since the 1950s.2 Although it is difficult to predict future levels of union
representation, Freeman (1985, p. 49) calculated a long-run, steady-state
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union coverage density of about 10 percent in the private sector, based
on trends in new organizing and coverage loss (decay) through 1980.
Subsequent organizing and decay trends now suggest steady-state levels
of private sector union coverage of less than 5 percent (Freeman 1988;
Chaison and Dhavale 1990).
Explanations for the decline in unionism abound, although the relative
importance of contributing factors remains very much in doubt (see,
for example, Dickens and Leonard 1985; Hirsch and Addison 1986, chap.
3; Freeman 1988; Reder 1988). The explanation most commonly prof
fered is that "structural" changes in the U.S. economy have led to declines
in unionization. It is argued that employment has declined in historical
ly highly unionized sectors of the economy (e.g., production jobs in
manufacturing), whereas job growth has occurred in nonproduction jobs
in the largely nonunion service sector. Complementary explanations in
clude increased foreign competition impacting most directly the goodsproducing sectors of the economy, deregulation in highly unionized
transportation and communication industries, more rapid job growth in
low-union regions of the country, increased entry of women into lowunion sectors of the labor market, and less favorable attitudes toward
unions exhibited by management, workers, legislatures, and ad
ministrative and judicial authorities.
Recent studies have challenged purely structural explanations for declin
ing unionism. Linneman and Wachter (1986) provide evidence that within
1-digit industries, declines in employment from 1973-1984 are restricted
almost entirely to union workers while, in contrast, nonunion employ
ment grew in almost all sectors. They calculate union premiums in each
industry, relative to an "opportunity cost" wage in growing (primarily
nonunion) sectors of the economy. Union premiums are found to have
increased over this period and Linneman and Wachter conclude that much
of the decline in union employment was in response to higher union
wage premiums. Linneman, Wachter, and Carter (1990), who provide
more recent and detailed evidence, reach an identical conclusion.
Likewise, Freeman (1985; 1988) is skeptical of the structural explana
tion, noting that Canada has not had such significant declines in unionism,
despite similar structural changes. Freeman links the decline in unionism
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to increased management opposition (evidenced primarily by increased
unfair labor practice charges) resulting, he argues, from an increased
union wage premium and less favorable NLRB rulings. Blanchflower
and Freeman (forthcoming) utilize international data and conclude that
in the United States the union wage premium is larger, and decline in
union density greater, than in other OECD countries.
This monograph examines a related explanation for union decline. A
model of union rent-seeking is described in which unions capture some
share of the quasi-rents that make up the normal return to investment
in long-lived capital and in research and development (R&D). In response,
firms rationally reduce their investment in vulnerable tangible and in
tangible capital. Contraction of the union sector, it is argued, has resulted
in part from the long-run response by firms to union rent-seeking, and
was inevitable given the relatively poor economic performance and pros
pects among unionized companies during the 1970s. Specifically, com
panies with extensive unionization are found to have had lower rates of
profit, market value, capital investment, and R&D investment than similar
companies whose workers had limited collective bargaining coverage.
The union rent-seeking framework introduced in this monograph con
trasts with the traditional on-the-demand curve model. In the traditional
model, union monopoly power in the labor market is viewed as chang
ing relative factor prices through its ability to raise union compensation
above competitive levels. In response to a higher wage, union firms move
up and along their labor-demand curve by decreasing employment, hir
ing higher-quality workers, and increasing the ratio of capital to labor.
Total investment in innovative activity and labor-saving capital can in
crease or decrease owing to offsetting substitution and scale effects.
The traditional model may be inadequate in this instance for at least
two reasons. First, settlements off-the-labor-demand curve, with lower
wages and greater employment than would obtain in the on-the-demand
curve model, are preferred by both the union and management. If set
tlements are not on-the-labor-demand curve, the effect of unions on factor
mix cannot be predicted in straightforward fashion. A second shortcoming
is the traditional model©s characterization of union wage increases as
exogenous or independent of factor price changes. In the rent-seeking
framework, union wage premiums are viewed as levying a tax on firm
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earnings. The union tax is not viewed as an independent factor price
change but, rather, as an outcome made possible by both union power
in the labor market and the presence of firm quasi-rents.
Implications of the rent-seeking model differ from the traditional onthe-demand curve model. Firms may be less rather than more likely
to commit to tangible and intangible capital investments that are relatively
long-lived and nontransferable, since such investments will face high
union tax rates. Long-run implications deriving from the union rentseeking model include the possibility of lower rates of profit and capital
investment, decreases in R&D and other innovative activities, and slower
productivity and output growth. These possibilities are explored in subse
quent chapters.
Empirical work in this monograph builds on a rapidly growing literature
examining union effects on profitability and productivity, and a more
limited body of evidence examining union effects on firm investment
and productivity growth. Studies examining union effects on profits almost
universally find that unions decrease profitability. This conclusion holds
for studies using industries, firms, or lines of business as the unit of
observation; for models where the profitability measures are industry
price-cost margins, firm rates of return to capital or sales, Tobin©s q or
other market value measures, or stock market value changes in response
to union "events"; for simultaneous equation as well as single equation
models; and regardless of the time period under study.
Despite the consensus that profitability is lower in unionized settings,
there is disagreement as to the magnitude of the profit reduction and
the sources from which union gains are obtained. Economists are
understandably skeptical that large profit differentials can survive in a
competitive economy, notwithstanding the sizable union-nonunion prof
it differences found in the empirical literature. Unfortunately, little at
tention has been given to the sources from which unions appropriate
rents. Several studies conclude that unions reduce profits primarily in
highly concentrated industries and that monopoly power provides the
primary source for union compensation gains. Other studies call this
conclusion into question and argue that returns from firm-specific R&D
capital and weak foreign competition are more likely sources for union
gains.
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Little attention has been given to union-nonunion differences in in
vestment behavior. The union rent-seeking model predicts that unioniz
ed firms invest less in highly taxed investment paths than do similar non
union firms. The small number of previous studies examining union ef
fects on firm investment behavior provide support for the union rentseeking model. Unionized companies invest less in physical capital and
R&D than do similar nonunion companies, and the level of innovative
activity appears to be decreased by union coverage. If unionized firms
invest less in tangible and intangible capital, over the long run they should
have slower growth in output and employment. While there is surpris
ingly little research on this latter topic, studies do suggest, however, that
unionization has produced significantly slower employment growth (Linneman, Wachter, and Carter 1990; Leonard forthcoming) and, perhaps,
weaker sales (output) growth (Clark 1984; Freeman and Medoff 1984).
Union effects on productivity have received considerable attention since
the appearance of the study by Brown and Medoff (1978), which con
cluded that union establishments are about 20 percent more productive
than similar nonunion establishments, after accounting for differences
in capital intensity and labor quality. Considerable methodological reser
vations attach to this and other studies in this literature, however. The
fuller body of empirical evidence does not suggest a sizable union pro
ductivity effect, nor are large productivity effects consistent with em
pirical evidence on profitability and employment (Addison and Hirsch
1989).
The link between unions and productivity growth is rather opaque.
There are numerous studies examining total factor productivity growth,
many of which include industry union density as a control variable. These
studies generally find productivity growth lower among firms and in
dustries with high union densities, but this result is suspect given the
data and econometric limitations of these studies. The rent-seeking model
implies, however, that even if unionism has no direct effect on produc
tivity growth, it may affect it indirectly via union effects on growthenhancing investments in physical and R&D capital.
A serious limitation of much of the previous empirical research on
unions and firm performance has been the difficulty in obtaining firmlevel measures of union coverage. In order to examine union effects on
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firm performance, 1977 union data from the survey conducted in this
study were matched to company and industry data on a panel of U.S.
manufacturing firms over the 1968-1980 period. Use of this data set
facilitates a detailed examination of the relationship between unioniza
tion and firm performance.
Union coverage data for 1987 were also collected. Because of limita
tions on other firm and industry data available at the time this study
was conducted, the 1987 data were not used to analyze union effects
on firm performance. The data, however, provide direct evidence on
the magnitude of firm-specific changes in union coverage between 1977
and 1987 (chapter 3). No such information is publicly available.
In the following chapters, theory and evidence on the relationship be
tween unions, investment, and economic performance are provided.
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical development of the union rent-seeking
model, in which union effects on profitability, the level and mix of tangible
and intangible capital investments, factor usage, and productivity growth
are examined. In chapter 3, detailed discussion of the union coverage
survey is provided. Chapter 4 provides the modeling and estimation of
union effects on firm profitability and market value. Firm investment
behavior is examined in chapter 5, while productivity and productivity
growth are the focus of chapter 6. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 each contain
a brief survey of previous research in the area under study. A summary
and evaluation are provided in chapter 7.
NOTES
1. Data for 1970 and 1980 are from Troy and Sheflin (1985, table 3.41). Figures for 1987 are deriv
ed from the Current Population Survey (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989, table 684). Although
the former source calculates figures based on union-reported dues, and the latter on surveys of
individuals, figures from the two surveys are very close during years in which both report union
density. Private sector union membership density is substantially lower than economywide densi
ty. Estimates of union membership and contract coverage by detailed industry and geographic area
are provided in Curme, Hirsch, and Macpherson (1990).
2. Election data are summarized in NLRB Annual Reports (these reports have not appeared regularly
during the 1980s) and are made available on data tapes. There was a particularly sharp and perma
nent drop in union organizing activity between 1981 and 1982; the average 1982-1987 level of organiz
ing is about half the 1975-1981 level (Chaison and Dhavale 1990, table 1, p. 369).

2
Union Rent-Seeking
and the
Economic Performance of Firms

A firm and labor union engage in a long-run bilateral relationship
in which both parties have market power and receive economic quasirents from their mutual relationship. Quasi-rents are the returns accru
ing to previously "installed" physical, intangible, or human capital above
those obtainable in the capital©s best alternative use. Quasi-rents,
therefore, are prevalent where physical capital or worker skills are
specialized, long-lived, and costly to transfer to an alternative use.
Although competitive labor market conditions heavily influence bargain
ing outcomes, both parties possess some degree of market power. On
the one hand, U.S. labor law specifies that the union be the sole represen
tative of covered workers and that the firm bargain in good faith with
the union. Workers possess legally protected rights and firm-specific
skills, and firms have made significant investments in human, physical,
and intangible capital. Because it is costly for a firm to replace its unioniz
ed workforce, the union can appropriate some share of the firm©s
quasi-rents.
On the other hand, because workers possess nontransferable job skills
(partially financed by workers) and face fixed costs of job switching,
the firm may behave opportunistically and capture worker quasi-rents
by paying workers only their current opportunity costs. Opportunistic
behavior by the firm may be severely constrained, however, by the
necessity to maintain a good reputation so as to attract quality workers
in the future.
The existence of mutual rents in a long-run bargaining situation be
tween firms and unions provides the setting for the union rent-seeking
framework. Emphasis in this study is given to the ability of unions
to appropriate firm quasi-rents. Below, union and firm behavior are
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analyzed and the implications for firms© investment behavior and
economic performance are developed.

Union Behavior
Labor unions attempt to acquire gains for their members. Gains
primarily take the form of wage increases, but may also be evinced
by increases in nonwage compensation, improved employment securi
ty, changes in the wage distribution, and changes in the work environ
ment and governance structure of firms. It is assumed that union leaders
are responsive to the demands of the rank-and-file. Interest compatibility
between agent (union leadership) and principals (rank-and-file) is enhanc
ed by the necessity of union leaders to be reelected and to obtain ma
jority approval of collective bargaining agreements. The simplest model
of union behavior is the median voter model wherein preferences are
well-ordered or "single peaked," so that individual preferences can
be aggregated into ordered group preferences. Majority rule voting in
this case produces a determinate and stable equilibrium. The median
voter model predicts that union leaders propose and attempt to execute
actions most consistent with the demands of union members with me
dian or average preferences (Hirsch and Addison 1986, chap. 2; Farber
1986). While the assumptions of the median voter model are an overly
simplistic description of union decisionmaking, the model provides a
reasonable and appropriate framework for analyzing most union
behavior.
Even if unions accurately represent current rank-and-file with me
dian preferences, an inefficient output of union services results because
the voting process does not readily permit weighting the intensity of
preferences. More fundamental to the discussion that follows, if the
concept of efficiency in union services is extended to include the
preferences of potential or future union members, unions are likely to
be "rationally myopic" in their actions, discounting too heavily longrun outcomes. Myopia results because incumbent union members do
not have sufficient incentive to take into account the welfare of poten
tial or future union members. The future is highly discounted because
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union members cannot sell their place in the union, members cannot
transfer their membership as a bequest to children or friends, and the
preferences of potential union members (i.e., qualified workers in the
union queue) need not be taken into account. The discount rate at which
unions evaluate long-run outcomes is increased further if the preferences
of senior union members receive particularly large weights in the union
calculus. It is argued below that the combination of union rent-seeking
and myopia leads to important union effects on firm profitability and
investment decisions, as well as other aspects of economic performance.

Union Rent-Seeking and Profitability
If unions reduce profitability significantly below a normal rate of
return, survival rates for unionized firms (or lines of business within
firms) will be lower than for their nonunion competitors. It is thus unlike
ly that unions can maintain large wage premiums in competitive in
dustries with small stocks of specialized capital unless they also increase
productivity significantly or organize industrywide in markets facing
low product demand elasticities (due, say, to limited foreign competi
tion). Industrywide unionism, in this case, acts much like a cartelizing
device to lower output and raise price. The possibility that unions in
crease productivity sufficiently to offset higher wage costs is address
ed subsequently.
Unions obtain compensation above competitive levels principally by
sharing in a firm©s monopoly returns and quasi-rents. Unionization is
less likely to have an impact on firm survival and pricing-output deci
sions if excess returns accruing from imperfect product market com
petition provide the principal source for union gains. Although excess
returns associated with market power may provide a target and poten
tial source for union gains, it need not follow that unions can appropriate
such returns. If the firm can continue operations during a sustained strike,
or the resources that generate the monopoly returns can be costlessly
transferred to a nonunion environment, the union may have relatively
little bargaining power to tax monopoly returns. For example, a phar
maceutical company whose primary assets are highly valued patents
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may be able to sell (or license) these patents to another company. A
strike threat by unionized production workers to shut down production
would not be credible in this situation, since resources can be transfer
red at low cost to an equally valued alternative use. If a company©s assets
are costly to transfer and not equally valued elsewhere, returns associated
with monopoly patents might better be treated as potentially appropriable
quasi-rents. 1
Quasi-rents are returns accruing to installed fixed-cost capital above
its opportunity cost. For example, once investment in specialized plant
or equipment has been made, a sizable reduction in the return stream
from that capital will not cause it to be sold, scrapped, or shut down.
Rather, assets will continue in use as long as they retain a return above
that available in their best alternative use. Quasi-rents can, but need
not, arise from imperfect competition; even with free entry and open
competition, specialized assets create quasi-rents that make up the com
petitive return to investment. It is argued here that quasi-rents provide
a primary source for union rent-seeking. And once a specialized asset
is in place, union wage gains financed by appropriated returns are unlike
ly to affect that asset©s use. In the long run, however, decreases in ex
pected rates of return will cause union firms to invest less in long-lived
specialized capital, until expected rates of return net of the union tax
are equal to competitive market rates of return.
Effective union rent-seeking should lower firm profitability, regardless
of whether union gains are at the expense of above-normal returns
resulting from market power, or represent a share of the quasi-rents
making up the normal returns to capital owners. Firm profitability can
be represented by traditional accounting measures of earnings, market
value measures (if the firm is publicly traded), or some combination
of the two. The accounting profit measure utilized in subsequent em
pirical work is the rate of return on capital (earnings/capital stock). Ac
counting returns reflect historically observed performance, but do not
directly reflect future performance or adjustments for risk. The return
on equity (earnings/equity) constitutes a hybrid measure, mixing ac
counting earnings in the numerator with the stock market valuation of
assets in the denominator. Union effects on the return to equity should
be small, since the rate of return to investors should tend toward equality
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across investment paths. That is, lower earnings by a union company
(shown in the numerator) will decrease that firm©s equity value (in the
denominator), but generally have small effects on the ratio.
Union effects on firm market value reflect investors© expectations about
unionism©s impact on the present value of future earnings. Market value
measures provide forward-looking, risk-adjusted estimates of union ef
fects. These effects on market value can differ from unionism©s impact
on current earnings. For example, a union may significantly decrease
current earnings but not market value if investors believe the firm can
adjust in the future or in some way offset the union©s current negative
impact. Or, a union may have little immediate impact on earnings but
significantly decrease market value if investors expect the union to have
a detrimental effect on firm growth and future earnings. Empirical studies
examining union effects on market value have typically measured prof
itability by either Tobin©s q (which will be used here), representing
market value divided by the replacement cost of assets, or by changes
in market value resulting from the "unanticipated" portion of unionrelated events (e.g., a union representation election).
This study will examine union-nonunion differences in accounting
rates of return and market value during the 1970s. A principal advan
tage of this analysis will be the use of company-specific (rather than
industry-specific) data on collective bargaining coverage, which poten
tially allows us to distinguish the effects of firm coverage, industry
coverage, and numerous other firm and industry determinants of prof
itability. To be examined are overall union effects on alternative profit
ability measures, changes in these effects over the 1968-1980 period,
differences in the magnitude of the union profit effect across broad 2-digit
industries, sources from which unions appear to extract gains, varia
tion in the union effect with the extent of firm coverage (i.e., the linearity
of the union-profits relationship), and the sensitivity of estimates to
specification. One of the principal arguments of this study is that union
rent-seeking affects firm investment behavior. Thus, we also will link
any evidence of union profit effects to subsequent evidence on invest
ment decisions by the firm.
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Union Bargaining Outcomes, Quasi-Rents,
and Investment Behavior
Unions and firms engage in repeated bargaining over what are typically
unlimited time horizons. Cooperative bargaining outcomes, if possi
ble, would maximize the sum of the firm©s market value, representing
the discounted stream of future expected earnings to shareholders, and
the present value of expected rents accruing to the union. Cooperative
or "efficient" bargaining outcomes could be nondistortionary if labor
market conditions were stable, contracts were binding for very long
time periods, and the time horizon over which the union evaluates its
welfare was at least as long as the life of the firm©s prospective new
capital. In practice, however, one observes long-run repetitive bargaining
governed by short-term (typically three-year) contracts, accompanied
by often unpredictable changes in labor and product market conditions.
Both parties may be deterred from engaging in short-term opportunistic
behavior when such behavior is expected to have deleterious effects
on future contract negotiations. But even if such cooperative bargain
ing obtains, union-management bargaining will still distort investment
decisions (relative to a nonunion firm) if the union©s time horizon is
relatively short or, stated similarly, if the union discounts the future
at a higher rate than shareholders. 2
As argued previously, union myopia is likely since the time period
over which voting rank-and-file or, more precisely, members with me
dian preferences evaluate their welfare is likely to be shorter than the
life of current or prospective firm-specific capital. In particular, influen
tial rank-and-file may have limited time horizons if they have few re
maining work years and face little prospect of layoffs owing to reverse
seniority provisions. They have little stake in the future financial health
of the firm if they cannot sell (or transfer to relatives or friends) their
union membership, and if they do not own significant amounts of the
company©s stock. To the extent that a worker©s future pension payments
are contingent upon the future health of the company, the worker©s time
horizon is lengthened, although such a response may be mitigated by
government pension guarantees. Thus, cooperative long-run bargain
ing outcomes between a firm and a myopic union may shift income
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streams (relative to a nonunion outcome) toward the present by taxing
long-lived capital already in place and decreasing current investment
in tangible and intangible capital.
While cooperative long-run bargaining outcomes are possible, they
are unlikely to systematically prevail over noncooperative outcomes,
since both parties have incentive to behave opportunistically. The union
is willing to lower its current wage demand in exchange for an employ
ment level greater than that shown on the labor-demand curve, or in
the expectation of realizing higher future employment and wages than
would otherwise occur. Once a contract is in place, however, the firm
has incentive to decrease its use of labor to a point on the labor-demand
curve. Firms also can appropriate returns on specific human capital
(Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Crawford 1988). Opportunistic
behavior by the firm, however, may be effectively constrained as long
as it must renegotiate contracts with the union on a recurring basis and
if the union can maintain a credible threat to impose large costs on the
firm through means of a strike. 3
The union typically has greater incentive than the firm to engage in
opportunistic or noncooperative behavior inconsistent with long-term
joint wealth maximization. Once specific assets are brought on line,
a union with bargaining power and a credible strike threat is likely to
appropriate some portion of the quasi-rents that comprise the normal
returns to investment. This situation can be characterized as one of nonbinding contracts in that the length of the labor contract is less than
the life of specific capital, so that once the capital is in place, labor
can "reopen" bargaining every three or so years. Firms will respond
to the union tax on specific capital by reducing investment until the after
tax rate of return equals the market rate of return on investment. 4
There are few mechanisms by which to move the union and firm from
a noncooperative to a cooperative long-term outcome. 5 The union could
pledge a future low-wage bargaining strategy in return for the firm©s
promise to increase investment in specific capital. But in the absence
of a bond held by a third party, the union©s ability to renege on its pro
mise would prevent such a declaration from being credible (van der
Ploeg 1987). The firm might encourage union members to adopt a
longer run outlook through increased reliance on compensation in the
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form of the company©s stock and greater back-end loading of the con
tract (bonuses based on current profits, as opposed to the stock price,
are not likely to expand workers© time horizon). But risky and delayed
compensation is not likely to appeal to senior rank-and-file. Perhaps
the most powerful incentive to extend rank-and-file©s time horizon and
encourage cooperative union behavior is management©s control over
pension funds. Indeed, Ippolito (1985; 1988) has argued that unioniz
ed companies have incentive to underfund their pension plans in order
to moderate future union wage demands. 6
The union rent-seeking model, therefore, predicts unambiguously a
reduction in investment among unionized companies as compared to
their nonunion counterparts. Even if union and management engage in
cooperative long-run wealth maximization, union myopia will discourage
investment in specific long-lived capital. And in the more likely case
of noncooperative bargaining outcomes, union bargaining power will
be employed to tax the quasi-rents accruing to fixed tangible and in
tangible capital, further reducing firm investment. Reductions in longlived capital will subsequently reduce a union©s bargaining power and
wage demands.
It is worth noting briefly differences between the bargaining model
approach to union rent-seeking developed above and the standard
microeconomic model of union settlements on-the-demand curve. The
standard model treats the union wage as an exogenous change in the
factor price. In response to an increase in the wage, the profit-maximizing
firm decreases employment. The effect on capital usage is indeterminate.
On the one hand, the increase in the wage lowers the relative price of
capital, leading to an increase in optimal capital usage and investment
(a substitution effect). On the other hand, the decrease in profitmaximizing output associated with the union cost increase causes an
increase in demand (a scale effect). Thus, the net effect on capital in
vestment resulting from an exogenous wage increase is indeterminate,
depending on the size of the relative demand shifts. The standard model
does predict, however, that the capital-labor ratio will increase in
response to a wage increase.
The on-the-demand curve outcome is not in general Pareto optimal,
however, since there exist potential settlements off-the-demand curve
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preferred by both the union and firm. The potential gain from
simultaneous bargaining over wages and employment can be seen in
figure 2.1, which shows not only the firm©s labor demand curve, but
also the union©s utility curve, Ut, and the firm©s isoprofit curve, TT,,
at the on-the-demand curve settlement (vv2 , L2). The lens-shaped area
formed by the intersection of these two curves contains wageemployment combinations preferred by both parties. "Efficient" con
tract settlements lie along a contract curve formed by the tangencies
of U{ and IT,. The "strong efficiency" case corresponds to a vertical
contract curve, CC, at the competitive employment level, L,. In this
special case, the competitive employment and capital-labor ratio ob
tain in the short run; i.e., holding constant the level of capital.
The strong efficiency case can be further illustrated by contrasting
it with the inefficient on-the-demand curve case. Subject to constraints,
let the union maximize "rents,"
(2.1) max R = (wu - wc)L,

(union maximand)

where wu is the realized union wage, wc is the opportunity cost or com
petitive wage (we ignore the effect of unions on nonunion wages), and
L is employment. R, a measure of the excess of the union wage bill
over the competitive wage bill, has been a common maximand assum
ed in the literature (e.g., Rosen 1969). The firm in turn maximizes prof
its, ?r, given wu . That is,
(2.2) max TT = PQ - rK - wJL,

(firm maximand)

where Q is output, P product price, K capital, r the price of capital,
and all else as defined above. Sequential wage-employment determina
tion, wherein the union maximizes R and the firm responds by select
ing L to maximize profits, given WM, corresponds to the on-the-demand
curve outcome (vv2 , Z^) shown in figure 2.1.
An efficient bargaining situation on a vertical contract curve implies
that the two parties will maximize the total value of the enterprise V
(Abowd 1989b), being the sum of firm profits (TT) and union rents (R),
and then bargain over division of the surplus. Maximizing V results
in the same output, price, and input usage as obtains in the case where
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the firm maximizes TT subject to the competitive wage or opportunity
cost wage, vvc; that is,
(2.3) max V = TT + R
= PQ-rK-wJL + (wu - wc)L
= PQ - rK - wj..
The firm, therefore, adjusts employment according to the opportunity
cost wage and not its "own" wage. 7 Here, the union has no short-run
real effects; rather, Q, P, K, and L are identical to the competitive case.
The union or own wage is indeterminate.

Figure 2.1
Short-Run Bargaining Model
w

H>

U;

Union Rent-Seeking and Economic Performance

17

By contrast, the rent-seeking model outlined here is a long-run bargain
ing model in which capital stocks are assumed to be variable. As discuss
ed previously, the bargaining model treats the wage premium as an out
come of union rent-seeking made possible by the existence of monopo
ly returns and quasi-rents. In the long run, the equivalency between
the union and competitive outcomes shown in eq. (2.3) breaks down.
First, capital and other fixed-cost inputs are no longer fixed and are
free to vary between union and nonunion firms. Moreover, if eq. (2.3)
is converted from a single-period model to a multiperiod present value
model, the equivalency between the outcomes no longer holds. The
reason for this is that the present value of wj-, evaluated by the union
does not match the present value of w^ evaluated by the firm, since
the union is evaluating it over a shorter time period (or more highly
discounting the future). Thus, the wJL terms in the second line of eq.
(2.3) no longer cancel out.
Our primary interest is to examine the effects of union rent-seeking
on the firm©s investment activity. As developed previously, it was seen
that the rent-seeking model predicts lower investment in long-lived
specific tangible and intangible capital than would occur in the absence
of the union. In addition to a "direct" union effect on investment, ow
ing to the union tax on returns emanating from tangible and intangible
capital, union rent-seeking is likely to have an "indirect" effect on in
vestment (Hirsch, forthcoming). Indirect effects result if unions decrease
company earnings, and if such earnings provide a low-cost source of
funds for firm investments. Subsequent empirical analysis will attempt
to distinguish unionism©s direct and indirect effects.
Graphically, union rent-seeking can be represented as levying a tax
on the returns associated with relation-specific tangible and intangible
capital. Figure 2.2 (a-c) presents diagrams showing curves labeled MRI,
representing the marginal rate of return on investment, and MFC,
representing the marginal financing cost of funds. Initially, we assume
that the firm faces constant marginal financing costs (this would occur
in a world with a neutral tax system and a competitive capital market
with no transaction/information costs). Firms will carry out investment
up to the point where the marginal rate of return on investment equals
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Figure 2.2
Union Effects on Investment
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marginal costs, corresponding to investment level /t in figure 2.2(a).
This framework can be applied not only to investment in physical capital,
but also to investment in intangible capital such as R&D.
The union tax on the prospective returns to investment flattens or
rotates downward the MRI curve to MRI©, with a slope of (\-f)S, where
S is the absolute value of the slope of the nonunion MRI curve and t
is the tax rate (i.e., the proportion of the return to capital appropriated
by the union). The union tax places a wedge between nonunion and
union rates of return, so the union firm reduces investment until its after
tax rate of return is equal to its marginal financing costs. In figure 2.2(a),
this implies a reduction in investment from 7j to /2; marginal and average
rates of return on investment are lower for a union than for a nonunion
firm at any given level of investment. If the MFC schedule were up
ward sloping, the equilibrium decrease in /would be somewhat smaller
owing to the falling opportunity cost of funds at lower levels of /.
The effect of the union tax on investment activity is more complicated
if union coverage affects the marginal financing cost. Assume for sake
of illustration that the lower profitability owing to union bargaining power
causes an upward shift in marginal financing costs, from MFC to MFC©,
as seen in figure 2.2(b). In this case, investment falls from /t to /3 , ow
ing both to the direct effect of the union tax from I{ to /2, and to an
indirect effect associated with the higher financing cost from /2 to Iy
Perhaps a more realistic case is an MFC curve that is discontinuous
at the point where a firm must shift from internal to external financing
of investment. Figure 2.2(c) identifies such an MFC schedule. In the non
union case, the MFC schedule is represented by acef; at point c the
firm must shift from internal to external funds. In the union case, re
tained earnings or profits are reduced, leading to the MFC schedule
abdf, the up ward" shift now occurring at the lower level b. In this case,
if both the pre- and postunion tax MRI schedules intersect MFC to the
right of point e, or to the left of point b, the entire union effect on / will
be a direct effect. Intuitively, the union will have no indirect effect if
the marginal financing cost is unchanged; that is, if the firm would re
ly on external marginal financing with or without a union, or if it relies
entirely on internal funds with or without a union. Otherwise, there
will be both a direct and an indirect union effect on investment activity.

20

Union Rent-Seeking and Economic Performance

Although different from the traditional model, the union rent-seeking
approach, which treats union wage demands as endogenous, does not
rule out the existence of substitution and scale effects. Union bargain
ing power facilitates cost increases that unambiguously reduce output
(scale) and hence usage of all factor inputs. And if the union tax on
capital can be reduced by a reduction in employment, the traditional
substitution effect is more likely to operate. Substitution or relative price
effects will affect the mix as well as level of investment, leading to
relatively lower use of factors taxed heavily by the union, and greater
reliance on factors whose returns are difficult for unions to appropriate.
For example, unionized firms are likely to decrease investment in longlived capital with high fixed costs, and in innovative activity that leads
to firm-specific returns. By contrast, the firm may increase investment
in technologies and innovative activity expected to lead to labor-saving
and whose returns are not vulnerable to union appropriation. Note that
long-lived, specific physical capital is perhaps most vulnerable to union
capture, even if such capital is labor-saving. Of course, the net effect
of unions on input use and investments in tangible and intangible capital
is ultimately an empirical question.
Union rent-seeking is likely to reduce not only investment in physical
capital, but also investment in R&D and other forms of innovative ac
tivity. The stock of knowledge and improvements in processes and pro
ducts emanating from R&D are likely to be relatively long-lived and
firm specific. To the extent that the returns from innovative activity
are appropriable, firms will respond to union power by reducing these
investments. Collective bargaining coverage within a company is most
likely to reduce investment in product innovations and relatively factorneutral process innovations, while having ambiguous effects on laborsaving process innovation. 8 R&D expenditures also tend to signal, or
be statistically prior to, investments in physical capital. 9 Therefore, firms
reducing long-range plans for physical capital investment in response
to union rent-seeking are likely to reduce investment in R&D.
Patents applied for or granted are a measure of innovative output
emanating from a company©s R&D stock. Patent activity is likely to
exhibit a relationship with company union coverage largely similar to
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that exhibited by R&D inputs. Unionized companies, however, may
be more likely to patent, given their stock of innovation capital, as a
means of reducing union rent appropriation (Connolly, Hirsch, and
Hirschey 1986). Although the patent application process is often cost
ly and revealing of trade secrets, patents offer the opportunity for firms
to license product and process innovations. The opportunity to license
transforms what might otherwise be firm-specific innovative capital into
general capital, and lessens a union©s ability to appropriate the quasirents from that capital. 10
A final point worth emphasizing is that most collective bargaining
agreements are made at the plant (establishment) or multiplant level,
rather than for the entire firm. To the extent that capital and produc
tion can easily be shifted to nonunion plants within a firm, a union©s
ability to appropriate returns from investment may be constrained. In
fact, a firm©s implicit or explicit threat to transfer production to non
union plants may limit union wage demands. To the extent that unionized
operations remain vital to the firm, however, union labor can still ap
propriate a share of a firm©s quasi-rents emanating from capital in its
nonunion operations. Similarly, the threat of union organizing in non
union plants and wage standardization across union and nonunion plants
within a firm lessen a firm©s ability to avoid the union tax through a
reallocation of capital away from its unionized plants. Ultimately, it
is an empirical question as to how unionization affects firm performance
and investment behavior. Data on within-firm or establishment-level
allocations of investment funds and economic performance, however,
would enhance our understanding of the process (see Verma 1985).

Summary
Unions and firms engage in a repeated bargaining relationship in which
the union attempts to appropriate quasi-rents emanating from firmspecific capital. Rent-seeking by the union results in lower earnings
and market value among union companies than among similar non
union companies. The level and mix of capital investment is affected
in turn because of the union tax on the quasi-rents that make up the
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normal returns to investment and because earnings, which provide a
low-cost source of funds, are lower. Union effects on investment
behavior will result even if cooperative or jointly maximizing long-run
bargaining outcomes obtain, owing to myopia on the part of senior rankand-file. Union effects on investment will be more negative if noncooperative bargaining outcomes are the norm. Most likely to be af
fected by union rent-seeking are investments in long-lived, relationspecific physical capital, and innovative activity leading to firm-specific
innovation and subsequent physical capital. Union companies are ex
pected to have a higher propensity to patent, given their R&D stock,
as a means of decreasing the union tax on quasi-rents.
The analysis to this point has assumed that unions have no signifi
cant effect on productivity in the firm. If unions do have systematic
effects on productivity, the above analysis must be qualified since union
effects could either reinforce or offset changes in compensation costs
engendered by union rent-seeking. Unions will affect productivity and
productivity growth indirectly, via their effects on investment behavior
and the use of inputs. Less clear is the direct role of unionism in affect
ing productivity and productivity growth independent of levels and
changes in input usage. Union effects on productivity have been the
focus of considerable study in recent years, whereas relatively little at
tention has been given to productivity growth. We turn to these issues
in chapter 6.
NOTES
1 .To the extent that patents result from previous investments in R&D or other forms of innovative
activity, the returns on patents might best be considered a quasi-rent. Of course, notions of fairness
in the labor market also may produce a positive relationship between profits and wages, even
if resources are relatively mobile. For an example of such a model, see Akerlof (1982).
2. For such a model, see Bronars and Deere (1989) and related discussions in Hirsch (1990a,
forthcoming).
3. See Reder and Neumann (1980) for a discussion of bargaining "protocols" that develop be
tween management and labor. A firm (or industry) in failing condition may encourage oppor
tunistic behavior by both management and the union. That is, noncooperative bargaining out
comes become more likely as one moves from infinitely repeated bargaining to a time-limited
bargaining horizon. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) examine the case of a declining industry with
large fixed costs in long-lived capital. They argue that labor demand elasticity will decrease since
substituting capital for labor is less attractive in a declining industry. Hence, union bargaining
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power and the wage premium may increase in the short run. Over the long run, employment
and output will be substantially reduced. They believe their model applies with some force to
the U.S. steel industry.
4. See Grout (1984) for an examination of investment decisions in situations with binding and
nonbinding contracts. Baldwin (1983) contends that firms will respond to union "expropriation"
of returns by retaining second-best or relatively less productive capital as a means of moderating
union wage demands. Union wage demands commensurate with productivity at a firm©s efficient
plants would then necessitate shutdowns at the firm©s less efficient plants. Tauman and Weiss
(1987) develop a duopoly model in which union and nonunion firms select their technologies.
5. Baldwin (1983) explores several possibilities. Wachter and Cohen (1988) propose a cooperative
implicit contract rule (named the "sunk-cost loss rule") wherein firms faced with declining de
mand can lower their wage bill through a reduction in hours but not wages, thus insuring that
profits are reduced.
6. Interestingly, government regulations and guarantees with respect to pension funding, although
defensible on other grounds, lessen union members© stake in the long-run future of the firm and
their union. A similar argument can be made with respect to antidiscrimination (nepotism) laws
applied to unions if, in their absence, rank-and-file could pass on membership to friends and relatives.
7. The prediction that a union firm will adjust employment to the labor market or opportunity
cost wage, and not to its own wage, has formed the basis for some of the empirical tests of strong
efficiency. Among the papers in this area are Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), McCurdy and Pencavel (1986), Card (1986), Eberts and Stone (1986), and Svejnar (1986).
8. Most company-financed R&D is described as product R&D, although many final products in
the producer goods sector end up as inputs into the production process of firms downstream.
9. Lach and Schankerman (1989) provide evidence that R&D "Granger causes" capital invest
ment, but investment doesn©t Granger cause R&D.
10. We treat the ratio of patents to R&D stock as a measure of patent propensity, and expect
unionized companies to have higher ratios. Alternatively, the ratio can be considered a measure
of R&D efficiency firms with higher ratios achieve greater innovative output from given in
puts. By this interpretation, union companies also should have higher patent to R&D stock ratios
since the union tax on investment returns implies a higher before-tax rate of return (or productivi
ty) to innovative activity in union companies. Empirical analyses of R&D and patents are found
in Griliches (1984). Levin et al. (1987) discuss numerous factors determining the appropriability
of returns from R&D, but do not mention labor unions.

3
Union Coverage Among U.S. Firms

Union Coverage Survey

In this study, the relationship between union coverage and various
dimensions of economic performance are examined at the firm level.
A serious limitation of past studies has been the difficulty in measuring
union coverage at the level of the firm.© There are no publicly available
data on the extent of union coverage among U.S. companies. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) does collect and publish announcements of
union contract agreements covering large groups of workers. Firm-level
coverage figures can thus be constructed by aggregating the number
of covered workers across all of a firm©s listed contracts and dividing
that sum by total employees in a firm. Such calculations are neither
simple nor necessarily reliable. Beyond the nontrivial problem of match
ing individual contract information to the appropriate flrm(s), there is
no mandatory reporting of contract information. Hence, estimates of
the proportion of a firm©s workforce covered by a collective bargain
ing agreement will understate actual union coverage, since only large
contracts are included, and since there may be incomplete recording
of these contracts. 2
The difficulty in obtaining firm-level information on union coverage
has prompted authors of previous firm-level studies examining union
effects on economic performance (Salinger 1984; Connolly, Hirsch,
and Hirschey 1986; Hirsch and Connolly 1987; Bronars and Deere 1989)
to match 3-digit industry-level data, based on calculations from the May
Current Population Surveys, to individual firms. Such studies, however,
fail to account for what may be considerable intraindustry variation in
unionization, and entangle to an unknown degree union and industry
effects on market value, investments in tangible and intangible capital,
and productivity.
25
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As part of this study, a survey of U.S. firms was conducted in order
to obtain more direct and reliable information on union coverage. The
survey, conducted during late 1987 and 1988, contacted firms from a
master list of 1,904 firms taken from the R&D Master File, a data file
comprised of all publicly traded manufacturing sector companies
operating in 1976 that were included on Compustat tapes during
1976-1978. 3 Firms were asked to answer the following question for 1987
and, as best they could, for 1977 (as their company then existed):
To the best of your knowledge, approximately what percent
age of your corporation©s total North American workforce
is covered by collective bargaining agreements?
The largest 300 firms (based on 1976 sales) were contacted by phone
and/or mail and received a follow-up questionnaire if they did not in
itially respond; the remaining firms were mailed a questionnaire. 4 Union
data for 1977 corresponds to the firm as it existed in 1977. In cases
where firms had merged, efforts were made to acquire union figures
for the operating units as they existed in 1977.
Usable data for 1977 or 1987 were obtained from 475 firms through
the mail and phone survey. A direct measure of 1977 union coverage
was obtained from 460 firms; 467 firms provided 1987 figures; and
452 firms provided both 1977 and 1987 figures. The relatively few firms
not providing 1977 data typically indicated the data were not available
and they could not provide an estimate. Firms for which 1977 but not
1987 data were available were those that were publicly traded in 1977,
but are now a subsidiary or fully integrated part of a merged firm.
The empirical work in this monograph utilizes a constructed measure
of 1977 union coverage, available for a total of 632 firms. In addition
to the 460 firms for which a direct measure of 1977 coverage was ob
tained, we estimate 1977 coverage for an additional 15 firms based on
reported 1987 coverage figures in the same survey, and for 157 firms
based on firm coverage figures collected in an independent 1972 Con
ference Board Survey (see below). Union coverage figures for 1977
were estimated for the 15 firms by multiplying the 1987 figures by 1.22,
based on the ratio of 1977- to-1987 coverage data among the 452 firms
for which both years of data were available (the simple correlation be
tween the 1977 and 1987 figures is 0.87).
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The 1972 union data were kindly provided by David C. Hershfield,
who developed the figures from data collected in a 1972 survey by the
Conference Board. These data, measuring the percentage of produc
tion and maintenance workers covered by a collective bargaining agree
ment, were available for 315 Fortune 1000 firms in our data base, 157
for which we could not obtain a response in our survey, and 158 for
which we obtained 1977 data (data from the merged surveys for 1972,
1977, and 1987 were available for 154 firms). Because we are interested
in the extent of unionization within the entire firm, the 1972 coverage
figures for production workers were multiplied by the estimated pro
portion of production workers in the firm based on 2-, 3-, and 4-digit
SIC industry figures for 1972. This conversion assumes zero coverage
among nonproduction workers, thus biasing downward the total firm
coverage estimates. Data for 1972 and 1977 were available for 158 firms;
total workforce coverage figures were about 20 percent higher in 1972
than in 1977 among these firms (the two measures had a simple cor
relation of 0.71). The 157 firms for whom only 1972 data were available
were assigned a 1977 coverage estimate equal to 0.84 times the adjusted
1972 figure.
We do not believe the empirical results or conclusions presented in
subsequent chapters are affected substantially by response bias in the
survey. The R&D Master File included information on virtually all firms
in the target population publicly traded firms in the manufacturing sec
tor. From this population, the union survey sample contains a dispropor
tionate number of large companies. But the number of small companies
who responded to the survey is substantial and firm size is a control
variable in subsequent empirical work. As a check for possible survey
bias, measures of profitability and investment were compared among
companies for whom firm union coverage is measured and companies
in the R&D Master File for whom no union measure is available. Dif
ferences in these measures between responding and nonresponding com
panies are small, and never close to statistical significance once firm
size and industry group are controlled.
The determination of firms© union status is not a principal focus of
this monograph. Firm-level union coverage information, however, is
interesting in its own right, particularly so since such figures are not
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widely available. In tables 3.1 and 3.2, union coverage figures for 1972,
1977, and 1987, disaggregated by industry category, are presented. Data
for three samples of firms are included: the 154 companies for whom
1972, 1977, and 1987 union coverage figures are available (table 3.1);
the 452 companies for whom data were obtained in this survey for both
1977 and 1987 (table 3.2); and the 632 firms for whom 1977 union
coverage was directly obtained, or estimated based on data from 1972
or 1987 (table 3.2). This latter measure, designated by UN, is the union
coverage measure utilized in the monograph©s subsequent chapters. 5
The secular decline in union coverage among U.S. firms is evident
from the data presented in both tables. Table 3.1 presents coverage
figures for the 154 Fortune 1000 firms for whom coverage data were
available from the 1972 Conference Board Survey, and for both 1977
and 1987 from the 1987 Hirsch survey conducted for this project. While
intertemporal changes are not measured precisely due to differences
in the periods and the nature of the surveys, the magnitude of the changes
in sample means is large. Union coverage among these relatively large
companies is estimated to have declined from 41.6 percent in 1972,
to 34.9 percent in 1977, and to 28.3 percent in 1987. A comparable
trend over the last decade is evident for the 452 firms in the Hirsch
survey (table 3.2, columns (2) and (3)): coverage declines from 30.5
percent in 1977 to 25.0 percent in 1987. In fact, union coverage declined
in 19 out of the 20 industry categories, the exception being electrical
equipment and supplies, where coverage remained roughly constant at
a low level of about 7 percent. Union coverage is lower among firms
in this larger sample than in the 154-firm sample because the Hirsch
survey included firms outside the Fortune 1000, among whom zero union
coverage was not uncommon.
The reliability of the estimated intertemporal change in union coverage
cannot be known with certainty. Differences between the 1972 and 1977
figures arise not only because of changes in coverage over time, but
also because the data are derived from different surveys, the 1977 figures
were reported in 1987, and the 1972 figures were converted from a
measure of coverage among production workers to a measure of coverage
among total workers. The 1977 and 1987 figures are more comparable
in that they derive from the same survey and responses were provided

Table 3.1
Company Union Coverage Figures by Industry: 1972, 1977, and 1987
n
Total
Food & kindred products
Textiles & apparel
Chemicals, excluding drugs
Drugs & medical instruments
Petroleum refining
Rubber & miscellaneous plastics
Stone, clay, & glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Engines, farm & const, equip.
Office, computers, & acct. equip.
Other machinery, not electric
Electrical equipment & supplies
Communication equipment
Motor vehicle and transp. equip.
Aircraft & aerospace
Professional & scientific equip.
Lumber, wood, & paper
Misc. manuf. & conglomerates

154
12
6
18
8
12
4
5
10
3
10
7
7
6
9
13
3
5
7
9

COV-72
s.d.
mean
41.6
45.1
11.8
41.0
9.1
32.0
50.1
43.4
72.6
58.1
61.9
8.0
27.2
29.7
60.3
63.2
12.8
20.6
47.9
44.3

(27.6)
(19.9)
(25.9)
(15.1)
(13.3)
(19.3)
(18.4)
(35.6)
(18.0)
(26.7)
(10.7)
(10.0)
(20.1)
(33.1)
(15.6)
(26.3)
(14.3)
(28.3)
(30.9)
(26.4)

COV-77
s.d.
mean
34.9
45.7
5.3
30.6
12.7
18.5
33.8
25.9
67.6
41.0
42.0
8.2
26.1
20.6
54.9
51.4
32.5
29.0
46.4
37.5

(24.9)
(22.0)
(9.1)
(16.4)
(13.9)
(9.9)
(17.4)
(22.5)
(18.8)
(29.5)
(15.6)
(9.7)
(18.9)
(24.8)
(16.0)
(21.7)
(33.5)
(39.7)
(31.6)
(20.7)

COV-87
s.d.
mean
28.3
39.2
4.4
21.7
10.1
11.6
30.2
16.7
63.2
33.7
31.1
5.2
21.6
16.3
36.5
47.5
20.2
23.0
45.9
30.5

(23.8)
(20.1)
(9.6)
(13.4)
(10.6)
(8.1)
(20.2)
(15.4)
(23.2)
(27.4)
(15.7)
(8.0)
(25.6)
(22.0)
(21-2)
(26.7)
(16.4)
(32.7)
(21.2)
(17.2)

NOTE: The sample is comprised of 154 companies responding in both the Hirsch survey for 1977 and 1987, and the Conference Board Survey for
1972. The surveys are described in the text.
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Table 3.2
Figures by Industry: 1977 and 1987
Coverage
Union
Company
n
Total
Food & kindred products
Textiles & apparel
Chemicals, excluding drugs
Drugs & medical instruments
Petroleum refining
Rubber & miscellaneous plastics
Stone, clay, & glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Engines, farm & const, equip.
Office, computers, & acct. equip.
Other machinery, not electric
Electrical equipment & supplies
Communication equipment
Motor vehicle and transp. equip.
Aircraft & aerospace
Professional & scientific equip.
Lumber, wood, & paper
Misc. manuf. & conglomerates

632
60
31
37
34
27
24
24
40
33
26
21
43
43
26
39
11
28
44
41

UN (1977)
mean
(1)
32.7
42.0
24.2
27.9
15.6
29.8
37.0
45.1
61.5
31.9
36.0
4.4
34.9
8.5
43.9
48.9
27.2
10.8
36.6
33.2

s.d.
(27.3)
(26.6)
(28.5)
(18.3)
(18.4)
(18.2)
(24.9)
(24.0)
(20.0)
(28.9)
(21.5)
(7.4)
(26.7)
(16.7)
(23.7)
(25.3)
(23.0)
(22.1)
(29.8)
(25.1)

it
452
39
19
30
27
25
14
17
20
23
21
18
30
38
18
28
9
21
30
25

COV-77
mean
(2)
30.5
44.8
18.9
29.7
16.5
29.7
32.4
41.6
67.7
27.3
31.3
4.7
29.5
6.9
43.8
47.0
31.0
11.4
36.0
34.2

s.d.
(27.8)
(29.2)
(27.7)
(18.6)
(19.6)
(18.3)
(26.8)
(27.3)
(19.7)
(30.4)
(21.3)
(7.9)
(26.6)
(15.5)
(22.5)
(27.1)
(23.9)
(23.9)
(29.6)
(26.1)

COV-87
s.d.
mean
(3)
25.0
40.1
15.5
23.0
10.4
21.9
27.9
35.5
62.1
20.7
23.0
2.4
21.1
7.0
32.6
38.0
18.4
10.7
33.2
30.3

(25.3)
(27.9)
(22.8)
(17.4)
(15.6)
(17.0)
(26.8)
(26.5)
(23.2)
(22.1)
(17.8)
(5.6)
(23.0)
(16.2)
(20.7)
(26.1)
(19.0)
(21.2)
(26.5)
(25.6)

NOTE: Columns reporting COV-77 and COV-87 are for the sample of 452 companies reporting both 1977 and 1987 union coverage in the Hirsch
survey. UN represents estimated union coverage in 1977 for 632 firms providing information in either the Hirsch or Conference Board surveys. Con
struction of UN is described in the text.
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by the same person for both years. Many firms, however, did not have
records of 1977 union coverage, and the reliability of the respondents©
estimates for 1977 cannot be directly ascertained.
Confidence in the reported union coverage figures is enhanced by
comparison with other available figures. Mean union coverage in 1977
for the full 632-firm sample is estimated to be 32.7 percent. For the
452-firm Hirsch survey sample, the corresponding figure is 30.5 per
cent, while for the smaller 154-firm sample for which data from both
surveys are available, union coverage is estimated to be 34.9 percent.
These figures can be compared to the figure of 36.8 percent coverage
among eligible workers in all manufacturing, based on union member
ship data from the 1976-1978 May Current Population Surveys (Kokkelenberg and Sockell 1985, table 4). Calculated union density among
all would be about 2 percentage points lower, or 35 percent (see Curme,
Hirsch, and Macpherson 1990, p. 9). Estimated 1987 union coverage
among the 452 firms in the Hirsch survey is 25.0 percent. This is very
close to the 25.8 percent figure reported by CPA firm Grant Thornton
in a 1987 survey of manufacturing firms (Wall Street Journal, 5-31-88,
p. 1), and the 24.7 percent coverage figure among manufacturing
employees derived from the 1987 CPS household surveys (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 1989, table 684).
Interindustry and intraindustry variation in firm-level union coverage
is substantial. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide means and standard devia
tions of coverage by 2-digit manufacturing industry; we focus on table
3.2, where sample sizes within industry categories are largest. 6 Disper
sion of firm union coverage is large within most broad industry
categories. In fact, in 1987 there was at least one firm in every industry
category with zero union coverage (there were two industry categories
with no nonunion companies in 1977). The substantial intraindustry
variation in unionization supports the proposition that measurement of
union coverage at the firm level is essential for obtaining reliable
estimates of union effects on firm performance.
The least highly organized industry categories are office, computers,
and accounting equipment; electrical equipment and supplies; profes
sional and scientific equipment; and drugs and medical instruments.
Although union coverage among firms in these industries is relatively low
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and declining, unionization among firms in most industries remains
substantial. Average coverage among all firms in 1987 was 25.0 per
cent; coverage figures among production workers only are substantial
ly higher. 7 Unionization remains widely prevalent among firms in the
primary metals (62.1 percent), food and kindred products (40.1 per
cent), and motor vehicle and transportation equipment (38.0 percent)
industries. Declines in firm union coverage between 1977 and 1987 were
particularly large in the aircraft and aerospace, communication equip
ment, motor vehicle and transportation equipment, and engines, farm,
and construction equipment industries.
Based on these data, it is tempting to draw inferences regarding causes
of union decline over this period. We make no such attempt at this point.
The results of the firm-level surveys on union coverage, summarized
in tables 3.1 and 3.2, do illustrate two points, however. First, substan
tial intraindustry variation in union coverage make it essential to use
firm-level coverage measures in econometric analyses of union effects.
Second, the large differences in average unionization across industry
categories makes it necessary to carefully control for a broad array of
industry measures in estimating union effects on firm performance. 8

Construction of the Data Set
Empirical analysis in this monograph matches the firm-level union
survey information discussed previously with firm- and industry-specific
financial, investment, and production data. The R&D Master File, com
prised of publicly traded manufacturing sector companies operating in
1976, was constructed at the National Bureau of Economic Research
and Harvard University and matches company data from Compustat
with U.S. patents data from the Office of Technology Assessment and
Forecasting.9 Compustat, which is produced by Standard & Poor©s (S&P)
Compustat Services, Inc., provides computer-readable "libraries" of
financial, statistical, and market information covering several thousand
industrial and nonindustrial companies. Information is obtained from
10-K reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, com
pany reports to shareholders, other S&P publications, telephone contacts,
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and stock market information services. The R&D Master File utilizes
information from various industrial Compustat files.
The R&D Master File provides panel data for companies for the years
1958 through 1980. Because missing data increase as one moves away
from 1976 and no time-series union coverage is available, subsequent
analysis focuses on the years 1968-1980. The data file contains relatively
complete reporting of company market value, accounting rates of return,
gross and net plant, and the book value of debt; less complete report
ing of R&D investment and patents; and relatively incomplete report
ing of advertising expenditures and labor compensation.
Industry data on shipments, capital intensity, payroll, and the ratio
of production to total employees are obtained from the Bureau of In
dustrial Economics tape consolidating data from the Annual Survey of
Manufactures. Data on industry concentration (adjusted for imports and
regional concentration), as well as import penetration, were available
for 1972 and 1977 in data assembled by Weiss and Pascoe (1986). In
dustry data are matched to the firm at the 2-, 3-, or 4-digit levels, bas
ed on the Compustat SIC-code variable designating the firm©s principal
industry in 1976.
Data Appendix 1 presents means and standard deviations for several
variables of interest from the data set, cross-tabulated by union status.
The data are presented separately for the full sample of 632 firms over
the 13-year period 1968-1980, and for firms divided into similarly siz
ed groups of nonunion (UN = 0), "low" coverage (0<UN<.30),
"medium" coverage (.30 < UN < .60), and "high" coverage (UN> .60)
companies. Total sample sizes given are significantly less than 13 times
632 owing to missing data. The substantial differences in firm-level and
industry-level performance between union and nonunion companies
evinced by the variable means make detailed empirical analysis of union
impacts on performance essential. Subsequent chapters examine in detail
the relationship of company-level union coverage with profitability,
market value, investment behavior, productivity, and productivity growth
during the 1970s.
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NOTES
1. Notable exceptions are Clark (1984), who uses the PIMS Database on lines of business, and
single-industry studies of the cement (Clark 1980a; 1980b) and construction (Alien 1986; 1987)
industries. Citations to more recent studies are in Addison and Hirsch (1989), Hirsch (1991),
and elsewhere in the text.
2. The BLS currently collects information on contracts covering a thousand or more workers;
prior to 1981, information was collected for contracts covering 500 or more workers. The Bureau
of National Affairs (BNA) collects similar data, including smaller contracts, although these data
are proprietary (but see Abowd 1989b). The name of the business on the contract must be match
ed to the firm name of the parent company, however, since there are no firm-level identifier codes
attached to the contract information. Moreover, multiemployer contracts do not provide informa
tion on covered workers by firm.
3. The R&D Master File is described later in the chapter.
4. Coverage data were collected for additional firms following completion of the empirical work
and initial draft of this manuscript. These data are utilized in subsequent research (Hirsch 1991,
forthcoming).
5. Subsequent empirical analysis in chapters 4-6 rely on the largest possible samples of firms.
When samples are restricted only to those firms for whom a direct 1977 union coverage response
is provided in the Hirsch survey, most results are highly similar to those shown.
6. The industry categories, previously utilized in the R&D Master File, are taken from Body and
Jaffe (no date). Although highly similar, they do not correspond exactly to a 2-digit SIC
classification.
7. The survey conducted for this monograph also asked for the percentage of a company©s pro
duction workforce covered by collective bargaining agreements. Responses to this question were
less complete and reliable than responses to the coverage question applying to a company©s entire
workforce.
8. Subsequent analysis bears out these points. When only an industry measure of union coverage
is included in regression models, its coefficient is highly sensitive to specification. When detailed
industry control variables are included, its coefficient is close to zero. When few industries are
included, their coefficient is often quite large (in absolute value). Because firms are matched only
to their primary industry and the industry codes from the Compustat and the CPS cannot be match
ed precisely, there exists far greater measurement error in the industry than in the firm union
coverage measure.
9. Documentation on the R&D Master File is provided in Cummins et al. (1985) and Body and
Jaffe (no date). The data were kindly made available by Zvi Griliches.

Labor Unions and Firm Profitability
Union compensation gains can be expected to lower firm profitabili
ty, unless they are offset by productivity enhancements in the workplace
or higher prices in the product market. Lower profitability will be
reflected in decreased current earnings and measured rates of return
on capital, and in a lower market valuation of the firm©s assets, thus
decreasing Tobin©s q (market value divided by the replacement cost of
physical capital) and other market valuation measures.
Profit-maximizing responses by firms to cost differentials should limit
the magnitude of differences in profitability between union and non
union companies in the very long run. Profit differentials will be reduced
through the movement of resources out of union into nonunion sectors.
That is, investment in and by union operations will decrease until posttax (i.e., post-union) rates of return are equivalent to nonunion rates
of return or, stated alternatively, union coverage will be restricted to
economic sectors realizing above-normal pre-union rates of return.
Because the quasi-rents accruing to long-lived capital may provide a
principal source for union gains and complete long-run adjustments occur
slowly, we are likely to observe differences in profitability at any point
in time. 1
This chapter briefly reviews previous studies examining union effects
on profitability. The data set assembled for this study is then employed
to examine union-nonunion differences in profitability. In addition to
estimating the overall differential, we examine differences in union ef
fects across industries and over time, and explore the possible sources
from which unions capture profits. Conclusions and interpretation of
the results follow.
Previous empirical analyses find unionization (or unanticipated union
contract gains) to be associated with significantly lower profitability,
although studies differ in their conclusions regarding the magnitude and
source of union gains. 2 Studies using aggregate industry data (e.g.,
35
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Freeman 1983; Karier 1985; Voos and Mishel 1986; and Domowitz,
Hubbard, and Petersen 1986) typically employ as their dependent
variable the industry price-cost margin, PCM, defined by [(Total
Revenue - Variable Costs) / Total Revenue] and typically measured by
[(Value Added - Payroll - Advertising) / Shipments]. Line of business
and some firm-level studies have used accounting profit rate measures:
the rate of return on sales, TTS , measured by earnings divided by sales,
and the rate of return on capital, Kk , measured by earnings divided by
the value of the capital stock (e.g., Clark 1984; Hirsch and Connolly
1987; Hirsch 1990b).
Firm-level analyses of publicly traded firms (e.g., Salinger 1984; Con
nolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey 1986; Hirsch and Connolly 1987; Hirsch
1990b) have used market value measures of profitability, a common
measure being Tobin©s q, defined as firm market value divided by the
replacement cost of assets. Finally, there have been several "event"
studies in which changes in market value attributable to union represen
tation elections or unanticipated changes in collective bargaining
agreements have been examined (e.g., Ruback and Zimmerman 1984;
Bronars and Deere £990; Becker 1987; and Abowd 1989b). 3
The conclusion that unionization is associated with lower profitabili
ty holds for studies using industries, firms, or lines of business as the
unit of observation; for models where the profitability measures are
industry price-cost margins, firm rates of return to capital or sales,
Tobin©s-^ or other market value measures, or stock market value changes
in response to union "events"; for simultaneous equation as well as
single equation models; and regardless of the time period under study.
Despite the consensus that profitability is lower in unionized settings,
there is disagreement as to the magnitude of the profit reduction and
the sources from which union gains obtain. Economists are understand
ably skeptical that large profit differentials can survive in a competitive
economy, notwithstanding the sizable union-nonunion profit differences
found in the empirical literature, and possible econometric biases causing
union effects to be understated. There are several potential biases that
work to bias toward zero the estimated union effect. First, profit func
tions are estimated only for surviving firms since those for whom union
effects are most deleterious may be less likely to remain in the sample.
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Second, unions are more likely to be organized where potential profits
are higher; hence, the negative union effect on profits may be
underestimated in empirical work where union density is treated as ex
ogenous (see Voos and Mishel 1986). Finally, in firm-level studies us
ing an industry-level union density variable, measurement error is likely
to bias the union coefficient toward zero. On the other hand, the
magnitude of the estimated union-nonunion profit differential is often
sensitive to specification. Omission of factors positively correlated with
union coverage and negatively correlated with profitability will bias the
union profit estimate in the opposite direction
Less attention has been given to the sources from which unions ap
propriate rents (see Addison and Hirsch 1989). Several studies con
clude that unions reduce profits primarily in highly concentrated in
dustries, and that monopoly power provides the primary source for union
compensation gains (e.g., Freeman 1983; Salinger 1984; Karier 1985),
whereas Clark (1984) finds that unions reduce profits only among
businesses with low market shares. Hirsch and Connolly (1987) seriously
question both sets of findings. They find neither product nor labor market
evidence to support the hypothesis that profits associated with industry
concentration provide a source for union rents (see also Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen 1986). Rather, they argue that returns from firmspecific market shares, R&D capital, and weak foreign competition are
more likely sources for union gains. Hirsch (1990b), using a data set
with a firm-specific union coverage measure, even more clearly rejects
the hypothesis that concentration-related profits provide a source for
union rents.

Union Effects on Profitability: Specification
and Full-Sample Results
In this chapter, both accounting and market value measures of prof
itability are examined. Accounting profit rates, measuring realized an
nual earnings relative to a sales or asset base, are historical and readily
available from financial reports. By contrast, market value measures
are forward-looking, reflect expected performance over time rather than
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accounting performance for a single period, measure risk-adjusted
returns, and are less likely to be affected by differences in accounting
procedures across firms.
Prior to presentation of regression model results, differences in firmlevel profit measures, cross-tabulated by union status, warrant men
tion. Data Appendix 1 presents means of Tobin©s q and the rate of return
on capital, irk , for the full sample of firms over the 13-year period
1968-1980, and for firms divided into similar-sized groups of non
union (UN = 0), low-coverage (0<UN<.30), medium-coverage
(.30<UN<.60), and high-coverage (UN>.60) companies. Market
valuation of firm assets, as measured by Tobin©s q, drops sharply with
respect to union coverage, particularly as one moves from the non
union to low-union sample of companies (mean q equals 2.34, 1.41,
0.99, and 0.88 for the four union categories, respectively). The sug
gestion is that even a low level of coverage significantly reduces in
vestors© expectations of future earnings. Likewise, the rate of return
on capital, vk, decreases continuously with respect to union coverage.
And in results not presented, gross rates of return on equity, ire, defined
as gross cash flows divided by equity value, do not vary systematically
with union coverage (ire is 0.18, 0.22, 0.20, and 0.21 in the nonunion
through high-union categories, respectively). This is to be expected since
equity values adjust to differences in expected earnings; that is, if union
firms have lower earnings, equity value falls until ire is similar for
union and nonunion firms. 4
Profitability equations using the natural logarithm of Tobin©s q and
the rate of return on capital as dependent variables are estimated. A
general form of the profit function is:
(4.1) TT,, = EfcXtt, + ZtyUN

Zjit + eit,

where TT,, is the profitability of firm i in year t, measured alternatively
by log(<?) and irk; X includes k firm- and industry-specific variables (in
cluding the constant one) that affect profitability directly; (3k are the
coefficients attaching to X; and eit is a random error term assumed (for
now) to have zero mean and constant variance. Z is a subset of X and
includes j firm- and industry-specific variables (including the constant
one) that affect profitability in conjunction with unionization of the firm,
UN, while \j/j are the coefficients attaching to UN • Z. 5
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Company profits arise from differences between revenues and costs;
thus, measurable firm and industry characteristics that affect either
revenues or costs may have an impact on profitability. In a competitive
market, economic profits will tend toward zero in the long run, while
large interfirm differences in risk-adjusted profitability at any point in
time may signal disequilibrium. Therefore, some portion of the varia
tion in profitability will be associated with differences in firm- and
industry-specific sales growth rates, which proxy, in part, disequilibriumrelated profits. Because profitability measures reflect accounting as well
as economic profits, measured profitability also will differ with respect
to company stocks of physical capital, innovative capital (proxied by
the R&D stock), and other forms of intangible capital (good will, loca
tion, etc.). That is, much of what is measured as profits reflects the
normal return to investment and special factors of production.
Market structure may influence price, revenues, and the profitabili
ty of firms. Therefore, variables proxying the degree of competition
(e.g., industry concentration and import penetration) are included in
profit equations. No direct measure of firms© market shares is available
for firms in the sample (but see Hirsch 1990b). Union effects on prof
itability may also differ with respect to market structure; therefore, in
teraction terms between union coverage and market structure variables
warrant examination. Empirical analyses must control as well for size
differences among firms, since size may have an impact on costs, or
reflect realized efficiencies in the marketplace. Likewise, a union©s
bargaining power and ability to capture rents may differ systematically
with firm size.
The effects of union coverage on profitability should be reflected
primarily in the form of union-nonunion differences in wage rates. In
subsequent empirical work, we do not directly measure differences in
labor costs facing firms but, rather, include a union coverage variable
to reflect these cost differences. 6 In the absence of firm-level union
coverage or the threat of union organizing, quality-adjusted wage rates
should be similar across firms, although there will be real differences
owing to differences across areas in labor market conditions, cost of
living, taxes, and the like. Stronger support can be furnished for the
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contention that companies face similar capital prices at any point in time,
since new capital and investment funds are relatively mobile. Because
factor price differences are not readily measurable, they are not included
directly in our profitability equations.
The inclusion of firm and industry union coverage variables is ex
pected to capture important differences in labor costs and the threat of
union organizing, respectively. Year dummies capture factor price dif
ferences uniformly impacting all firms over time, while industry dum
mies capture differences uniformly affecting all firms in a broadly defined
industry group. Estimated union coefficients will be biased due to the
omission of factor prices only to the extent that factor price differences
not resulting from union coverage differences are in fact correlated with
the error term in the profit equation. The existence or direction of such
bias cannot be determined a priori.
Initially, a simple specification of eq. (4.1), including only a con
stant in Z, is estimated. That is, firm unionization, UN, is included in
eq. (4.1) as a separate variable, and not in interaction with variables
in Z. Among the variables to be included in X are measures of firm
size, capital intensity, the R&D stock, firm sales growth, industry con
centration, foreign competition, industry sales growth, and dummies
for industry and year. Specific variables will be described as empirical
results are discussed. Data Appendix 2 provides definitions for all
variables used in the profitability regressions.
Unionization is measured in 1977 both at the firm (UN) and industry
(I-UN) levels, and is assumed fixed over the period. To be examined
subsequently are interactions of UN with variables in Z, interindustry
differences in union profit effects, changes over time in unionism©s ef
fects, models accounting for varying levels of industry controls, and
models correcting for serial correlation of error terms within firms across
years. Two important possibilities omitted variable bias associated with
firm fixed effects and simultaneity bias between unionization and
profitability are examined subsequently in a less satisfactory manner.
Initial time-series/cross-section regression results using the entire
1968-1980 panel, with the log of Tobin©s q and the rate of return on
capital (TT^) as dependent variables, are presented in table 4.1. Com
plete data are available for 572 firms in 1976, with a smaller number

Table 4.1
Profitability Regression Results
Dependent variable - irk

Dependent variable - log(^)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(10

(20

(30

(40

-0.626
(15.06)

-0.509
(12.88)

-0.493
(15.87)

-0.034
(11.90)

-0.027
(9.53)

-0.035
(14.98)

0.676
(7.97)
~

0.182
(2.12)

-0.555
(17.13)
--

-0.009
(1-61)

-0.031
(4.95)

-0.033
(13.74)
~

0.707
(9.47)

0.185
(2.22)

-0.015
(2.74)

-0.034
(5.34)

0.019
(2.98)

0.031
(5.15)

0.015
(3.02)

0.023
(4.68)

-0.001
(1-73)

-0.000
(0.36)

-0.001
(2.70)

-0.000
(1.32)

log (K/L)

-0.035
(2.36)

0.010
(0.53)

-0.054
(4.79)

-0.058
(3.87)

-0.003
(2.80)

-0.003
(2.17)

-0.005
(5.89)

-0.008
(7.32)

GROWTH

0.032
(1.05)

0.049
(1.80)

0.008
(0.42)

0.008
(0.45)

0.009
(4.34)

0.009
(4.72)

0.006
(4.63)

0.006
(4.61)

I-GROWTH

1.598
(8.50)

0.844
(4.71)

1.867
(12.19)

1.301
(8.74)

0.102
(7.89)

0.065
(5.03)

0.128
(11.41)

0.103
(9.08)

Variable
UN
R&D-STK/S
R&D-STK/S681
log(L)

I-CR4
I-DOMSH

0.423
(7.06)
0.376
(2.45)

0.064
(0.95)

0.563
(12.16)

0.380
(7.09)

0.021
(5.05)

0.004
(0.90)

0.029
(8.62)

0.021
(5.11)

0.087
(0.56)

0.283
(2.25)

0.058
(0.44)

0.011
(1.03)

-0.003
(0.30)

0.012
(1.31)

-0.003
(0.34)
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Dependent variable - irk

Dependent variable - log(^)
Variable
I-UN
IND
YEAR
R2
n

(20

(30

(40

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(10

-0.428
(5.95)
no

-0.012
(0.11)

-0.497
(9.03)
no

-0.176
(2.15)

-0.006
(1.22)
no

0.031
(4.11)
yes

-0.008
(2.02)
no

yes

yes
0.480
6,248

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes

0.132
4,248

0.225
4,248

0.149
6,236

0.217
6,236

yes

yes
yes

0.332
4,257

0.468
4,257

0.382
6,248

yes

0.014
(2.16)

NOTES: | t | in parentheses. Below are coefficients (1 1 \ ) obtained substituting union dummies for UN in equations (4) and (4©), with nonunion the omit
ted reference group and where UN-LOW=1 if (0<UN<.30); UN-MED = 1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UN-HIGH = 1 if (UN>.60).
(4): -0.217 UN-LOW - 0.3% UN-MED - 0.371 UN-HIGH.
(14.85)
(16.92)
(9.68)
(4X): -0.015 UN-LOW - 0.028 UN-MED - 0.026 UN-HIGH.
(13.65)
(15.52)
(9.01)
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of observations in earlier and later years. Total sample sizes are 6,248
for the log(<7) equations and 6,236 for the irk equations. Attention is
focused on the coefficients on the time-invariant variable (UN) measuring
the proportion of workers covered by a collective bargaining contract
in the firm in 1977. In regression results not presented, the estimated
effects of unionization on a profitability variable measuring the rate of
return to sales are found to be generally similar to those found for irk.
Regression results presented in table 4.1 include specifications with
and without 2-digit industry dummies and for two samples of firms (see
below). Coefficients and f-ratios are presented in a table note for a
specification omitting UN, but instead including union dummies for lowunion (firms with coverage less than .30), middle-union (with coverage
from .30 to .60), and high-union (with coverage .60 or greater) com
panies. Nonunion is the omitted reference group. Year dummies are
included in all specifications.
Sample sizes are limited owing to missing data on annual R&D ex
penditures and the R&D stock, particularly for the earlier years. No
distinction can be made in the data set between missing and zero R&D
(see Bound et al. (1984) on this issue). For the analysis in this chapter,
we have constructed a predicted R&D stock intensity variable, (R&DSTK/S)est, equal to the actual value for those firms with reported
values, and equal to the predicted value for companies without such
data but with information on its patent stock. The predicted R&D stock
intensity variable is calculated based on coefficient estimates from an
auxiliary regression of R&D-STK/S on linear, squared, and cubed
variables measuring the patent stock divided by deflated sales, plus year
and industry dummies. The regression had a sample size of 4,547 and
R2 of 0.42. Regression results are presented both for the larger sample
sizes using actual and predicted values of the R&D-STK/S stock inten
sity variable (columns (3), (4), (30, and (40), and for smaller sample
sizes wherein R&D-STK/S measures firms© actual stocks (columns (1),
(2), (I 7), and (20). 7 The R&D stock is divided by S rather than by the
physical capital stock, since the latter is included in q and thus might
lead to coefficient bias owing to mismeasured capital on both sides of
the equation.
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Prior to examining union effects, the relationship of profitability with
other variables in table 4.1 is noted. R&D intensity, measured by the
estimated real R&D stock divided by (constant dollar) sales, has a
positive and significant impact on market value, but is negatively related
to the current accounting profit rate. This apparent anomaly may result
because current R&D expenditures (which are highly correlated with
the R&D stock measured here) lower current earnings, but raise ex
pected future earnings and the market value of the firm. Previous studies
have found a negative relationship between accounting profits and R&D
divided by sales (Ravenscraft 1983). The R&D-STK/S coefficient is
highly sensitive to inclusion of the industry dummies, but relatively in
sensitive to sample. The log of the capital-labor ratio is included as a
control variable in the profitability equations. It is negatively related
to q and irk, indicating decreasing marginal returns to capital or
measurement error in the capital stock variable. 8
Profitability measure Trk is not found to be significantly related to
company size, as measured by log(L), while Tobin©s q is found to in
crease moderately with respect to size, ceteris paribus. Firm-specific
two-year growth rates in sales are found to be positively related to cur
rent accounting profits, but not to the market valuation of the firm©s
assets, after accounting for other determinants of q. 9 We also considered
the relationship between advertising and profitability. In work not shown,
an advertising intensity variable, ADV/S, is positively and significant
ly related to profitability in regressions excluding industry dummies,
but less significant in regressions including industry dummies. To avoid
a significant reduction in sample size, advertising is not considered in
empirical work presented in the monograph.
Industry-level variables are also found to affect firm profitability.
I-GROWTH, the annualized growth rate in real industry sales between
years t and t-4, is positively and significantly related to all profit rate
measures, even after accounting for firm-specific sales growth. The in
dustry concentration ratio (I-CR4), measuring the percentage of sales
accounted for by the four largest firms in the assigned industry, is
positively and significantly related to both profitability measures. The
share of U.S. firms in domestic sales, I-DOMSH, is positively related
to profitability measures when industry controls are excluded, but this
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relationship is not significant in specifications with industry controls
(20 dummies to account for 21 industry categories). Industry dummy
variables capture any otherwise unmeasured differences in profit deter
minants that vary systematically across broad industry categories. Their
inclusion in the profit equations also can be argued on statistical grounds;
the industry dummies are jointly significant by all standard criteria. 10
We now turn to results on the firm-level union coverage variable,
UN. By any measure, union firms have significantly lower market valua
tion and profit rates than similar nonunion firms, although the magnitude
of the estimated differentials displays some sensitivity to specification.
Comparing nonunion to union firms with 42.3 percent coverage (cor
responding to mean coverage among unionized companies), coefficient
estimates from specifications (4) and (4;) indicate that q and irk are
lower by an average 20 and 14 percent, respectively, in union firms
than in nonunion firms. 11 The magnitude of the estimated union profit
effect is even larger when 2-digit industry dummies are excluded, sug
gesting that union coverage is higher among firms in less profitable in
dustries. Note that this evidence need not be inconsistent with the
theoretical prediction that unions are most likely to organize firms where
there exist above-normal monopoly returns or quasi-rents.
In order to check on the robustness of the estimated union effect,
specifications also were estimated with 105 industry dummy variables,
corresponding to the firms© Compustat SIC codes, provided at the 2-,
3-, and 4-digit SIC levels. Following addition of the dummies, the coef
ficient on UN fell from -0.493 to -0.446 in the log(g) equations, while
remaining constant at -0.033 in the irk equation. Because the union
coefficients are not highly sensitive to inclusion of detailed industry dum
mies, subsequent analysis using industry dummy variables includes only
the 20 dummies corresponding to the broader industry categories.
Of particular interest is the fact that the estimated coefficients on firm
coverage variable, UN, while sensitive to inclusion of the broad in
dustry dummies, are little affected by inclusion of a measure of industry
union coverage, I-UN. This result increases our confidence that we are
in fact capturing firm-level union effects on profitability and not
unmeasured industry-specific effects correlated with unionization. In
dustry union density is negatively related to market value, but positively
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related to current accounting profit rates. Such relationships are con
sistent with high industry union density decreasing industry output, in
creasing product price, and improving current profitability, while at
the same time having a negative effect on the market valuation by in
vestors of firms© assets (due, perhaps, to a greater threat of union organiz
ing). The sensitivity of estimated coefficients on I-UN to sample,
specification, and profitability measure, however, makes us reluctant
to draw any inferences about the relationship between industry coverage
and firm profitability. Moreover, in results not shown, there was ex
treme specification sensitivity of estimated union coefficients when the
CPS-based industry union measure is used as a proxy for firm coverage
(i.e., when I-UN but not UN is included). This reinforces our prior
conclusion that a firm-level measure of union coverage is strongly prefer
red to industry measures.
Union Profitability Effects by Industry and Year
In addition to the pooled time-series/cross-sectional analysis presented
above, the profitability equations are estimated separately by broad in
dustry category and by year. We first examine union-nonunion dif
ferences in profitability within 19 broad 2-digit industry groupings. In
order to facilitate presentation, three broad industry groupings
miscellaneous consumer goods, miscellaneous manufacturing not
elsewhere classified, and conglomerates have been combined into a
single industry grouping. To the best of our knowledge, industry dif
ferences in union profit effects have not been examined prior to this
project (for related analysis, see Hirsch 1991).
Table 4.2 provides estimates of the union coverage coefficients from
log(<7) and wk regressions, using as alternative coverage measures the
proportion of a company©s workforce covered by collective bargaining
agreements, UN, and a union coverage dummy variable, UN-DUM,
equal to one if UN >. 10 and 0 otherwise. The alternative measures are
used because sample sizes of firms and variability in union coverage
are limited within some industry groupings. Because estimated union
effects proved sensitive to the union measure in some cases, alternative

Table 4.2
Union Profitability Effects by Industry, 1968-1980
log(irfc) equations

log(g) equations

Ul

n

UN

|/|

-0.226

(12.39)

6236

-0.033

(13.74)

-0.017

(12.26)

(2.78)
(1.90)
(8.07)
(2.45)
(0.49)

-0.197
-0.049
-0.499
-0.262
-0.032

(3.56)
(0.79)
(5.99)
(3.41)
(0.55)

597
293
423
349
286

-0.029
-0.028
-0.054
-0.049
-0.034

(4.56)
(3.87)
(5.99)
(3.01)
(4.18)

-0.027
-0.008
-0.040
-0.017
-0.010

(5.98)
(1.82)
(7.59)
(2.96)
(2.50)

-1.063
-0.059
-0.713
0.068
0.048

(7.67)
(0.54)
(6.61)
(0.55)
(0.26)

-0.417
-0.200
-0.309
-0.001
-0.037

(4.32)
(2.09)
(2.49)
(0.01)
(0.36)

225
239
436
320
273

-0.048
-0.031
-0.036
-0.007
0.026

(5.41)
(4.85)
(4.90)
(0.88)
(1.96)

-0.004
-0.034
-0.021
-0.013
-0.007

(0.71)
(6.27)
(2.58)
(2.49)
(1.01)

177
412
414
276
403

-3.723
-0.865
-0.187
-0.525
-0.709

(5.24)
(9.25)
(0.85)
(3.37)
(6.46)

-0.478
-0.630
0.085
-0.523
-0.280

(3.48)
(10.78)
(1.17)
(4.94)
(3.68)

111
409
412
276
401

-0.050
-0.057
-0.050
-0.012
-0.041

(0.84)
(6.82)
(2.50)
(1.07)
(4.06)

0.005
-0.051
-0.007
-0.004
-0.008

(0.47)
(9.91)
(1.08)
(0.46)
(1.16)

119
213
431
359

-0.007
-1.016
-0.778
-0.335

(0.07)
(3.51)
(7.58)
(3.34)

0.078
-0.382
-0.428
-0.032

(1.47)
(2.95)
(7.66)
(0.50)

119
213
429
359

-0.006
-0.043
-0.056
0.007

(0.41)
(2.63)
(5.51)
(0.97)

0.004
-0.018
-0.035
0.013

(0.50)
(2.44)
(6.45)
(2.84)

n

UN

\t\

6,248

-0.493

(15.87)

Food & kindred products
Textiles & apparel
Chemicals, excluding drugs
Drugs & medical instruments
Petroleum refining

597
293
423
350
286

-0.213
-0.199
-1.103
-0.544
0.061

Rubber & miscellaneous plastics
Stone, clay & glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Engines, farm & const, equip.

225
239
437
320
274

Office, computers & acct. equip.
Other machinery, not electric
Electrical equip. & supplies
Communication equipment
Motor vehicle & trans. equip.
Aircraft & aerospace
Professional & scientific equip.
Lumber, wood & paper
Misc. manufac. & conglomerates

Industry
All manufacturing

UN-DUM

UN-DUM

I©l

NOTE: Control variables in industry-specific regressions include R&D-STK/Sest, log(L), log(A7L), GROWTH, I-GROWTH, I-CR4, I-DOMSH, and
year dummies. The all-manufacturing regression also includes I-UN. The variable UN-DUM = 1 if UN>. 10.
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estimates are presented. The top row of table 4.2 presents union coef
ficient estimates for the entire sample, taken from regressions including
both 2-digit industry dummies and industry union density, I-UN. The
remainder of the table presents estimated union effects by industry group
ing, based on regressions with firm and industry control variables, but
not industry dummies or industry union density (the latter varied little
across firms within some of the industry categories).
The results reveal substantial variability among industries in the im
pact of unions on firm profitability. We ignore the results for mis
cellaneous manufacturing goods and conglomerates (the bottom row),
since firms within that category differ so extensively that comparisons
have little meaning. No evidence is found for sizable or significant
positive effects of unionization on profitability in any of the industry
categories. There is little evidence, however, of negative union effects
on profitability in the fabricated metal products; engines, farm, and con
struction equipment; electrical equipment; and aircraft and aerospace
industry categories. And in the textile and apparel; petroleum refining;
office, computer, and accounting equipment; and communication equip
ment categories, statistically significant negative effects are found for
one, but not the other, measure of profitability. 12 Evidence of negative
union profit effects is relatively clear-cut in the remaining industries,
with particularly sizable impacts found in chemicals; rubber and plastics;
primary metals; nonelectric machinery; motor vehicles and transporta
tion equipment; professional and scientific equipment; and lumber,
wood, and paper. 13
Although some of the interindustry variability in estimated union profit
effects is due to relatively small sample sizes of companies within broad
industry categories, it is implausible that this is the primary explana
tion for these differences. It is, of course, not surprising that union ef
fects on profitability differ among industries, given that there are substan
tial differences in bargaining power, labor relations, and union effects
on productivity and wages across industries. Unfortunately, it appears
difficult to discern a clear-cut pattern in the estimated union effects.
Many of those factors that might explain differences in union power
industry concentration, import penetration, firm capital intensity, firm
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and industry growth, and the like are already accounted for in the
regressions. And in a set of profitability regressions including the union
variable and year dummies, but not other control variables, estimated
union-nonunion differentials in profitability were not systematically
higher or lower than the estimates presented above where detailed con
trol variables are included. Providing an explanation for the sizable inter
industry differences in union profit effects thus poses an important and
possibly fruitful avenue for future research.
Union-nonunion profitability differences by year are examined next.
The primary advantage of the pooled time-series/cross-section regres
sions used to this point is the substantial increase in sample size and
efficiency associated with pooled analysis. Separate annual regressions,
however, also provide significant advantages. First, separate annual
regressions avoid the statistical problems of positively correlated error
terms (within firms across years) and biased standard errors inherent
in the pooled model. 14 Second, annual regressions can help us apprise
the degree of measurement error in UN. Union coverage is estimated
at a single point in time thus, measurement error should bias downward
its coefficients as one moves away from 1977. Findings to the contrary
would suggest that our 1977 union measure provides a reasonable
measure of coverage over time. Finally, allowing the union coefficient
(as well as others) to vary by year provides evidence as to how unionnonunion differences in profitability have varied over time. Such
evidence is of considerable interest and has not been examined previous
ly. For example, a finding that union-nonunion profitability differences
were decreasing over time might suggest union bargaining power had
weakened and that future contraction in the size of the unionized sector
will slow. By contrast, large or increasing profit differences at the end
of our period might suggest continued financial pressure on firms© union
operations. Alternatively, changes in union profit effects over time can
be interpreted in a macroeconomic context, although such an effort would
be highly speculative.
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the coefficients on the union variable
from the log(#) and -Kk equations, estimated by year. The top line pro
vides estimates from the pooled model, with year dummies (correspond
ing to estimates presented previously in table 4.1, columns (4) and (40).
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The annual estimates are from an identical model, minus the year dum
mies. The estimates from both sets of equations display reasonable stabili
ty across time there is no clearly evident secular pattern in the union
profit effect. 15 The demonstrated intertemporal stability of the estimated
union effects provides support for relying on estimates from the pool
ed models presented in table 4.3.
Interpretation of the annual regression results is not altogether clear.
It appears that union coverage significantly reduces companies© earn
ings and market values, and the magnitude of this detrimental effect
has varied little over time. A reasonable interpretation of this evidence
is that in response to the large and continuing union tax on profits, there
has been a sizable expansion in nonunion operations and a concomitant
decrease in the extent of union coverage among U.S. companies. We
will return to this theme subsequently. There is the suggestion that unionnonunion differences were particularly large during 1972-1973, years
in which stock market values in mean q were also very high. This result
is consistent with a hypothesis of union rent-sharing in which unions
tax profits at a higher rate during good years. Union rent-sharing in
profits also is consistent with the hypothesis of risk-shifting from
stockholders to labor (Decker and Olson 1989).
An alternative interpretation of the annual results is that the union
variable is proxying some other important determinant of profitability,
and that this omitted factor has had a stable effect over time. Although
this latter possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand, it is difficult to
identify what this omitted factor might be. And there is no reason to
expect that the effect of this omitted determinant of profitability would
have had a constant effect over a 13-year period. We would, of course,
have greater confidence in our intertemporal results were union coverage
measured throughout the period, and not just in 1977. 16

Union Rent-Seeking and the Sources of Union Gains
Extant empirical evidence has shown clearly that unionization is
associated with significantly lower profitability among U.S. firms and
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industries. Although there is general agreement that unions reduce prof
its, there is no consensus as to the sources from which unions appropriate
gains. 17 On the one hand, some authors (Freeman 1983; Salinger 1984;
Karier 1985) have contended that monopoly profits associated with in
dustry concentration provide the principal source of union gains, whereas
Clark (1984) has found that unions reduce profits principally among
companies with low market shares. Hirsch and Connolly (1987) have
challenged both sets of results. They soundly reject the notion that in
dustry concentration provides a source for union gains, based both on
the absence of such evidence from their firm-level data set and on labor
market evidence indicating that union-nonunion premiums are, if
anything, somewhat lower in more concentrated industries. They pro
vide evidence suggesting that returns associated with R&D capital,
market share, and, possibly, limited foreign competition, provide more
likely sources for union rents.
The relatively rich data set employed in this study provides a good
opportunity to reexamine these unsettled issues. The general specifica
tion of the profit model, shown as eq. (4.1), provides for inclusion of
variables interacting union coverage with selected explanatory variables.
The interpretation of a coefficient on an interaction variable is that it
measures union-nonunion differences in that variable©s effect on firm
profitability. For example, a positive coefficient on concentration and
a negative coefficient on a union-concentration interaction term would
indicate that industry concentration is associated with higher profitability
in companies with low union coverage, but that concentration contributes
less to profitability as coverage increases. In general, negative coeffi
cients on union interaction variables would be consistent with a union
rent-seeking model in which unions tax some portion of the returns
associated with profit-enhancing characteristics.
We estimate two versions of eq. (4.1), the first in which UN enters
only as a separate variable, and a second in which UN is interacted with
all the right-hand side variables, apart from the 2-digit industry and
year dummies. As stated above, the coefficients on the interaction terms
provide tests as to how the impact of each of the firm and industry deter
minants of profitability differs with the extent of firm-level union
coverage. Although a simple union tax model would predict that union
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firms have flatter profiles relating profitability to all profit-enhancing
firm and industry characteristics, it is likely that unions are more suc
cessful at capturing the returns from some profit determinants than from
others. Hence, union interaction coefficients are allowed to vary freely
across the right-hand side variables. 18
Table 4.4 presents regression results for the log(^) and irk equations.
The first column under each profitability measure (columns (1) and (I©))
presents regression results in which a single union variable, UN, but
not interaction terms are included (these estimates were presented
previously in table 4.1, columns (4) and (4©)). The adjacent columns
present regression results from equations with a full set of interaction
terms. The F statistics presented in these columns test the null hypothesis
that the union slope interactions equal zero; in both cases, the null is
rejected using standard criteria.
First examined is the extent to which industry monopoly power, proxied crudely by industry concentration, increases firm profitability, and
the extent to which these returns are captured by union labor. In a number
of past firm-level studies, industry concentration has not been found
to be a significant determinant of profitability; indeed, it has often been
negatively rather than positively related to profitability (Bothwell,
Cooley, and Hall 1984). 19 In this data set, however, industry concen
tration is positively related to log(#) and irk. The hypothesis that
monopoly profits associated with concentration provide a significant
source of union gains implies that the coefficient on CR should be positive
and that on UN«CR negative. That is, CR would significantly increase
profitability for nonunion companies, but not for highly unionized com
panies since unions would capture a share of the above-normal returns
associated with monopoly power.
For both the log(^) and Trk equations there are large positive coeffi
cients on UN»CR, implying that concentration, if anything, increases
profitability more in highly unionized firms than in nonunion firms.
These findings are consistent with labor market evidence indicating
smaller union-nonunion wage differentials among workers in more con
centrated industries. This is strong evidence against the hypothesis that
monopoly profits associated with industry concentration provide an

Table 4.4
Profitability Regression Results, With and Without Union Interactions

Variable

Dependent variable - log(?)
UN**,X{
Xt
(2)
(1)

xi
(10

§

Dependent variable - *k

xi

UN**,.

0.469
(1.11)

--

-0.033
(13.74)

0.116
(3.57)

-

R&D-STK/Sest

0.185
(2.22)

0.685
(6.51)

-2.646
(7.72)

-0.034
(5.34)

-0.032
(3.99)

-0.017
(0.65)

log(L)

0.023
(4.68)

0.029
(3.90)

0.002
(0.13)

-0.00
(1.32)

-0.001
(2.18)

0.002
(1.76)

-0.058
(3.87)

-0.012
(0.56)

-0.123
(2.71)

-0.008
(7.32)

-0.004
(2.65)

-0.011
(3.12)

GROWTH

0.008
(0.45)

0.034
(1.35)

-0.078
(1.37)

0.006
(4.61)

0.009
(4.90)

-0.010
(2.37)

I-GROWTH

1.301
(8.74)

1.883
(8.99)

-1.837
(4.06)

0.103
(9.08)

0.132
(8.19)

-0.085
(2.46)

I-CR4

0.380
(7.09)

0.163
(1.96)

0.678
(3.91)

0.021
(5.11)

0.011
(1.72)

0.025
(1.87)

log(K/L)

5©

(20

-0.493
(15.87)
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important source for union gains. Rather, it suggests that union-nonunion
profitability differences are most substantial in highly competitive in
dustries. 20
Although no evidence is found to support the hypothesis that labor
unions capture concentration-related profits, evidence does support the
hypothesis that unions capture some share of the improved current earn
ings associated with limited foreign competition. Evidence from the irk
regressions indicates that limited foreign competition (a high domestic
share) is associated with higher earnings in nonunion firms, but not in
highly unionized firms. The weakness of the relationship between log(<?)
and the extent of foreign competition suggests that gains from limited
foreign competition among firms in the manufacturing sector are relative
ly short-lived; despite higher current earnings, investors do not expect
these excess returns to continue indefinitely.
Previous empirical evidence in Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey
(1986), based on a single 1977 sample of Fortune 500 firms, an industrylevel measure of union density, and the use of R&D expenditures as
a proxy for the R&D stock, suggests that the returns to R&D invest
ment provide an important source for union gains. This conclusion was
based on the finding of a negative coefficient on a union-R&D intensi
ty variable in a market valuation equation; that is, R&D investment added
less to the market value of a unionized firm than to an otherwise similar
nonunion firm. 21 The results from estimation of the \og(q) equation here
provide strong support for this hypothesis. The size of a firm©s R&D
stock, divided by sales, adds significantly less to the market value of
a firm as its union coverage increases (as seen by the negative coeffi
cient on UN»R&D-STK/S). These results provide support to the
hypothesis that quasi-rents emanating from a firm©s innovative capital
stock provide an important source for labor union gains. The implica
tions of these findings for subsequent firm investment behavior are ex
plored in the next chapter. As seen previously, a firm©s R&D stock
is not positively or significantly related to current earnings. Although
the union-R&D interaction term is negative in the irk equation, no in
ferences can be made from these results alone. The evidence supports
only the proposition that the current R&D stock produces higher future
earnings, and unions are expected to appropriate some portion of the
returns from these investments.
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In addition to examining the market valuation of R&D capital in union
and nonunion firms, the valuation of a firm©s patent stock is considered.
Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986) suggest that innovative capital
that can be patented or licensed is less likely to have its returns ap
propriated by union labor, since the firm can more easily avoid the union
tax. In order to examine this hypothesis, the variable PAT/S, measur
ing a company©s patent stock (Body and Jaffe, no date) divided by
constant-dollar sales, is added to the profitability equations shown in
table 4.4, separately and in interaction with UN (to conserve space,
these results are not shown). The interaction term should not be negative
if returns from patented innovative capital can be shielded from union
appropriation. Consistent with the finding in Connolly, Hirsch, and
Hirschey, however, the interaction term is neither negative nor signifi
cant, regardless of profitability measure. The absence of a significant
union-patent interaction lends credence to the union rent-seeking model
outlined earlier wherein the union tax rate varies across different types
of tangible and intangible capital.
Union rent-seeking at the expense of returns from long-lived physical
capital leads to the prediction of a negative interaction term between
union coverage and capital intensity, UN»log(#/L). The coefficient on
this interaction term is negative and significant in both the log(#) and
Trk equations. Although these results are consistent with the hypothesis
of union appropriation of the returns from capital, coefficient bias
resulting from measurement error in the net capital stock (which is on
both sides of the equation), and simultaneity between profitability, capital
investment, and unionization, make us reluctant to attach undue weight
to these results. Subsequent evidence in chapter 5, indicating lower an
nual capital investment by unionized firms, however, provides cor
roborative evidence and support for the union tax model.
Strong evidence is found for a negative relationship between profitabili
ty and interactions between unionization and both firm and industry sales
growth. Growth-related profits may represent, in part, quasi-rents and
disequilibrium returns associated with variable product demand. Results
from the irk regressions indicate that unions tax a significant propor
tion of the current earnings emanating from faster firm and industry
sales growth. The results from the log(^) regressions indicate that rapid
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sales growth adds less to the market valuation of union companies than
to otherwise similar nonunion companies, supporting a tax model in
which union appropriation of earnings is sustained over time and lowers
investors© market valuation of the firm. Such results are consistent with,
and may help explain, recent trends indicating simultaneous nonunion
employment growth and union membership decline within industries
(Linneman and Wachter 1986; Linneman, Wachter, and Carter 1990).
In addition, the results support the proposition of implicit risk-sharing
between the union and shareholders. Union gains increase during good
times and fall during bad times. This evidence supports the proposition
by Becker and Olson (1989) that there is a shifting of risk from
shareholders to labor in unionized companies. They base their conclu
sion on evidence of lower stock market "betas" (a measure of systematic
risk) among highly unionized companies. 22
The effect of industry union density, I-UN, on firm profitability is
not clear-cut. Union bargaining power and the size of the union-nonunion
wage premium tend to increase with industry density, placing unionized
firms at an increasing disadvantage as density rises. Increased density,
coupled with threat effects raising wages for nonunion workers, also
permit price increases to be more easily sustained (i.e., unions act like
a cartelizing device). Thus we would expect increased industry density
to be associated with lower profitability for union firms, but either higher
profitability or less detrimental density effects for nonunion firms. The
coefficients on I-UN and UN»I-UN presented in table 4.4 provide lit
tle evidence in support of this hypothesis, the standard errors on the
union density variables being particularly large. In results not shown,
however, a union dummy U-DUM (equal to one if UN>.10) is
substituted for UN in specifications (2) and (2©). Using this specifica
tion, stronger support is found for the hypothesis. In both the log(^)
and irk equations, coefficients on I-UN are positive and significant,
while coefficients on U-DUM*I-UN are negative and significant.
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Econometric Qualifications: Correlated Errors,
Union Endogeneity, and Fixed Effects
In this section, three potential shortcomings of the previous analysis
are examined positively correlated firm-specific error terms across
time, the possible endogeneity of firm union coverage, and omitted firmspecific effects on profitability. Omitted variables affecting company
earnings and market value may have similar effects over time. Hence,
firm residuals in one year are likely to be positively correlated with
firm residuals in subsequent years, biasing downward coefficient stan
dard errors, and possibly biasing coefficient estimates. Correlation of
firm residuals is corrected using a two-step estimation procedure (a
related procedure is suggested by Bronars and Deere 1989). In firststep regressions, log(^) and Trk are regressed on all firm and industry
variables that vary from year-to-year, year dummies, and firm dum
mies for each firm (571 dummies corresponding to 572 firms in the
estimating sample). Excluded are variables fixed over time in our data
set UN, I-UN, and industry dummies. The coefficients of the dum
mies are then used as the independent variables in second-step regres
sions (the excluded reference firm is assigned a value of zero) in which
the fixed variables UN, I-UN, and IND are included. Coefficients on UN
provide estimates of the union profit effect with unbiased standard errors.
Results from the second-step regressions (n=572) can be compared
to previous estimates presented in table 4.1, columns (4) and (4©). The
union coefficient (1 1 \ ) in the second-step log(#) equation, which includes
UN, I-UN, and industry dummies on the right-hand side, is -0.330
(3.41), as compared to -0.493 (15.87) in the single-stage pooled model.
Similarly, the union coefficient in the Kk changes from -0.033 (13.74)
in the single-stage model presented previously, to -.025
(3.60) in the two-stage model. There is the strong suggestion in these
results that pooling across years not only biases downward the stan
dard errors, but may also have resulted in too high an estimate of the
union profit effect. But even after accounting for bias resulting from
simple pooling, estimated union effects remain large and statistically
significant. 23
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A potential shortcoming of virtually all empirical studies of union
effects on economic performance has resulted from the fact that union
coverage is not randomly distributed across firms or industries. If union
coverage is determined simultaneously with firm profitability, or if
significant determinants of profitability are not controlled for but are
correlated with union coverage, estimated union effects are likely to
be biased.
It is likely that union organizing is more extensive and successful
among firms with larger monopoly profits and quasi-rents from which
unions can appropriate gains. Union coverage, therefore, not only af
fects firm profitability, but firm profitability also affects the level of
coverage. Moreover, the direction of bias resulting from simultaneity
appears clear. If higher profits lead to greater union coverage, then the
negative effect of unionization on profitability is understated using or
dinary least squares (OLS) estimation (Voos and Mishel 1986). Past
attempts to estimate a simultaneous relationship between unionization
and profitability have produced two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates
of union profit effects that are even more negative than are estimates
obtained from OLS (Voos and Mishel 1986; Hirsch and Connolly 1987).
The primary difficulty in accounting for union endogeneity is that
one must identify and measure factors that influence union coverage,
but not profitability. That is, there must exist at least one variable that
is included in a reduced-form union equation, but reasonably can be
excluded from a structural profitability equation. This task is particularly
difficult in this study since unionization is measured at the firm-level,
and measurable firm-level variables that influence union coverage and
have no impact on profitability are not readily available. Nevertheless,
we experimented with various choices of instruments and exclusions
from the profit equations in order to obtain 2SLS estimates of union
profit effects. In all cases, estimated union profit effects were more
negative after accounting for union endogeneity.
Table 4.5 presents OLS, 2SLS, and Hausman specification test results
for our preferred set of estimates. The Hausman (1978) specification
test provides a formal test of the hypothesis that a variable is exogenous.
Both the union coverage variable, UN, and an instrumental variable,

Table 4.5
Test for Union Coverage Exogeneity
Variable
UN

OLS
(1)

Dependent variable - log(qr)
exogeneity test
2SLS
(3)
(2)

-0.493
(15.87)

UN-HAT
R2
n

0.480
6,248

-0.709
(9.46)
0.466
6,248

-0.446
(13.06)
-0.263
(3.23)
0.481
6,248

OLS
(10

Dependent variable - irk
exogeneity test
2SLS
(30
(20

-0.033
(13.74)

0.217
6,236

-0.038
(6.62)
0.198
6,236

-0.031
(12.04)
-0.006
(1.01)
0.217
6,236

NOTES: M in parentheses. Regression equations include R&D-STK/Sest , log(L), \og(K/L), GROWTH, I-GROWTH, I-CR4,1-DOMSH, I-UN, and
YEAR and IND dummies. UN-HAT is the predicted value of UN from a reduced form equation including 105 industry dummies and the above variables,
excepting IND.
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UN-HAT, measuring predicted union coverage are included in the profit
equations. 24 If the instrumental variable is significantly different from
zero, the null hypothesis of union coverage exogeneity can be rejected.
For both the 2SLS and exogeneity test estimation, a reduced-form union
equation that includes 105 industry dummies is first estimated. The detail
ed industry dummies are in turn excluded from the subsequent profit
equation (20 2-digit dummies are included).
Column (1) provides OLS estimates of the union coefficient, column
(2) presents the 2SLS estimates, and column (3) presents OLS results
when both UN and UN-HAT are included. Examining first the market
value equations, it is seen that the OLS estimate is that a firm with
average union coverage (UN = .423) has a q about 20 percent lower
than the average nonunion firm. Column (2) provides 2SLS results, with
UN-HAT included rather than UN. Consistent with expectations, the
estimated union effect on profitability is larger after accounting for
simultaneity, the coefficient changing from -0.493 to -0.709. Column
(3) provides evidence for a Hausman (1978) specification test where
the null is that UN is exogenous. Although the null is rejected in the
log(<?) equation (the coefficient on UN-HAT is significant), the relative
magnitudes of the coefficients and f-ratios on UN and UN-HAT sug
gest that exogeneity may not be too inappropriate an assumption.
Although there is some evidence for simultaneity between firm union
coverage and market value, no evidence is found for simultaneity be
tween unionization and rates of return on capital. Union coefficient
estimates from the 2SLS profitability equations are only slightly larger
(in absolute value) than with OLS, and the null hypothesis that UN is
exogenous cannot be rejected. 25 The difficulty in identifying appropriate
instruments to exclude from a profitability equation, however, makes
us reluctant to attach much weight to any specific set of estimates us
ing techniques designed to account for simultaneity bias.
An additional source of concern is that omitted determinants of prof
itability may be correlated with the union coverage variable, thus leading
us to mistakenly attribute to unionism the impact of some omitted fac
tor. The primary means by which such a pitfall is avoided is through
the inclusion of detailed control variables in all equations. Estimates
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of union effects have been based on regressions including numerous
firm- and industry-level control variables, including firm-specific sales
growth and detailed industry dummies (generally 20 2-digit dummies
are included, but as seen earlier, the estimated union effect is relative
ly insensitive to inclusion of 105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit dummies). Inclu
sion of such detailed control variables in fact may cause an understate
ment of the true effect of union coverage since some of unionism©s im
pact is likely to occur through, say, slower growth in sales and lower
stocks of R&D, while some of the effects captured by detailed industry
dummies may be the result of firm and industry unionization rates.
An alternative way to account for omitted firm-specific effects is the
use of a fixed-effects or first-difference model. Rather than estimate
the profitability equations in levels form, one can estimate changes in
profitability as a function of changes in union coverage and other ex
planatory variables. Any omitted variables whose effects on company
profit levels are fixed over time will thus "fall out" of the difference
equation. 26 Unfortunately, data requirements for estimation of fixedeffects models are often prohibitive. Data must be available on the same
observations for at least two time periods, degrees of freedom are cut
in half if there are only two periods, bias resulting from measurement
error in variables is magnified in a change equation (Griliches and
Hausman 1986), and the length of time between periods must be suffi
ciently long for there to be a measurable response of the dependent
variable to changes in the independent variables, but not so long a period
that the model©s parameters change significantly.
Estimation of such a model here is made difficult by the absence of
repeated observations on firm-level union coverage at different points
in time. Union data for both 1972 and 1977 (along with all other
necessary variables) are available for 149 companies, however, therefore
allowing a fixed-effects model to be estimated for these firms. Regres
sion equations with the change in profitability between 1972 and 1977
as the dependent variable, and the change in union coverage and in all
other explanatory variables during the same period, are estimated. 27
Unfortunately, estimates from these equations provide little informa
tion. Estimated coefficients on the change in union coverage variables
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are close to zero with large standard errors. The models estimated have
extremely poor explanatory power and do not allow one to draw in
ferences about union effects on profitability.
Taken at face value, results from the fixed-effects models suggest
that true union effects on profitability are small and that the significant
negative effects previously estimated (both here and in all other studies)
result from omitted variable(s) positively correlated with unionism and
negatively with profitability. Such a conclusion is unfounded, however,
in the absence of suspect omitted variables that could possibly account
for such large union-nonunion differences in profitability observed in
a cross section. No such suspect has been identified. Moreover, the
estimated fixed-effects model has a number of deficiencies that are likely
to account for the absence of a relationship between changes in union
coverage and profitability. First, sample size is relatively small. More
fundamentally, the union coverage measures are from different surveys
and initially measured different things (the 1972 response measured the
proportion of a company 's production workers covered; this figure was
converted to an estimate of company wide coverage). The 1977 measure
was collected in 1987-1988 and thus also may contain a fair degree of
measurement error. Measurement error in levels is compounded when
constructing a difference variable; that is, the ratio of noise to true varia
tion in union coverage is extremely high, biasing the union change coef
ficient toward zero (Freeman 1984; Griliches and Hausman 1986).
An additional source for concern in the fixed-effects model is that
there is likely to be simultaneity between changes in profitability and
changes in company union coverage between 1972 and 1977. Com
panies with improving profit performance may be more likely to at
tract union organizing efforts and less likely to attempt cutbacks among
their unionized workers. Positive effects of profitability growth on union
growth may partially or fully offset negative effects of union growth
on profitability growth. On the other hand, firms with improving prof
it performance may be more likely to expand and build new facilities,
many (or most) of which are likely to be nonunion. This bias would
work in the opposite direction, leading to an exaggeration of any
deleterious union effects. Neither theory nor data is so rich that these
relationships can be separated and identified in a reliable fashion. Future
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research utilizing this study©s figures on 1977 and 1987 union coverage
promises to provide more reliable evidence on the relationship between
changes in profitability and changes in union coverage.

Conclusions
The results presented in this chapter provide evidence broadly sup
portive of the union tax model, whereby unions appropriate a share of
the returns from profit-enhancing firm and industry characteristics. Union
coverage at the firm level exhibits a strong negative relationship with
company earnings and market value, even after controlling in detail for
firm and industry characteristics. Average union effects on profitabili
ty have been relatively stable over the 1968-1980 period. Differences
across 2-digit industries in the union profit effect are substantial,
however, and do not lend themselves to simple explanation. The evidence
strongly rejects the hypothesis that monopoly profits associated with
industry concentration provide a source for union gains. By contrast,
evidence is provided suggesting that unions capture current earnings
associated with limited foreign competition, both current and future earn
ings associated with disequilibrium or growing firm and industry de
mand (sales growth), future earnings emanating from R&D capital, and
current and future quasi-rents emanating from long-lived physical capital.
The poor profit performance of unionized companies during the 1970s
may provide an important explanation for the marked decline in union
membership during the 1980s. As noted by Linneman, Wachter, and
Carter (1990) and others, employment declines have been concentrated
in the unionized sectors of the economy; nonunion employment has ex
panded even in highly unionized industries. Although important, shifts
in industry demand are an insufficient explanation for the marked decline
in private sector unionism. The evidence presented here supports the
thesis that declines in union membership and coverage in no small part
have been a response to the continuing poor profit performance of
unionized companies throughout this period. 28 In subsequent chapters,
the implications of union rent-seeking on firm investment behavior, pro
ductivity, and productivity growth are explored.
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NOTES
1. Lazear (1983) provides a model in which firms that can prevent union organizing at a low
cost will be nonunion, and firms that have high prevention costs will be unionized. Although
marginal union and nonunion firms will have equivalent profit rates in equilibrium, union firms
will on average have lower profit rates than nonunion firms.
2. Becker and Olson (1987) and Addison and Hirsch (1989) provide surveys and analyses of the
profit and market value studies.
3. Several studies examine the effect of strikes on market value. For a review, see Becker and
Olson (1987). Interesting as well is the detailed analysis by Abowd (1989b), who finds that unan
ticipated changes in labor contracts are offset roughly dollar-for-dollar by opposite changes in
market value. Abowd interprets these results as supporting the case for "strongly efficient" bargain
ing outcomes, wherein the union and firm maximize the joint value of the enterprise (market value
plus worker rents), and bargain over division of the surplus. Note that Abowd©s results imply
unions are nondistortionary, given the firm©s capital stock. His results do not imply that unions
have no effect on firms© investment decisions.
4. The ratio of current earnings to equity may differ with respect to union status due to differences
in debt financing, risk, or life-cycle earnings among companies with equivalent present values.
For example, if union companies shift earnings to the present and rely heavily on debt (Bronars
and Deere 1991), they may have a higher earnings-equity ratio than nonunion companies. Or
if shareholder risk (beta) is lower in unionized firms (Becker and Olson 1989), earnings-equity
ratios and accounting rates of return will be lower (and market valuation of assets higher) than
in otherwise similar nonunion firms.
5. The dependent variable log(^) rather than q is employed as the dependent variable on theoretical
and statistical grounds. Based on estimates using the Box-Cox transformation to compare func
tional forms, and the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the semilog form of the q equation is found
to be strongly preferred to the linear (Hirsch and Seaks 1990). Derivation of the multiplicative
semilog model is shown in Hirsch and Seaks.
6. Firm-specific labor costs cannot be directly measured for most companies in our sample. It
is therefore difficult to estimate how much of the union effect on profitability is due to differences
in labor costs.
7. Because R&D-STK/S is bounded below by zero, Tobit model estimation of its predicted value
would be preferable to use of ordinary least squares. It is unlikely that estimates of union profit
effects are sensitive to the estimation method used for the R&D intensity proxy.
8. Measurement error can lead to a spurious negative correlation since capital is included in the
denominator on the left-hand side and in the numerator on the right-hand side. In order to lessen
the potential for such bias, the lagged value of the log of the capital-labor ratio was used as an
instrument; however, results are highly similar to those presented in table 4.1.
9. The coefficient on GROWTH is significant in log(^) equations in which firm-year observa
tions with extreme values of GROWTH are omitted from the sample.
10. As discussed below, more detailed industry dummies (105 versus 20 dummies) at the 2-, 3-,
and 4-digit levels are also included. Estimated union coefficients are affected little. Subsequent
tables in the monograph providing separate estimates by industry category show 19 rather than
21 industry groupings, owing to a merging of the miscellaneous consumer goods, miscellaneous
manufacturers not elsewhere classified, and conglomerates categories.
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11. In results not shown, the corresponding figure for the rate of return on sales is 12 percent.
Mean ir^ is . 103 for nonunion companies. Letting i/- represent the estimated coefficient on union
coverage, the average percentage effect of union coverage on profitability is calculated by
(.423^7.103) 100 for irk, and by [exp(.423^)-l]100 for q.
12. The evidence suggests that union firms in the relatively high-tech computing and communica
tion equipment industry categories do not have significantly lower current earnings than other
wise similar nonunion firms, but market valuations of the unionized firms© assets, as measured
by Tobin©s q, are significantly lower. In contrast, union companies in the relatively mature tex
tile and apparel and petroleum industries display significantly lower current earnings, but little
difference in market valuation of assets.
13. Interestingly, Clark (1984, p. 912) reports an interindustry pattern of union productivity ef
fects not dissimilar from the profitability pattern reported above. Broad industry categories reported
here to have weak or uncertain profit effects tended to have positive estimated productivity ef
fects in Clark©s analysis, whereas industries found here to have sharply lower profits were reported
by Clark to have negative productivity effects. We examine empirically the links between the
profitability and productivity evidence more directly in a subsequent chapter.
14. A firm with higher than predicted profitability in one year (i.e., a positive error term) is like
ly to have higher than predicted profitability the following year. Standard errors in the pooled
model, therefore, will be biased downward. A two-step estimation procedure is employed below
that utilizes data for all years, but avoids the problem of correlated firm error terms across years.
15. Some variability in estimated coefficients results because the sample of firms changes slightly
across years.
16. An omitted variable we can identify is company age, which is positively related to union coverage
and negatively related to profitability. Subsequent research incorporating company age into the
analysis reveals that it is a significant determinant of profitability, but that its inclusion causes
the UN coefficient estimate to decline (in absolute value) by a rather small amount. For an analysis
including an age variable, see Hirsch (1991).
17. For an interpretation of this literature, see Addison and Hirsch (1989).
18. Collinearity among the union interaction terms, however, causes some degradation in statistical
results and makes precise estimation of the union interaction coefficients difficult. An alternative
specification would be to estimate a nonlinear model in which a single union tax parameter is
estimated (Salinger 1984; Hirsch and Connolly 1987). Such a model, however, provides little
insight as to the sources from which union gains are captured.
19. Ravenscraft (1983) has argued that industry concentration has acted as a proxy for firm market
shares, and that it is the latter rather than the former that is positively associated with profitabili
ty. In industry-level studies, concentration is almost always positively related to industry pricecost margins.
20. Hirsch (1990b) provides evidence on unions, profitability, and market structure using a smaller
sample of companies for which measures on firm market share and industry concentration, weighted
to reflect firm sales across industry categories, are available. He finds no evidence to support
the proposition that either industry concentration or firm market share provides a source for union
rents. Union effects on profitability appear to be most detrimental among companies with low
market shares in highly competitive industries.
21. Similar evidence recently has been presented in Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1989) and Becker
and Olson (1990).
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22. In work not reported here, we confirm with these data the Becker-Olson result of a negative
correlation between beta and union coverage in 1977.
23. Use of weighted least squares (WLS) estimation, where observations are weighted by the
inverse of the standard error of the firm dummy coefficients, produces similar results.
24. Because UN is bounded below by zero (and above by one), a Tobit rather than OLS reducedform estimate would be more appropriate. It is unlikely that this approach would alter our qualitative
results.
25. Hirsch and Connolly (1987), using a 1977 firm sample and a union variable measuring the
extent of industry coverage, find an identical pattern.
26. Inclusion of a constant in a difference equation accounts for changes in the intercept of the
levels equations over the two periods. Note that a difference model is similar to a model in which
variables are expressed as deviations from means.
27. Industry dummies fall out since they do not change over the period. They can be included
on empirical grounds to account for industry-level difference in profitability change, holding constant
changes in other independent variables. The changes in union coverage coefficients are not significant
with or without industry dummies.
28. The conclusion here that large union-nonunion profitability differences help explain declin
ing unionization is complementary to the conclusion reached by Freeman (1988), Linneman,
Wachter, and Carter (1990), and others that high union wage premiums have accelerated unionism©s
decline. It is worth noting that direct evidence linking changes in unionization to changes in prof
itability has not been provided.

5
Labor Unions
and
Firm Investment Behavior

In the previous chapter, union rent-seeking has been shown to reduce
current earnings and the stock market valuation of company assets. In
response to the union appropriation of some portion of quasi-rents,
unionized companies are expected to reduce investment in tangible and
intangible capital relative to their nonunion counterparts. Differences
in investment behavior between union and nonunion companies are
predicted even where there are strongly efficient contracts maximizing
the joint present value of union plus shareholder wealth. As developed
in chapter 2, union myopia, owing to the political structure of the union
and the nontransferability of union membership, may cause the union
to press for current contract gains at the expense of investment and future
employment growth. Evidence of differences in investment behavior
would indicate that union representation and contract coverage provi
sions are distortionary, with real effects on resource allocation.
In this chapter, primary attention is focused on estimation of the ef
fects of union coverage on investment in physical capital and in research
and development (R&D). l In each section, previous literature is review
ed, prior to turning to new estimates drawn from the empirical analysis
of the data set assembled for this study. The robustness of the
econometric results are probed in some detail. Additional evidence is
used to examine the relationship of union coverage with firms© capitallabor ratios, patent propensity, advertising intensity, and debt-equity
ratios.
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Union Effects on Capital Investment
The union rent-seeking model developed in chapter 2 explains how
a union tax on the returns emanating from relation-specific capital stocks
can deter company investment in tangible and intangible capital. The
union tax effect (plus scale effects associated with higher wage costs)
may offset the substitution effect owing to higher relative labor costs.
The net effect of union coverage on firm investment behavior is therefore
an empirical question. Surprisingly, there is only scant empirical
evidence exploring union investment effects. Bronars and Deere (1989)
match industry union coverage data to firm observations and find that
firms in highly unionized industries have lower capital investment,
capital-to-labor ratios, R&D investment, and advertising expenditures.
Hirsch (1990a) utilizes 1972 union coverage data for 315 companies
and provides evidence showing that union companies have lower physical
capital investment than do similar nonunion firms. And Clark©s (1984)
evidence from lines of business suggests that union coverage has little
effect on capital-labor ratios.
Union rent-seeking is likely to affect firm investment behavior both
directly and indirectly. The union tax on the returns or quasi-rents to
nontransferable capital will directly decrease investment as firms decrease
investment in order to equate their marginal post-union tax rate of return
with their marginal financing cost (see chapter 2). In addition, union
rent-seeking will have an indirect effect on investment. Lower current
earnings due to the union tax will typically produce higher marginal
financing costs, thus leading to a further decrease in investment. In this
chapter, differences between union and nonunion firms in their in
vestments in physical capital and R&D are examined, with more limited
attention given to union effects on other aspects of firm behavior. Because
we are interested in how unionism affects current investment, we focus
on investment flows or, in other words, additions to the stock of capital
and innovative activity (capital stocks are controlled for on the righthand side of the equation).
Profit-maximizing levels of investment are determined by, among
other things, firm output and relative factor prices. We estimate dou
ble log models in which input variables measuring employment and the
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capital stock are included on the right-hand side. Output is some linear
combination of these included input variables. Alternatively, output (or
scale) can be accounted for by estimating investment intensity equa
tions in which both sides of the equation are divided by sales (estimates
of intensity equations are provided in table 5.5).
We are unable to construct a variable measuring directly capital costs
facing the individual firm. Firms within the same industry should face
largely similar capital costs. To the extent that capital costs differ among
firms with equivalent measured characteristics, we have no reason to
expect these differences to be correlated with union coverage. Therefore,
an explicit measure of capital costs is not essential, given adequate control
for industry and selected firm characteristics. Year dummies will ac
count for economy wide cost differences over time. Because retained
earnings may provide a lower cost source of funds, we include current
firm profitability as a regressor.
A direct measure of labor costs facing the firm is available only for
a small number of our firms, but we are able to include a measure of
industry labor costs. Although necessitated by data availability, the in
clusion of an industry rather than firm wage rate may be appropriate.
To the extent that unions affect investment through changes in wage
costs, inclusion of a firm-specific wage would be misleading since it
would capture much of what is in fact a union effect. Moreover, bargain
ing models predict that the output and factor mix of union companies
is a function of the opportunity cost (industry) wage rather than the
"own" wage (chapter 2).
Capital investment equations take the general form:
(5.1) log(INV),, = Eft^ + rUN + eit.
INy, represents investment in physical capital by firm i in year t, Xkit
includes k independent variables (including a constant) affecting invest
ment, and eit is an error term with assumed zero mean and constant
variance. Included in X are firm-level variables measuring current earn
ings, firm size, capital and R&D stocks, and firm sales growth; industry
variables measuring concentration, sales growth, import penetration,
the wage level, and industry union density; and industry and year
dummies.
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Regression results for capital investment equations, with the log of
annual real investment expenditures, log(INV), as the dependent
variable, are presented in table 5.1. Results are presented for specifica
tions with and without industry dummies and the profitability measure,
irk. The direct union effect on investment is measured by T, the coef
ficient on UN in eq. (5.1). As shown below, the indirect union effect,
operating through a reduced profit rate, is estimated by combining the
UN coefficient previously estimated in a profits equation (chapter 4)
and the coefficient on the profit measure estimated in eq. (5.1).
The empirical evidence presented in table 5.1 indicates that firmlevel union coverage, measured by UN, is negatively and significantly
related to capital investment. In addition to the full regression results
presented for the three specifications including UN, the note to the table
presents the coefficients attaching to categorical union variables in a
specification where three dummies are substituted for a continuous
coverage variable (UN-LOW = 1 if [0<UN<.30], UN-MED = 1 if
[.30<UN<.60], UN-HIGH = 1 if [UN >.60], and nonunion is the omit
ted reference group). Focusing on column (3), the estimated coefficient
(1 1 1) on UN is -0.142 (4.41), implying that an average unionized firm,
which in our sample has UN=.423, has annual capital investment about
6 percent lower than a similar nonunion firm.
Coefficients on the categorical variables in the note to table 5.1 sug
gest a more negative union effect on investment, ranging from 7 to 14
percent. Surprisingly, investment is not found to decrease continuous
ly with respect to union coverage. Rather, deleterious union effects are
found to be largest among companies with medium coverage, and
somewhat smaller among companies with low and high coverage.
The union coefficients provide estimates of the direct effect of
unionization on capital investment, resulting from the union tax on quasirents that make up the normal return to investment. In addition, unions
have an indirect effect on investment by decreasing the earnings which
provide what may be a lower cost source for funding investment than
reliance on the capital market. 2 The direct plus indirect effect of unions
on annual capital investment can be estimated by:
(5.2)

cfloglNV/JUN = aiogINV/aUN| 7r +(aiogINV/air)UN(a7r/aUN)
= -.142 + (5.212)(-.033) = -.314
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Table 5.1
Capital Investment Regression Results

(1)

(2)

(3)

UN

-0.192
(5.91)

-0.142
(4.41)

*k

5.213
(30.25)

-0.299
(8.75)
~

Variable

log(R&D-STK)est

5.212
(30.40)

-0.041
(5.34)
0.068
(4.47)

-0.005
(0.54)

-0.012
(1.44)

0.200
(10.84)

0.142
(8.16)

log(/0 (-D

1.023
(82.10)

0.863
(50.50)

0.931
(57.81)

GROWTH

0.045
(4.83)

0.054
(5.69)

0.038
(4.29)

I-GROWTH

0.014
(8.83)

0.014
(8.70)

0.009
(5.79)

I-log(EARN)

0.397
(8.58)

0.351
(4.61)

0.365
(5.13)

I-CR4

-0.002
(3.41)

-0.001
(2.28)

-0.003
(4.60)

I-DOMSH

0.003
(2.80)
-0.146
(2.49)

0.005
(3-24)

0.005
(3.54)

0.192
(2.09)

0.110
(1.28)

no

yes

log(L)

I-UN
IND
YEAR
R2

yes

yes

yes
yes

0.916

0.913

0.924

n

6,232

6,232

6,232

NOTES: Dependent variable is log(INV). 1 1 \ in parentheses. Below are coefficients (| /1) obtain
ed substituting union dummies for UN in equation (3), with nonunion the omitted reference group
and where UN-LOW = 1 if (0<UN<.30);UN-MED = 1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UN-HIGH = 1
if (UN>.60).
(3): - 0.073 UN-LOW - 0.145 UN-MED - 0.091 UN-HIGH
(3.49)
(5.92)
3.15)
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where dloglNV/dUN^ and dlogINV/d7TUN are obtained from the coef
ficients on UN and Trk in table 5.1, column (3), and the estimate of
dTT/dUN is obtained from the UN coefficient in table 4.1, column (4©).
The estimates imply that a typical unionized firm (UN = .423) will have
capital investments about 13 percent lower than an otherwise similar
nonunion firm. Approximately 45 percent of this total is a direct union
effect, while 55 percent is an indirect effect owing to unionism©s im
pact on the firm©s current profitability. 3 Note that the total differential
of -0.314 corresponds closely to the estimated union coefficient of
-0.299 (8.75) in the investment equation specification with irk exclud
ed (column (2) of table 5.1). Thus, comparison of investment equa
tions estimated with and without irk included (columns (2) and (3)) pro
vides a relatively simple way to differentiate between unionism©s direct
and indirect effects.
Results other than those concerning union coverage can be briefly
examined. The lagged capital stock variable, log(£)(-l), acts as a scale
variable, with a coefficient close to unity (the log of INV/K could alter
natively have been employed as the dependent variable). The positive
coefficient on log(L) indicates that larger companies have higher in
vestment rates, ceterisparibus, while no relationship is found between
capital investment and the R&D stock. Both firm and industry sales
growth, intended to proxy demand shifts, are positively and significantly
related to current capital investment. The variable I-log(EARN), measur
ing average industry labor compensation in a firm©s principal 2-, 3-,
or 4-digit industry, is a crude proxy for differences in per unit labor
opportunity cost facing the firm, independent of company-specific union
coverage. As expected, capital investment is positively related to labor
costs. Industry concentration is negatively related to firm investment,
while limited import penetration (a high I-DOMSH) is associated with
greater company investment. Industry union density (I-UN) is positively,
but weakly, related to company investment levels in specifications in
cluding industry dummies.
The robustness of the union-investment results is probed in several
ways. These include the addition of 105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit industry
dummy variables to the pooled investment equation, by estimation of
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investment equations disaggregated by 2-digit industry, and through use
of a two-step estimating procedure that purges within-firm serial cor
relation and its accompanying standard error bias. 4
Because investment varies significantly across industries, indepen
dent of union coverage, highly detailed industry dummies are included
to examine the robustness of union coefficient estimates. Inclusion of
105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit industry dummies has little effect, however,
changing the coefficient (|f|) on UN from -0.142 (4.41) in column
(3) of table 5.1, to -0.148 (4.38) (the latter result is not shown in the
table). The insensitivity of the union coverage coefficient to the addi
tion of detailed industry increases one©s confidence in the robustness
of the previously presented results. Because of the relative insensitivi
ty of estimates to inclusion of the detailed dummies, subsequent regres
sions only include dummies corresponding to the broader 2-digit in
dustry categories.
Table 5.2 presents union effects estimates from investment equations
disaggregated for 19 2-digit industry groupings (the category
Miscellaneous Manufacturing and Conglomerates combines three
categories miscellaneous consumer goods, miscellaneous manufac
turers, and conglomerates for which separate 2-digit dummies are in
cluded in regression estimates). Because industry sample sizes are small
and the distribution of union coverage differs enormously across in
dustry categories, estimates are provided with alternative union coverage
measures, the continuous coverage variable UN and a union dummy
variable, UN-DUM, equal to 1 if UN>.10. Separate coefficient
estimates are provided for UN and UN-DUM, and for specifications
with and without the inclusion of irk. Our expectation is that union in
vestment effects vary considerably across industries, just as do union
effects on wages, profitability, and productivity. The results in table
5.2 confirm that expectation. Union coverage has negative effects on
investment in most industries, but there are substantial differences across
industry groupings. Estimates are sensitive to the measure of union
coverage (UN versus UN-DUM) and there is variability in the relative
importance of direct and indirect union effects. Although some union
coefficients are positive and several are close to zero, in no industry

Table 5.2
Union Effects on Investment by Industry, 1968-1980
Industry

n

log(INV) equations w/irfc
UN-DUM
|/|
UN

|/|

UN

log(INV) equations w/o irk
|r|
UN-DUM
|/|

6,248

-0.142

(4.41)

-0.138

(7.38)

-0.299

(8.75)

-0.221

(11.16)

Food & kindred products
Textiles & apparel
Chemicals, excluding drugs
Drugs & medical instruments
Petroleum refining

597
293
422
349
286

-0.027
-0.026
-0.207
-0.499
-0.461

(0.30)
(0.23)
(1.55)
(3.47)
(2.50)

-0.188
-0.080
-0.078
-0.059
-0.275

(2.75)
"(1.27)
(0.95)
(1.20
(3.31)

-0.176
-0.178
-0.489
-0.668
-0.542

(1.79)
(1.51)
(3.58)
(4.43)
(3.04)

-0.320
-0.113
-0.307
-0.126
-0.300

(4.42)
(1.70)
(3.82)
(2.43)
(3.66)

Rubber & miscellaneous plastics
Stone, clay & glass
Primary metals
Fabricated metal products
Engines, farm & construction equip.

225
239
436
320
273

-0.507
-0.252
0.378
-0.150
-0.100

(3.33)
(1.65)
(2.49)
(1.21)
(0.52)

-0.276
-0.234
-0.033
-0.210
0.079

(3.03)
(1.73)
(0.18)
(2.81)
(0.75)

-0.760
-0.657
0.028
-0.213
0.035

(4.91)
(3.95)
(0.17)
(1.61)
(0.18)

-0.269
-0.646
-0.178
-0.274
0.065

(2.67)
(4.54)
(0.89)
(3.48)
(0.59)

Office, computers & acct. equip.
Other machinery, not electric
Electrical equip. & supplies
Communication equipment
Motor vehicle & trans. equip.

177
409
412
275
401

-0.020
-0.072
-0.106
-0.350
-0.226

(0.03)
(0.62)
(0.41)
(2.87)
(1.53)

0.026
-0.070
0.080
-0.309
-0.265

(0.19)
(0.89)
(1.00)
(3.68)
(2.40)

-0.358
-0.293
-0.334
-0.413
-0.437 -

(0.46)
(2.49)
(1.25)
(3.12)
(2.93)

0.029
-0.269
0.066
-0.335
-0.350

(0.20)
(3.62)
(0.79)
(3.65)
(3.05)

Aircraft & aerospace
Professional & scientific equip.
Lumber, wood & paper
Misc. manuf. & conglomerates

119
213
429
357

0.133
-0.295
0.027
0.183

(0.46)
(1.45)
(0.20)
(1-52)

-0.229
-0.205
0.061
-0.058

(1.58)
(2.35)
(0.85)
(0.73)

0.136
-0.403
-0.189
0.218

(0.47)
(1.82)
(1.36)
(1.72)

-0.232
-0.252
-0.090
0.019

(1.61)
(2.65)
(1.25)
(0.23)

All manufacturing

NOTES: Industry regressions include logCR&D-STK)651, log(K)(-l), GROWTH, I-log(EARN), I-Growth, I-CR4,1-DOMSH, and year dummies. Variable
wk included where noted. All manufacturing regressions include these controls, I-UN, and industry dummies. UN-DUM = 1 if UN>.10.
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is evidence found for a positive and significant relationship between
union coverage and capital investment.
Among those industries where union effects on capital investment ap
pear particularly detrimental are drugs and medical instruments;
petroleum refining; rubber and plastics; stone, clay, and glass; com
munication equipment; motor vehicle and transportation equipment; and
professional and scientific equipment. Those industry groups previously
found (chapter 4, table 4.2) to have the largest gap between union and
nonunion rates of return on capital are here found most likely to have
large negative union coverage coefficients in investment regressions ex
cluding irk. There is little extant evidence with which these results can
be compared. 5 Nor do we possess sufficient industry-specific knowledge
that might enable us to identify and interpret patterns in the industry
findings. Future research providing additional evidence on differences
in within-industry union effects on investment behavior, coupled with
a systematic explanation for these differences, is essential.
An attempt is next made to account for positively correlated firmspecific error terms across time through the use of a two-step estima
tion procedure (see chapter 4 for discussion). In a first-step regression,
log(INV) is regressed on all firm and industry variables that vary from
year-to-year, year dummies, and dummies for each firm (571 dummies
corresponding to 572 firms in the estimating sample). Excluded are
variables fixed over time in our data set UN, I-UN, and industry dum
mies. The coefficients of the dummies are then used as the indepen
dent variables in second-step regressions (the excluded reference firm
is assigned a value of zero), in which the fixed variables UN, I-UN,
and IND are included (n=572). Second-step regression results provide
estimates of the union investment effect with unbiased standard errors.
Results from the second-step regression, as presented below in the
text, with the firm coefficients from the first step as the dependent
variable, can be compared to previous estimates presented in table 5.1,
column (3). The union coefficient (\t\) in the second-step equation,
which includes UN, I-UN, and IND on the right-hand side, is -0.119
(1.23), as compared to -0.142 (4.41) in the single-step pooled model.
The coefficient (|r|) on industry density, I-UN, is -0.273 (1.06).
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Regressing firm effects on union categorical dummies (with I-UN and
IND included) produces the following results:
-0.046 UN-LOW - 0.084 UN-MED - 0.125 UN-HIGH.
(0.68)
(1.18)
(1.64)
These results, suggesting direct negative effects of unions on capital
investment in the neighborhood of 4 to 12 percent for companies with
various levels of coverage, are similar in magnitude to the single-stage
pooled estimates presented previously in table 5.1 (weighted least squares
(WLS) estimation, with the inverse of standard errors of the firm coef
ficients as weights, produced highly similar results). Although the large
standard errors associated with the second-step estimates make us
cautious in placing too much confidence in the precision with which
we are able to estimate such union effects, the results do reinforce the
general conclusions reached previously.

Union Effects on Research and Development
The union rent-seeking model predicts that unionized firms should
invest less in highly taxed investment paths than do similar nonunion
firms. Only recently has there been much attention given to possible
effects of unions on investment in forms of intangible capital such as
R&D. Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986) find lower R&D invest
ment intensities (i.e., R&D/sales) among firms in highly unionized in
dustries. More recently, Hirsch (1990a, forthcoming) has provided
evidence showing that union companies have lower R&D investment
than do similar nonunion firms, a result confirmed by Bronars, Deere,
and Tracy (1989), who also use firm union coverage data. Acs and
Audretsch (1988) find fewer innovations in highly unionized industries,
while Hirsch and Link (1987) find product innovative activity to be less
important among a sample of union businesses than among similar non
union businesses.
Based on theory and past evidence, union rent-seeking is expected
to have significant effects on company investments in R&D and other
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forms of innovative capital. R&D investment equations here take the
general form:
(5.3) log(R&D),v = EftfcX^ + TUN + eir
R&D/r represents annual investment in R&D by firm i in year t, Xkit
includes k independent variables (including a constant) affecting R&D,
and eit is an error term with assumed zero mean and constant variance.
Included in X are firm-level variables measuring current earnings, firm
size, capital and R&D stocks, and firm sales growth; industry variables
measuring concentration, sales growth, import penetration, wage level,
and industry union density; and industry and year dummies. 6 The direct
union effect on R&D is measured by 7, the coefficient on UN in eq.
(5.3), while the indirect union effect, operating through a reduced prof
it rate, is estimated by combining the UN coefficient previously estimated
in a profits equation (chapter 4) and the coefficient on the profit measure
estimated in eq. (5.3).
Table 5.3 presents pooled regression results for R&D investment equa
tions, based on the sample of firms for which R&D expenditure data
are reported directly. The dependent variable is the logarithm of real
annual expenditures on R&D. 7 Specifications are presented with and
without inclusion of industry dummies and irk.
The coefficients associated with firm union coverage (UN) measure
the direct union effect and indicate that unionization significantly
decreases R&D investment. The UN coefficient in column (3) implies
that a typical unionized company with 42.3 percent union coverage will
have R&D investment about 15 percent lower than a similar nonunion
company, holding constant Trk and other R&D determinants. There is
evidence, however, that the negative union effect on R&D investment
varies little with the extent of union coverage. Using categorical coverage
dummies (seen in the note to table 5.3), even low levels of coverage
are associated with significantly lower R&D investment, but the marginal
impact of higher levels of coverage is modest. Based on the categorical
coverage variable coefficients, unionized companies are found to have
R&D investment 23 to 30 percent lower than nonunion companies
(calculated by [exp(a/)-l]100, where a, are the union dummy
coefficients).
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Table 5.3
R&D Investment Regression Results
(1)

(2)

(3)

UN

-0.392
(8.69)

-0.378
(8.36)

*k

2.534
(12.08)

-0.429
(9.45)
~

log(L)

0.433
(20.51)

0.348
(14.08)

0.334
(13.64)

log(/0

0.021
(1.19)

0.215
(9.01)

0.228
(9.64)

log(R&D-STK) (-1)

0.601
(57.24)

0.507
(45.18)

0.508
(45.75)

GROWTH

-0.019
(1.18)

-0.007
(0.48)

I-GROWTH

0.010
(4.92)

0.013
(0.81)
0.006
(2.80)

I-log(EARN)

1.032
(15.49)

I-CR4

-0.003
(5.10)
-0.009
(5.58)

-0.005
(5.74)

-0.005
(5.56)

-0.005
(2.71)

-0.006
(3.26)

I-UN

-0.635
(7.98)

-0.303
(2.34)

-0.364
(2.85)

IND

no

yes

yes

YEAR
R2

yes
0.889

yes
0.898

yes
0.900

n

4,327

4,327

4,327

Variable

I-DOMSH

0.734
(7.08)

2.031
(9.81)

0.005
(2.17)
0.700
(6.82)

NOTE: Dependent variable is log(R&D). | /1 in parentheses. Below are coefficients (1 1 \) obtain
ed substituting union dummies for UN in equation (3), with nonunion the omitted reference group
and where UN-LOW=1 if (0<.30); UN-MED=1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UN-HIGH = 1 if
(UN>.60).
(3): - 0.261 UN-LOW - 0.313 UN-MED - 0.351 UN-HIGH.
(9.82)
(9.66)
(8.60)
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The coefficient on UN in column (3) (or on the categorical coverage
variables) may understate the true direct effect of unionism, since past
unionization has lowered the size of the R&D stock, which in turn lowers
current investment. In addition, unions decrease investment indirectly
via their effects on the firm profitability, measured here by irk. The
total effect of unionism on R&D investment can be measured by:
(5.4) JlogR&D/JUN=dlogR&D/dUN (T +(dlogR&D/dTr), UN(d7r/aUN)
=-.378+2.031(-.033)=-.445
where dlogR&D/dUN | T and dlogR&D/d7T| UN are obtained from the
coefficients on UN and Trk in table 5.3, column (3), and the estimate
of d-Tr/dUN is obtained from the UN coefficient in table 4.1, column
(4©). These results indicate that most (about 85 percent) of unionism©s
effect on R&D investment is direct; indirect effects via changes in firms©
earnings are relatively small. Note that the union coefficient from a
regression without irk included (column (2) of table 5.4) provides a
good approximation of the direct plus indirect union effect.
Coefficient estimates on variables other than union coverage are also
of interest. The lagged R&D stock variable, log(R&D-STK)(-l), in con
junction with the capital stock and log of employment variables, acts
to control for scale and firm size. All three have positive and signifi
cant coefficients, although that on log(R&D-STK)(-l) is well below
unity. 8 Industry, but not firm, sales growth is positively related to cur
rent R&D investment. As expected, R&D investment is positively related
to labor costs, proxied by I-log(EARN). R&D investment appears to
be stimulated by competition. R&D investment is negatively related to
industry concentration, while vigorous foreign competition (a low
I-DOMSH) is associated with larger investments in R&D. Industry union
density (I-UN) is negatively related to company R&D investment.
The robustness of the union-R&D results is investigated in a manner
analogous to that employed previously for capital investment. Results
are examined following the addition of 105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit industry
dummy variables to the pooled investment equation, by estimation of
R&D investment equations disaggregated by 2-digit industry, and
through use of a two-step estimating procedure that purges within-firm
serial correlation and standard error bias. As in the case of capital
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investment, inclusion of detailed industry dummies has little effect on
estimated union effects on R&D, changing the coefficient (1 1 \ ) on UN
from -0.378 (8.36) in table 5.3, column (3), to -0.365 (7.90) (not shown
in the table). The relative insensitivity of estimated union effects to in
clusion of detailed industry dummies is noteworthy, since R&D oppor
tunities and investment intensities vary so significantly across industry. 9
Table 5.4 presents union coefficient estimates from R&D investment
equations disaggregated for 19 2-digit industry groupings. Separate coef
ficient estimates are provided for UN and UN-DUM, since the range
of firm-level union coverage within some of the industry categories is
limited (there are no firms in the stone, clay, and glass category with
both positive R&D and union coverage less than 10 percent). Union
effects on R&D vary considerably across industries, just as do union
effects on capital investment (and wages, profitability, and productivi
ty). Although union coverage has negative effects on R&D in most in
dustries, several positive union coefficients are obtained, including
significant estimates in the food, petroleum refining, and rubber and
miscellaneous plastics industry categories. Large negative (and signifi
cant) estimates of union effects on R&D are found in the chemicals,
drugs, office and computing equipment, nonelectric machinery, com
munication equipment, and lumber, wood, and paper industries.
Research providing further evidence on, and explanation for, interin
dustry differences in union effects on R&D investment is needed.
A two-step procedure is used next to estimate the union-R&D rela
tionship after accounting for positively correlated firm-specific error
terms across time. A first-step estimating equation regresses log(R&D)
on dummies for each firm (451 dummies corresponding to 452 firms
in the estimating sample), year dummies, and all firm and industry
variables that vary from year-to-year. Variables fixed over time in our
data set UN, I-UN, and industry dummies are excluded. The coef
ficients of the dummies are subsequently employed as independent
variables in second-step regressions (the excluded reference firm is
assigned a value of zero), in which the fixed variables UN, I-UN, and
IND are included. Coefficients on UN provide estimates of the union
investment effect with unbiased standard errors.
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Results from the final or second-step R&D regression, with the firm
coefficients from the first step as the dependent variable, indicate a
nonlinear relationship between log(R&D) and union coverage (these
results are presented below in the text). The union coefficient (1 1 \ ) in
the second-step equation, which includes UN, I-UN, and IND on the
right-hand side, is effectively zero, 0.027 (0.11). By contrast, the coef
ficient on a single union dummy variable UN-DUM (equal to 1 if
UN >.10) is estimated as -0.168 (1.16). Regressing firm effects on
three union categorical dummies (with I-UN and IND included) pro
duces the following results:
-0.160 UN-LOW - 0.192 UN-MED - 0.057 UN-HIGH.
(0.29)
(1.06)
(0.92)
The second-step estimates, suggesting direct negative effects of unions
on R&D investment in the neighborhood of 5 to 17 percent for com
panies with various levels of coverage, are somewhat lower than singlestage pooled estimates presented previously (WLS results are similar
to the two-step OLS). Moreover, the large standard errors associated
with the second-step estimates produce concern about the precision with
which the union-R&D relationship can be measured. The coefficient
on industry union density, I-UN, is approximately -1.0 (with t s of
about 1.3) in all second-step regressions. Although the overall evidence
for the hypothesis that union rent-seeking deters investment in innova
tion capital remains strong, the fragility of the two-step results is troubl
ing. 10

Further Results: Union Effects on Investment Intensity,
Factor Mix, Patent Propensity, Advertising, and Debt
The results presented in this chapter support the proposition that
unionized companies invest significantly less in physical capital and R&D
than do similar nonunion companies. The union effect appears to result
primarily from a union tax on returns from such investments and, to
a lesser degree, from lower earnings in unionized firms. In this sec
tion, the partial correlations between union coverage and alternative
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measures of capital investment, R&D, and other behavioral variables
are examined briefly. In table 5.5, we present partial regression results
providing estimates of union effects on R&D intensity (R&D/S),
measured by R&D expenditures divided by sales; capital investment
intensity (INV/S), measured by investment divided by sales; capital in
tensity (K/L), measured by the ratio of the net capital stock to employ
ment; patent propensity (PAT/R&D-STK), measured by the annual
number of patents granted per (million) dollar of R&D stock; advertis
ing intensity (ADV/S), measured by the ratio of advertising expenditures
to sales; and the debt-equity ratio (DEBT/EQUITY), measured by the
ratio of the age-adjusted book value of debt (Cummins et al. 1985) divid
ed by the market value of the firm (for related evidence on several of
these relationships, see Bronars and Deere 1989, 1991).
Table 5.5 presents coefficients on firm union coverage variables
measured, alternatively, by the single coverage variable, UN, and by
the categorical dummy variables UN-LOW, UN-MED, and UN-HIGH.
Some of the behavioral variables treated here as dependent variables
may be determined simultaneously with right-hand side explanatory
variables. We are reluctant, therefore, to interpret the union coefficient
as estimates of unionism©s causal effects but, rather, interpret these as
partial correlations.
Consistent with the R&D and investment level equation results
presented above, R&D intensity (R&D/S) and capital investment in
tensity (INV/S) are found to be significantly lower in union than in non
union firms. The magnitude of the estimated union-nonunion differen
tial in R&D intensity is particularly large, suggesting union firms have
ratios of R&D to sales .015 to .022 lower than nonunion firms, relative
to a mean R&D/S of .024 for this sample of R&D-active firms. Point
estimates of union-nonunion differences in capital investment intensi
ty, ranging from -.004 to -.009, are relatively small compared to mean
INV/S of .062 for this sample of companies. Further examination of
the relationship between unionization and physical capital produces in
teresting results. Although unionized firms invest less in physical capital
than do similar nonunion firms, they are more likely than nonunion firms
to be capital intensive, as demonstrated by the positive relationship of
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Table 5.5
Union Effects on Selected Behavioral Variables: Partial Regression Results
Dependent
variable
R&D/S

n

UN

UN-LOW

UN-MED

UN-HIGH

4,327

-0.025
(6.41)
-

—

—

—

-0.016
(5.95)
—

-0.019
(6.55)
—

-0.022
(6.90)
»

-0.004
(2.16)
—

-0.009
(5.38)
-

-0.007
(3.92)
—

-2.941
(3.31)
—

-0.532
(0.57)
—

1.465
(1.47)
—

1.827
(3.15)
—

0.445
(0.72)
—

1.315
(1.90)
—

-0.004
(2.53)
--

-0.005
(3.49)
~

-0.005
(3.27)
--

0.271
(2-64)

0.234
(2-18)

0.216
(1.85)

4,327
INV/S

6,596
6,596

K/L

6,602
6,602

PAT/R&D-STK

4,121
4,121

ADV/S

3,301
3,301

DEBT/EQUITY

5,983
5,983

-0.012
(5.14)
—
3.524
(2.84)
-0.585
(0.67)
-0.006
(2.84)
—
-0.001
(0.01)

-

NOTES: All regressions include irk, log(L), GROWTH, I-CR4, I-GROWTH, I-log(EARN), IDOMSH, year dummies, and industry dummies. Other firm-level variables included differ slightly
across equations. Dependent variables are defined as: R&D/S=annual R&D expenditures divid
ed by sales (defined for R&D-active firms only); INV/S=annual investment expenditures divid
ed by sales; K/L=net inflation-adjusted capital stock divided by employees (thousands 1972$);
PAT/R&D-STK=patents granted per year, divided by the R&D stock (in millions of 1972$);
ADV/S=annual advertising expenditures divided by sales (defined for advertising-active firms
only); and DEBT/EQUITY=value of long-term debt adjusted for age structure, divided by equi
ty value.
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union coverage with K/L. Coefficients on the categorical union dum
mies indicate this relationship is nonlinear; it is only highly unionized
firms that are more capital intensive than nonunion firms. 11
We find evidence from the categorical union coefficients supporting
the proposition that unionized firms have a higher propensity to license
or patent than do nonunion firms, given levels of the innovative capital
stock (PAT/R&D-STK). This evidence was examined to test the con
jecture by Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986) that returns from
licensable or transferable innovative activities are less vulnerable to the
threat of strike and union appropriation. The relationship between pa
tent propensity and union coverage is highly nonlinear, however, mak
ing us cautious in reading much into these results. 12
Evidence of lower advertising intensity (ADV/S) in high union firms
is also found, despite the contention by Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey
that advertising capital is relatively short-lived and not highly vulnerable
to union appropriation (ADV/S results display some sensitivity to
specification). Point estimates indicate that companies with medium and
high union coverage have advertising intensity ratios about .5 percent
age points lower than nonunion companies, relative to a mean of 2 per
cent for the estimation sample. Finally, we find mixed evidence for a
significant relationship between DEBT/EQUITY and union coverage
(the debt equation is not well specified and has an R2 of .024). The
debt-to- equity ratio does not increase with the extent of union coverage,
but is significantly larger among union firms than among nonunion firms
(as seen by coefficients on the union categorical dummies). The coeffi
cient estimates are also large, relative to the mean DEBT/EQUITY of
.43 for this sample of firms. These results provide only limited support
for the theoretical and empirical evidence in Bronars and Deere (1991),
where it is argued that union firms maximize shareholder wealth by
engaging in relatively higher levels of debt financing than do nonunion
firms.

Conclusions
Union appropriation of quasi-rents, which include the normal returns
to investment in long-lived fixed capital, significantly affects the
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investment behavior of unionized companies relative to their nonunion
counterparts. Although strongly efficient bargaining outcomes may ob
tain, implying that unions have no real allocative effects given existing
stocks of tangible and intangible capital (Abowd 1989b), long-run
resource allocation is affected. Efficient bargaining outcomes maximizing
the sum of union and shareholder wealth imply lower rates of longlived capital investment among unionized companies, owing to the
relatively high discount rate placed on future returns by current union
members who cannot recoup the value of future union membership.
Moreover, it is unlikely that long-run efficient bargaining outcomes are
realized in most industrial settings. To the extent that bargaining par
ties engage in short-run opportunistic behavior rather than long-run joint
ly maximizing behavior, current investment in tangible and intangible
capital is likely to be further reduced.
The results presented in this chapter provide evidence of unionnonunion differences in physical capital and R&D investment. It ap
pears that union rent-seeking has significant effects on firm investment
behavior. Unionized companies invest roughly 20 percent less in physical
capital than do similar nonunion companies. Approximately half of this
impact appears to be a direct union effect (holding constant current earn
ings), owing to the union tax on the future earnings stream emanating
from the capital stock, while about half is an indirect effect resulting
from the significantly lower current earnings among unionized com
panies. Union investment effects vary considerably, however, across
broad industry categories.
Union companies also invest significantly less in R&D than do their
nonunion counterparts. Point estimates of the union effect are sensitive
to the measurement of union coverage, but the average effect on unioniz
ed companies appears to be at least 20 percent. Most of the union ef
fect on R&D investment is a direct effect; indirect effects resulting from
lower earnings among union companies are modest. As is the case for
physical capital, union effects on R&D investment vary considerably
across industry categories. Besides investing less in R&D and physical
capital than do nonunion companies, further analysis shows that union
companies have a higher propensity to patent given the level of innovation
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(R&D) capital, lower advertising intensity, and higher debt-equity ratios.
Each of these relationships provides further support for the union rentseeking model and the implication that unionization has real effects on
investment behavior. 13
NOTES
1. Hirsch (forthcoming) extends parts of the analysis contained in this chapter.
2. A profitability variable can also be included in an investment equation on the grounds that
it proxies product demand shifts. Note that the specifications estimated here already include fouryear industry sales growth and two-year firm sales growth variables intended to capture demand
shifts.
3. The estimate ofdir/dUN using a two-step process described in chapter 4 was -0.025, as com
pared to -0.033 cited above. Using this lower estimate of the union profit effect, the total dif
ferential (eq. (5.2)) equals 0.272, with the indirect effect contributing just under half of the total
effect.
4. Results from annual regressions for the years 1968-1980 are not presented. They reveal con
siderable year-to-year variability in point estimates of union effects on capital investment, along
with considerable imprecision in estimating these effects. No secular trend is discernible. A fixedeffects model was estimated for 117 firms with union coverage information for 1972 and 1977.
No relationship was found between changes in investment and changes in union coverage. For
reasons stated in chapter 4, we have little confidence in coefficient estimates from the fixed-effects
model.
5. Hirsch (forthcoming) provides closely related evidence using an expanded sample of companies
and alternative specifications, and Abowd (1989a) provides industry-specific estimates of union
investment effects. Despite large differences in data and methodology, these two papers report
broadly similar results.
6. See the discussion above on inclusion of factor prices in an investment equation. The role of
union rent-seeking on R&D investment is discussed extensively in chapter 2.
7. Estimates of union effects on R&D based on a larger sample of firms for which a predicted
R&D expenditure variable is the dependent variable, are somewhat lower.
8. The sum of the coefficients on the logs of the R&D stock, capital stock, and employment is
about one, indicating that, say, a 10-percent increase in labor, the R&D stock, and the physical
capital stock, is associated with about a 10-percent increase in current R&D expenditures.
9. In results not shown, separate annual R&D investment equations for the years 1968-1980 are
estimated. The coefficients demonstrate a reasonable degree of year-to-year stability, but are
somewhat larger (in absolute value) during 1976-1979.
10. Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1989) examine the union-R&D relationship, and conclude that
firm and industry union coverage have negative and significant effects on R&D investment inten
sity, supporting the previous finding by Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey (1986).
11. Causation between capital intensity and unionization may run more from capital intensity to
union coverage than the other way around, since unions are more successful at organizing capitalintensive firms (Hirsch and Berger 1984). An analysis of this simultaneous relationship is beyond
the scope of this study.
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12. The literature on patents and R&D typically treats the patent-to-R&D ratio as a measure of
R&D efficiency; that is, innovative output for given levels of R&D input.
13. An important variable omitted from the analysis in this chapter is company age. It is likely
that older companies invest less, ceteris paribus, and are more likely to be unionized. Hirsch
(forthcoming) includes a variable measuring company age (years since incorporation) and finds
it to be negatively related to capital and R&D investment. Estimates of union effects on invest
ment, however, are affected relatively little. Preliminary analysis (whose results are not shown)
did not provide clear-cut evidence of union effects on employment or the mix between changes
in employment and capital investment, although results were sensitive to specification. (Bronars
and Deere (1990) have found that firms respond to union representation elections by lowering
employment.) Employment is higher in union than in nonunion firms, but then appears to decrease
moderately with the extent of coverage. No evidence was found of a significant relationship be
tween union coverage and a dependent variable measuring the four-year change in the log of employ
ment minus the change in the log of the real capital stock. The possible neutrality of changes
in the factor mix between capital and labor with respect to union coverage is, of course, consis
tent with the proposition of strongly efficient bargaining outcomes. But it is also consistent with
the union rent-seeking model presented here. High union wages reflect in part the ability to ap
propriate some portion of the firm's quasi-rents accruing to long-lived capital. Hence, shifts in
the factor mix away from labor and toward capital, as suggested by conventional theory, need
not be profit-maximizing.

Labor Unions, Productivity,
and Productivity Growth
Sizable differences exist among U.S. companies in their earnings,
market value, and investment behavior. Previous chapters in this
monograph have examined the extent to which these differences are
accounted for by the variation in union coverage among firms. The
results have been interpreted within the context of a union rent-seeking
model in which unions appropriate a portion of the returns accruing
from market power and long-lived tangible and intangible capital assets.
In this chapter, differences in productivity and productivity growth
among U.S. companies are examined. Neither theory nor previous
evidence provides unambiguous predictions as to how collective bargain
ing affects these crucial dimensions of firm performance. Relatively
little evidence has been provided, however, on productivity and pro
ductivity growth among wide cross-sections of U.S. companies using
firm-level measures of union coverage. Below, a brief development of
past theory, methodology, and evidence is presented, prior to turning
to new evidence on union effects on productivity and productivity
growth.

Union Effects on Productivity and Productivity Growth
There exist widely divergent opinions about unionism's effect on pro
ductivity. Recent empirical research on productivity and other union
effects in the workplace has been inspired in large part by Freeman
and Medoff s collective voice/institutional response view of unions
(Freeman 1976; Freeman and Medoff 1984) and the seminal article by
Brown and Medoff (1978) concluding that union establishments are
significantly more productive than nonunion establishments. 1 The
voice/response view emphasizes the potential positive role of unions on
91
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productivity in environments characterized by internal labor markets
with long-run attachment of workers and firms (typically associated with
extensive firm-specific training), worker complementarities or team
work in training and production, and workplace "public" goods such
as safety, personnel policies, and hours of operation. Unions provide
a potential mechanism for correcting the "market failure" deriving from
public goods in the workplace. Unionization does this through increas
ed reliance on collective voice, reflecting the preferences of average
workers, as opposed to nonunion reliance on individual voice express
ed through entry and exit behavior of marginal workers. 2 A union, it
is argued, provides a collective voice that more accurately identifies
and communicates worker preferences to the firm and establishes
grievance procedures and other formalized governance structures that
help to reduce exit (quits) and improve employee morale. Cooperative
labor-management relations are a necessary but not sufficient condi
tion for positive productivity effects in union establishments.
The voice/response view of unions stands in marked contrast to the
traditional view of economists, portraying unions as a labor market
monopolist retarding productivity and productivity growth. Negative
union effects are believed to result from wage-induced allocative inef
ficiency, union work rules, limitations on management discretion and
flexibility in promotions and job assignments, and decreased worker
incentives due to limitations on merit-based wage dispersion. Despite
a litany of anecdotal evidence, careful empirical analyses of the effects
of work rules are few; and many that exist are industry-specific. Evidence
from the construction industry, where much work has been done, sug
gests that union work rules reduce productivity rather modestly (Alien
1986). In one of the few economy wide estimates, Ichniowski (1984)
concludes that union work rules, as proxied rather crudely by contract
length, are negatively related to productivity. The considerable atten
tion given to work rules by firms and unions during contract negotia
tions suggests that their effects are not trivial. Yet in the absence of
empirical evidence, little can be said about the direct negative effects
of union work rules and limitations placed on management.
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The empirical debate has centered not on union effects on allocative
efficiency but, rather, whether there is a productivity differential be
tween union and nonunion establishments, given equivalent labor and
nonlabor inputs (i.e., technical efficiency). Most studies have follow
ed Brown and Medoff (1978) in employing a variant of the Cobb-Douglas
production function
(6.1) Q = AK«(Ln + cLM)'-«,
where Q is output, Lu and Ln are union and nonunion labor respectively,
K is capital, A is a constant of proportionality, and a and (1-a) are the
output elasticities with respect to capital and labor. The parameter c
measures productivity differences between union and nonunion labor.
A c greater (less) than unity implies union labor is more (less) produc
tive than nonunion labor. Letting P equal union density (LU/L), Brown
and Medoff approximate eq. (6.1) by:
(6.2) log(0/L) = logA + a\og(K/L) + (l-a)(c-l)P.
Eq. (6.2) assumes constant returns to scale, an assumption relaxed by
including a logL variable as a measure of establishment size. The pro
ductivity differential of unionized establishments is estimated by the
coefficient on P (the coefficient on P divided by 1-a provides an estimate
of c if the union productivity effect solely reflects the differential effi
ciency of labor inputs).
Using state-by-industry data for 1972, Brown and Medoff (1978) con
clude that union establishments are significantly more productive than
nonunion establishments. And subsequent industry-specific studies have
provided some additional evidence of positive union productivity ef
fects (see Freeman and Medoff 1984). Addison and Hirsch (1989),
however, evaluate extant evidence and conclude that no compelling case
exists for a statistically or quantitatively significant positive or negative
union productivity effect. Previous estimates, they point out, vary con
siderably across firms and industries and positive productivity effects
appear to be in response to decreased profit expectations. This is broadly
consistent with a "shock effect" and selectivity interpretation (Addison
and Hirsch 1989). Productivity gains are largest where unions acquire
sizable wage gains and where there are significant competitive pressures,
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thus shocking management into increasing productivity. Little evidence
is found for positive union productivity effects in the public and notfor-profit sectors. Moreover, union firms whose productivity and prof
its decrease are most likely to contract in size or go out of business
and, therefore, are underrepresented in available data samples. Final
ly, large positive productivity effects are inconsistent with the evidence
on profitability and employment (see Addison and Hirsch 1989, and
Wessels 1985, respectively).
There have been few productivity studies using both firm (or line of
business) observations from multiple industries and firm (or businesslevel) measures of unionization. Clark (1984) finds little difference be
tween productivity (sales per unit of labor input) in union and non
union lines of business. Hirsch (1990a) uses a sample of Compustat
companies and a 1972 measure of collective bargaining coverage. He
finds productivity to be lower among union companies, but estimates
are highly sensitive to the inclusion of industry control variables. Recent
ly, Kruse (1988, chap. 3) has estimated production functions for a sample
of Compustat companies, employing a firm-level union status dummy
equal to one if the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has reported any
collective bargaining contract settlements involving the company. He
reports moderately higher productivity among manufacturing companies
with some union coverage (and substantially higher productivity among
unionized nonmanufacturing companies). 3
There are a number of limitations to the production function test
(Brown and Medoff 1978; Addison and Hirsch 1989). The use of value
added as an output measure may confound price and quantity effects,
since part of the measured union productivity differential can result from
higher prices in unionized sectors. In this case, the union coefficient
in the production function may crudely track the union-nonunion wage
differential. 4 Data limitations may also necessitate the assumption of
identical production function parameters in the union and nonunion sec
tors. And the reliability of the production function test also may de
pend on the ability to control for all important inputs in the production
process, since unmeasured "firm effects" may not be independent of
union status.
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A serious concern surrounding the union productivity test is that of
selectivity. Since union firms (or units of firms) facing higher wage
rates must be more productive to survive in the very long run, the pro
ductivity effect is not being measured across a representative sample
of firms. Rather, only surviving union firms with sufficient produc
tivity increases are likely to be observed, thus causing the union pro
ductivity effect on a representative firm to be overstated. Additional
concerns are the overly restrictive assumption of Cobb-Douglas
technology, and the* simultaneity problem between inputs and outputs
in OLS estimation of any production function. While these limitations
are not addressed here, one response to these latter concerns has been
to directly estimate (translog) cost and profit functions (e.g., Alien 1987).
The limitations discussed above will make it necessary to qualify
carefully the conclusions based on subsequent productivity evidence.
Because several of our reservations apply to omitted or unmeasured
determinants of productivity levels, analysis of productivity changes
(growth) may purge empirical analyses of fixed effects. Hirsch and Link
(1984) show that changes in total factor productivity, Q, derived by sub
tracting a\og(K/L) from both sides of eq. (6.2) and differencing, is a
function of changes in union density, </UN. Following the productivity
growth literature emphasizing the role of R&D on growth, Hirsch and
Link employ a three-factor Cobb-Douglas function that includes technical
capital, T. Their total factor productivity growth equation (ignoring con
trol variables) is
(6.3) Q = y + <t>(dT/dt)/Q + (l-a)(c-l)rfUN,
where Q is total factor productivity growth, y is the rate of disembodied
growth (the time derivative of [log£ - otlogK - (l-a)logL]), <f> is dQ/dT
(the marginal product of technical capital), dT/dt approximates net in
vestments into stock T, and (dT/dt)/Q is proxied by R&D intensity. A
positive coefficient on the change in union density, d\JN, implies c> 1
and supports the voice/response view. Estimating the production func
tion in difference form has the advantage of netting out unmeasured
fixed effects, but in this context requires a measure of changes in
unionization over a suitably long time period. 5 As seen below, we
estimate productivity growth equations,including a union-level variable
but not a change variable.
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Union Effects on Productivity: Empirical Evidence
In order to examine union effects on productivity, a variant of the
Brown-Medoff model is estimated, with labor productivity a function
of capital intensity and unionization. We estimate:
(6.4) \og(VA/L)i( = EftJfe, + alog(AT/L)ft + (l-a)(c-l)UNf. + cu,
where \og(VA/L) is the log of value added per employee in firm / and
year t, \og(K/L) is the log of the capital-to-labor ratio, UN is firm-level
union coverage, and X includes k firm and industry determinants of pro
ductivity (including an intercept). A positive (negative) coefficient on
UN implies that union firms have c> 1 (c< 1) and have higher (lower)
technical efficiency. Among the variables in X will be the log of labor,
log(L); the log of the R&D stock per employee, log(R&D-STKest/L);
the two-year firm-specific growth rate in real sales, GROWTH; the fouryear industry growth rate of real sales, I-GROWTH; industry concen
tration, I-CR; industry share of sales by domestic firms, I-DOMSH;
industry union coverage, I-UN; and year and industry dummies. The
industry variables and dummies are potentially important since labor
productivity varies considerably across industries and time, and unioniza
tion is not randomly distributed across industries.
Variables measuring firm and industry growth, industry concentra
tion, import competition, and industry union density are not variables
normally included in production function equations. Variables affect
ing demand growth, product market competition, and union density are
likely to affect product price, however, so their inclusion is important
in studies using a value added rather than physical output measure of
productivity. If these control variables were absent, it is likely that some
of the measured differences in value added would result from price rather
than output differences. This is particularly critical for measurement
of union-nonunion differences in productivity, since union coverage is
correlated with growth and product market structure variables.
All variables used in regressions in this chapter are defined in Data
Appendix 2. Productivity is measured by value added per worker, where
value added represents the approximate difference between company
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sales and the costs of materials (inventory changes are ignored). Value
added is measured with error, however, owing primarily to the absence
of data in Compustat on the cost of materials. The Compustat item "cost
of goods" measures materials and production costs, including all labor
costs. In order to approximate value added, firm labor costs must be
added back in. Approximately a quarter of the firms in our sample had
direct measures of labor compensation and pension costs available in
Compustat, thus allowing a relatively accurate approximation of value
added. For the remaining firms, labor costs were estimated by multiply
ing firm employment times average industry compensation, the latter
being inflated by 1.25 times UN in order to reflect the higher labor
costs in union firms (were this adjustment not made, there would have
been spurious negative correlation between unionism and value add
ed). The 1.25«UN adjustment factor is consistent with a 25-percent labor
cost differential and was arrived at through experimentation on the sam
ple of firm-years with actual labor and pension costs. For these firms,
mean measurement error (defined as the difference between "actual"
value added and "estimated" value added) was less than 1 percent and
uncorrelated with union coverage (the simple correlation coefficient is
.001). Thus, measurement error in value added should not result in coef
ficient bias in the productivity level or productivity growth equations.
Production function estimates are presented in table 6.1 for specifica
tions with and without inclusion of industry variables and dummies. 6
The coefficient on UN is found to be negative and significant in all
specifications. The magnitude of the union coefficient, however, is sen
sitive to the inclusion of industry-level variables and dummies. In col
umn (1), the coefficient (|f|) is -0.186 (13.76), but falls in absolute
value to -0.131 (9.07) when industry variables are included (column
(2)). The further addition of 2-digit industry dummies changes the union
coefficient to -0.082 (6.10). For a typical unionized company with
UN = .423, the point estimate in (3) indicates that factor productivity
is about 3.5 percent lower than in a nonunion company. Use of separate
union coverage dummies (see the note to table 6.1) indicates a nonlinear
union effect, with the most negative effect on productivity being for
firms with medium coverage (.30 < UN < .60). These results indicate that
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Table 6.1
Productivity Regression Results
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

UN

-0.186
(13.76)

-0.131
(9.07)

-0.082
(6.10)

log(/sT/L)

0.274
(51.47)

0.266
(51.49)

0.285
(43.64)

log(R&D-STKest/L)

0.080
(24.30)

0.073
(22.80)

0.038
(11.20)

log(L)

-0.001
(0.41)

-0.011
(4.55)

-0.013
(6.07)

GROWTH

0.025
(5.80)
--

0.020
(4.86)

0.018
(4.81)

0.009
(13.17)

0.006
(9.33)

I-GROWTH
I-CR4

~

0.004
(18.52)

0.003
(14.44)

I-DOMSH

~

0.001
(2.61)

0.001
(2.38)

I-UN

~

-0.051
(2.09)

0.283
(7.95)

IND
YEAR
R2

no

no

yes

yes

yes
yes

0.400

0.450

0.567

n

6,248

6,248

6,248

NOTES: Dependent variable is log(K4/L). |/| in parentheses. Below are coefficients (|r|) ob
tained substituting union dummies for UN in equation (3), with nonunion the omitted reference
group and where UN-LOW = 1 if (0<UN<.30); UN-MED = 1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UNHIGH =1 if (UN>.60).
(3): - 0.020 UN-LOW - 0.065 UN-MED - 0.49 UN-HIGH.
2.04)
(6.49)
(4.50)
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low-, medium-, and high-union coverage firms have factor productivities
2.0, 6.5, and 4.9 percent lower, respectively, than their nonunion
counterparts.
As further evidence of the sensitivity of union coefficient estimates
to the addition of industry controls, 105 2-, 3-, and 4-digit industry dum
mies are added to the labor productivity equation, in lieu of the 2-digit
dummies and I-UN, which is measured at the 3-digit level (these results
are not shown in the tables). Inclusion of these dummies causes the union
coefficient (1 1 \ ) to fall in absolute value from -0.082 (6.10) to -0.030
(2.38). Coefficients (|f|) on the coverage dummies become -0.026
(2.90), -0.054 (5.78), and -0.026 (2.58) for the low-, medium-, and
high-union dummies, respectively. These estimates, indicating that
unionized companies have factor productivities roughly 2.5 to 5 per
cent lower than nonunion companies, are consistent with dark's (1984)
finding of negative but small (2 to 3 percent) union productivity effects
among U.S. lines of businesses during the 1970-1980 period. Our results,
in conjunction with the finding that profitability is significantly lower
among union companies, provides strong evidence that the frequently
cited finding by Brown and Medoff (1978) of large positive union pro
ductivity estimates is unique to their data set and should not be generaliz
ed. Nor can a compelling case be made from the data assembled here
that there exists a large and statistically robust negative effect of unions
on productivity.
Coefficients on other variables in the productivity equations are largely
as predicted. The coefficient a, on \og(K/L), which provides a crude
proxy for capital's share in value added, is 0.29. The coefficient on
the R&D stock per employee is about 0.04, in line with (or a little lower
than) estimates from previous studies (Griliches 1986). There exists weak
evidence of diseconomies of scale, based on the negative coefficient
on log(L), although measurement error in Compustat's variable measur
ing number of employees may produce a spurious negative correlation
between log(K/4/L) and log(L). Firm- and industry-specific growth rates
in sales, intended to proxy demand shifts, are positively associated with
factor productivity. This relationship may result either from high capacity
utilization rates among firms facing strong sales growth (and labor hoard
ing during downturns), or the presence among growing firms of newer
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and more productive capital which is not fully reflected in our measures
of the capital stock. The variables I-CR and I-DOMSH appear to cap
ture industry effects (e.g., product price effects on value added); the
coefficient on each changes from a positive to negative value when 3-digit
industry dummies are included (results not shown).
Finally, the positive coefficient on industry union density, I-UN, is
consistent with the hypothesis of a positive price effect in industries
with high union density. That is, to the extent that a high level of in
dustry union coverage increases product price, measured productivity
or value added is higher for both union and nonunion companies. The
magnitude of the coefficient is surprising, however, suggesting that IUN is correlated with (i.e., capturing) omitted determinants of produc
tivity. This increases further our caution in attaching much weight to
coefficient estimates on the firm-level union measures.
In addition to examining economy wide union-nonunion productivity
differences, we also disaggregate results by industry. Although the
overall union productivity effect appears to be small, union effects across
industries should vary considerably. This expectation is based in part
on the considerable interindustry variation observed for union-nonunion
differences in wages, profitability, and investment. Union wage and
profit effects, for example, should provide a major impetus to manage
ment to reduce X-inefficiency and increase measured productivity (Addison and Hirsch 1989). The expectation of highly variable union pro
ductivity effects is based as well on the belief that union-nonunion pro
ductivity differences result from differences across firms in labor rela
tions and the "institutional response" by management to union represen
tation (Freeman and Medoff 1984).
Table 6.2 provides estimates of union productivity effects by industry
category, based on specifications including a single union coverage
variable, UN, and the three categorical coverage variables. A considerable
degree of variation in union productivity effects across industry categories
is found. Note that some of the variation results from the very small
number of companies within each industry-by-union category cell. In
cases where there are less than two companies in a nonunion or highunion cell (each company is of course observed for multiple years), the
dummy variable is collapsed into the next union category variable.
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Positive union productivity effects are observed for several industries
(we ignore the miscellaneous manufacturing and conglomerate category).
As previously found by Clark (1984), union companies in the textile and
apparel industry have higher productivity than do nonunion companies.
Productivity effects are not large enough, however, to prevent somewhat
lower profitability among these companies (chapter 4, table 4.3).7 Positive
union productivity effects are found as well among companies in the
following industries: fabricated metal products; engines, farm and con
struction equipment; and motor vehicle and transportation equipment.
The latter results must be discounted somewhat since there are a small
number of firms in both the nonunion and low-union categories. The
other two industries, however, were previously found to have similar
earnings and market valuation of union and nonunion firms, indicating
that positive productivity effects are sufficient to offset union wage
premiums. There is also weak evidence of higher union productivity
among companies in the stone, clay, and glass, communication, and air
craft and aerospace industries. The small number of nonunion firms in
these industries, however, makes such comparisons difficult.
More widespread evidence is found for negative union productivity
effects, although the magnitude and statistical significance of these
estimates are small in many of the industry categories. A relatively clearcut union disadvantage in productivity is found in the following industries:
chemicals; drugs; petroleum refining; primary metals; nonelectric
machinery; electrical equipment; professional and scientific equipment;
and lumber, wood, and paper. This list of industries corresponds close
ly to the industry categories for which companies are found to have lower
profitability and market value (chapter 4, table 4.3). In short, union ef
fects on company profits are most severe in those industries where
negative union productivity effects reinforce (or do not offset) union ef
fects on labor compensation.
The productivity equations estimated above assume common slope
parameters or output elasticities with respect to capital, R&D, and labor
among union and nonunion firms. But as shown by Brown and Medoff
(1978), union productivity estimates may be highly sensitive to viola
tions of this assumption. In order to examine the possibility of varying
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slope parameters, the right-hand variables log(£/L), logCR&D-STK^VL),
log(L), and I-UN are interacted with UN. The interaction variables permit
the effects of these inputs and industry union density to vary systematically
with the extent of firm-level union coverage, and allow us to identify
the routes through which union-nonunion productivity differences take
place. In results not shown, significant negative coefficients are found
on the interaction terms of UN with log(£/L), log(R&D-STKest/L), and
log(L). A positive coefficient is found on the interaction of UN with I-UN.
The lower output elasticities with respect to physical capital and R&D
found for highly unionized companies are consistent with Baldwin's (1983)
union expropriation model in which union companies rationally invest
in "second-best" capital as a means of mitigating union wage demands.
The reasoning here is that unions will tend to have a standard rate across
establishments within the same company. By maintaining inefficient
capital or plants, union demands for wages above the marginal revenue
product at the inefficient plants will result in employment losses for the
union. What appears clear is that union companies are more likely to
be in mature industries and establishments, with older and less produc
tive capital stocks. Although the R&D and physical capital variables are
age-adjusted measures, they may not reflect fully quality differences in
the capital stocks between union and nonunion companies. The positive
coefficient on the interaction of UN with I-UN suggests that produc
tivity or price increases are more likely among union than among non
union companies in highly unionized industries.
The robustness of the union productivity results are examined fur
ther by using a two-step estimation process intended to account for
positively correlated firm-specific error terms across time. In a firststep regression, log(P£4/L) is regressed on all firm and industry variables
that vary from year-to-year, year dummies, and dummies for each firm
(571 dummies corresponding to 572 firms in the estimating sample).
Excluded are variables fixed over time—UN, I-UN, and industry dum
mies. The coefficients of the dummies are then used as the dependent
variables in second-step regressions (the excluded reference firm is
assigned a value of zero), in which the fixed variables UN (or, alter
natively, union category dummies), I-UN, and IND are included
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(n=572). Second-step regression results provide estimates of the union
productivity effect with unbiased standard errors.
Results from the second-step regression (shown in text below), with
the firm coefficients from the first step as the dependent variable, cast
further doubt on the robustness of the results presented previously. The
union coefficient (1 1 \ ) in the second-step equation, which includes UN,
I-UN, and IND on the right-hand side, is -0.014 (0.23), as compared
to -0.082 (6.10) in the single-stage pooled model. The coefficient (1 1 \ )
on industry density, I-UN, is 0.537 (3.30). Regressing firm effects on
union categorical dummies (with I-UN and IND included) produces the
following results:
0.082 UN-LOW + 0.041 UN-MED + 0.030 UN-HIGH.
(1.90)
(0.92)
(0.63)
These results suggest that productivity is somewhat higher among com
panies with relatively low levels of union coverage than among non
union and highly organized companies (results using weighted GLS
regressions are similar). This pattern is exactly the opposite of that
previously found. The positive and significant coefficient on industry
union density, I-UN, is relatively insensitive to the measurement of firm
union coverage.
The large standard errors associated with the second-step estimates
prevents us from placing weight on these specific results. But, likewise,
our earlier results must also be discounted owing to the sensitivity of
the union coefficient estimates to the addition of detailed industry dum
mies, the considerable diversity of productivity estimates across in
dustries, the different pattern of union effects found using the two-step
estimation procedure, and the known biases and difficulties inherent in
the production function methodology (Addison and Hirsch 1989).
In short, the econometric evidence on productivity is simply too fragile
to draw strong inferences about union effects in the workplace. That
being said, there is no evidence to support the contention of large and
statistically significant positive union productivity effects. Based on the
relatively clear-cut evidence of lower profits and market values in union
companies, we also know that positive union productivity effects are
not sufficiently large in general to offset cost increases owing to union
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wage premiums. Based on the evidence from this study, it can be con
cluded that union productivity effects are small on average, vary con
siderably in sign and magnitude across industries and individual
workplaces, and cannot be estimated precisely with existing techniques
and data bases.

Union Effects on Productivity Growth: Empirical Evidence
The effects of unionization on productivity growth are examined us
ing a variant of eq. (6.3). Rather than compute changes in total factor
productivity, "partial" productivity growth rates (Griliches 1986) are
calculated. The variable Q it ,_4 is defined as the annualized logarithmic
growth between years t and t-4 in deflated value added, minus the growth
of employment times labor's share of total cost. The growth rate of capital
is included on the right-hand side of the equation. Such a specification
is appealing in data sets where capital's share is difficult to estimate ac
curately. The productivity growth equation takes the following general
form:
(6.5) e ,x ,_4 = E0QkXkit>t_4 + 5UNf. + £>,,,_4 ,
where e,,,_4 is the growth rate in productivity (as defined above) by firm
/ between years t and t-4, and UN is firm-level union coverage in 1977
with coefficient 6. The vector X includes a constant and firm-level
measures of the growth rate of physical capital (d\og,(K)), the growth
rate of the R&D stock or estimated R&D stock (dlog(R&D-STKest)),
the average level of the R&D stock in years t and t-4 (log(R&DSTKest)), the growth rate and average level of employment (d[og(L) and
log(L)), and 2-digit industry dummies. Industry-level variables include
union density in 1977 (I-UN), average annual sales growth over the fouryear period (I-GROWTH), the average share of sales by domestic firms
in an industry during years t and t-4 (I-DOMSH), and the average share
of energy in total cost during years t and t-4 (I-ENERGY/Y\). Because
we measure firm unionization only at a single point in time, we are unable
to estimate the relationship between changes in productivity and changes
in unionism.
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Table 6.3 presents regression results for the productivity growth equa
tions, with and without inclusion of industry level variables and dum
mies. In regression models without industry variables, we find that pro
ductivity growth is positively and significantly related to the growth rate
of physical capital and the level of (but not change in) R&D stocks, but
significantly lower among union firms.8 The UN coefficient in column
(1) suggests that unionized firms realize productivity growth substan
tially lower than do nonunion firms (mean Q is .023 for this sample of
firms and four-year periods). Once industry-level variables and 2-digit
dummies are included, however, the estimated direct union effect on
productivity growth falls, from a point estimate of-0.027 in column (1),
to -0.011 when industry-level variables (but not industry dummies) are
added in (2), and to -0.007 with the further addition of industry dum
mies in (3). Replacing the continuous union coverage variable, UN, with
three categorical variables corresponding to low, medium, and high levels
of coverage (see the note to table 6.4), coefficient (1 1 \ ) estimates of -0.004
(1.96), -0.006 (2.86), and -0.005 (2.30) are obtained for low-, medium-,
and high-union coverage firms, respectively. These results indicate that
even small levels of coverage are associated with slower productivity
growth, but that growth varies little with the extent of coverage among
unionized companies.
The results strongly suggest that much of the slower productivity
growth of union firms during the 1970s was due to industry-level ef
fects independent of unionization. This conclusion is based on the fact
that estimated union coefficients become closer and closer to zero as
industry control variables are added to the regressions. Yet even in a
regression with detailed controls, we find that unionized companies had
productivity growth about a half of a percentage point lower than nonu
nion firms, not a trivial amount relative to a sample average Q of 2.3
percent. To check the sensitivity of the estimates to a more detailed
control for industry, the productivity growth model is estimated with
the inclusion of 105 industry dummies measured at the 2-, 3-, and 4digit level (these results not shown in tables). It is interesting that the
union coefficients do not further decrease (in absolute value) following
the addition of detailed dummies, the coefficient (1 1 \ ) on UN changes
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Table 6.3
Productivity Growth Regression Results

(1)

(2)

(3)

UN

-0.027
(9.95)

-0.011
(3.89)

-0.007
(2.32)

<Aog(K)

0.107
(8.57)

0.136
(11.28)

0.151
(13.06)

<flog(L)

0.270
(20.30)

0.231
(17.96)

0.221
(18.15)

0.002
(0.32)
0.004
(6.01)

0.001
(0.15)

-0.003
(0.58)

0.002
(3.28)

0.002
(2.38)

-0.003
(352)

-0.001
(153)

-0.001
(0.70)

0.154
(11.78)

0.130
(9.90)

I-DOMSH/100

-0.050
(4.46)

-0.010
(0.83)

(I-ENERGY/VA)/100

-0.143
(12.69)

-0.030
(1.79)

Variable

<flog(R&D-STKest)
log(R&D-STKest)
log(L)
I-GROWTH/100

I-UN

~

-0.011
(2.22)

0.013
(1.80)

IND

no

no

yes

yes

yes
0.463
4,258

YEAR
R2

0.335

yes
0.390

n

4,258

4,258

NOTES: Dependent variable is gf f_4 . \t\ in parentheses. Below are coefficients (\t\) obtained
substituting union dummies for UN in equation (3), with nonunion the omitted reference group
and where UN-LOW = 1 if (0<UN<.30); UN-MED=1 if (.30<UN<.60); and UN-HIGH = 1
if (UN >.60).
(3): - 0.004 UN-LOW - 0.006 UN-MED - 0.005 UN-HIGH.
(2.30)
(2.86)
(1.96)
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to -0.008 (2.97), and those on UN-LOW, UN-MED, and UN-HIGH
change to -0.005 (2.57), -0.007 (3.53), and -0.006 (2.95), respectively.
Thus, the results appearing in table 6.3 appear to provide sufficient con
trols for industry-specific effects on productivity growth.
Estimates of union effects on productivity growth by industry category
are provided in table 6.4. As expected, considerable variability exists
and standard errors are relatively large in most cases. In no industry
is evidence found for a significant positive relationship between union
coverage status and productivity growth. There is at least moderately
strong evidence of a negative union effect on growth in the chemicals,
drugs and medical instruments, communication equipment, motor vehicle
and transportation equipment, and professional and scientific equipment
industries. Interestingly, these industries tend to be technologically ad
vanced and have higher than average productivity growth rates and in
vestments in R&D. And although the correlation is not perfect, these
industries also tend to be ones where union coverage was previously
found to impact negatively on profitability, investment in capital and
R&D, and productivity.
Finally, robustness of the productivity growth results is examined by
using the two-step estimation process designed to account for positive
ly correlated firm-specific error terms across time. In the first step, Q
is regressed on firm and industry variables that vary from year-to-year,
year dummies, and dummies for each firm (530 dummies correspond
ing to 531 firms in the estimating sample). The coefficients on the firm
dummies then form the dependent variable in second-step regressions
in which the fixed variables UN (or, alternatively, union category dum
mies), I-UN, and IND are included. These second-step regression results
(n=531) provide estimates of the union growth effect with unbiased
standard errors.
Results from the second-step regression (not shown in tables) indicate
a sizable negative relationship between productivity growth and union
coverage when industry dummies are excluded. When industry dum
mies are included, however, the negative relationship between firm pro
ductivity growth and union coverage vanishes (weighted GLS regres
sion results are similar). For example, the coefficient (|f |) on UN in
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a second-step equation with I-UN and industry dummies excluded is
-0.009 (1.60), but changes to 0.003 (0.51) in the second-step model
that includes I-UN and IND on the right-hand side. The evidence
presented in this chapter supports the proposition that most of the slower
productivity growth associated with union coverage is accounted for
by the disproportionate presence of unionization in industries with slower
growth. And given the relative fragility of the productivity growth
evidence following econometric probing, we are unwilling to reject the
proposition that union effects on productivity growth are, on average,
close to zero.

Conclusions
Results presented previously in this monograph have shown rather
clearly that union coverage in the workplace has significant negative
effects on firm profitability and investment behavior. These relation
ships are interpreted within the context of a rent-seeking model in which
unions appropriate some share of the quasi-rents that make up both nor
mal and supra-competitive returns to fixed, long-lived, tangible and in
tangible capital. In this chapter, we explore differences in productivity
levels and productivity growth between union and nonunion companies,
given their stocks and investments in capital, R&D, and labor.
Neither theory nor previous evidence provides unambiguous predic
tions as to union effects on productivity levels and growth. Although
the initial evidence in this chapter indicates that union coverage is
associated with lower productivity levels and slower productivity growth,
further probing indicates that these relationships are anything but clearcut. Much of the union-nonunion difference in performance results from
the fact that unions are organized disproportionately in companies and
industries with characteristics leading to lower productivity and slower
growth, independent of any direct union effects.
Moreover, estimated union effects exhibit tremendous variability
across and within industries, not only in magnitude and statistical
significance, but also in sign. Admittedly, sample sizes of companies
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within industry categories are small, but much of the interindustry
variability appears to result from real differences in unionism's impact
across sectors. While explanation for these differences lies beyond the
scope of this research, differences in competitiveness, management and
labor relations, financial conditions, and technological opportunities are
likely to be important. A final caveat emerges from the fragility of the
estimates found when using a two-step estimation process designed to
purge firm-specific correlation of error terms across years. Negative
relationships of union coverage with productivity and productivity growth
are no longer found using this two-step process.
Based on the evidence presented here, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that unions, on average, have little direct effect on productivity and pro
ductivity growth. Note that this conclusion does not imply that unions
do not matter in the workplace. Rather, it implies that unionism's net
impact, comprised of both positive and negative effects on performance,
is generally small. Moreover, attention in this chapter has focused ex
clusively on unionism's direct impact on economic performance or, more
explicitly, on union-nonunion differences in productivity levels and
growth for given inputs and characteristics. Indirect effects resulting
from the union impact on profits, market value, and investments in capital
and R&D may be of consequence. That is, even though the union im
pact on technical efficiency (i.e., output obtained from given inputs)
is apparently small, the financial and investment impact of unionism
leads to lower levels and slower growth in productivity-related inputs.
As discussed previously, absent positive productivity effects that off
set union wage increases, decreased profitability leads predictably to
lower investment and retrenchment in the unionized sectors of the
economy.
NOTES
1. Surveys and interpretations of the unions and productivity literature are available in Freeman
and Medoff (1984), Hirsch and Addison (1986, chap. 7), and Addison and Hirsch (1989).
2. While they do not explicitly discuss unions, Williamson, Wkchter, and Harris (1975) analyze
a similar workplace environment, which they characterize as one of "idiosyncratic exchange." Fbulkes
(1980) examines personnel policies in large nonunion companies. Freeman and Medoff are skep
tical, however, about the possibility of a nonunion solution to the public goods problem.
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3. Recent firm- and industry-level studies from the U.K. suggest that British unions (and, in par
ticular, the closed shop) have even more negative productivity effects (for a survey, see Metcalf 1988).
4. Evidence of lower profitability by union firms, however, indicates that firms are limited in their
ability to pass price increases forward to consumers.
5. Hirsch and Link find both union level and change variables to be negatively related to produc
tivity growth among 2-digit manufacturing industries. Besides having an extremely small sample
size, industry-level analyses do not allow disentangling of union and industry effects on growth.
6. These specifications also were estimated for two smaller samples—those companies with directly
measured (i.e., not estimated) R&D stocks, and the sample of companies for which labor com
pensation, used in the calculation of value added, is reported directly. In the first case, results
from the alternative samples were highly similar. In the latter case, estimated union effects on
productivity were somewhat larger (more negative) than those reported in this chapter.
7. Addison and Hirsch (1989) conclude that a competitive environment (as in textiles and apparel)
is a necessary condition for positive productivity effects to result in response to union wage and
profit effects. Kazis (1989) documents how unions and large manufacturers have worked together
to modernize and improve productivity in the textile and apparel industries.
8. Results with respect to union coverage are not affected when the equation is estimated for the
smaller sample with complete R&D stock information. The coefficients on the R&D variables,
however, are larger and more significant than those presented in table 6.4.

7
Summary and Evaluation
This monograph examines the impact of collective bargaining coverage
on the economic performance of publicly traded U.S. manufacturing
companies during the 1970s. It develops a union rent-seeking model
which posits that unions appropriate a share of the returns from market
power and from quasi-rents accruing to long-lived capital. Among the
performance measures examined are company profitability, market
value, investment behavior, productivity, and productivity growth.
As part of this study, a survey of companies was conducted to col
lect firm-level information on the extent of collective bargaining coverage
during 1977 and 1987. Coverage data from this survey are combined
with more limited information obtained from a 1972 Conference Board
study to create a single firm-level union variable approximating collec
tive bargaining coverage in 1977. Firm union coverage information is
then combined with detailed company data for the 1968-1980 period
on market value, earnings, sales, capital investment flows and capital
stocks, R&D expenditure flows and R&D stocks, patents, employment,
advertising, and debt, as well as industry data on concentration, im
port competition, sales growth, payroll, and union density.
Data collected from the survey indicate substantial interindustry and
intraindustry variability in the proportion of workers covered by col
lective bargaining agreements. Among the 452 companies reporting
figures for both 1977 and 1987, collective bargaining coverage averages
30.5 percent in 1977, but declines to 25.0 percent by 1987 (table 3.2).
The decline in unionization is widespread, coverage decreasing in all
but one of 19 broad industry categories (there is virtually no change
in average coverage among companies in the electrical equipment and
supplies group). Substantial intraindustry variation in collective bargain
ing coverage indicates a potentially large benefit from measuring
unionization at the firm- as well as industry-level in empirical studies
of economic performance.
113
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Examination of variable means, cross-classified with union coverage
status, reveals large differences in economic performance between non
union and highly unionized companies (Data Appendix 1). The market
valuation of company assets, measured by Tobin's q, and company prof
itability, measured by the rate of return on capital, decline sharply with
respect to union coverage. Investment intensity in innovation capital,
measured by the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales and the ratio of
patents to sales, shows particularly steep decreases with respect to union
coverage. Capital investment intensities, measured by the ratio of an
nual investment to sales, and advertising intensity, measured by the ratio
of advertising expenditures to sales, are similar among nonunion com
panies and companies with low levels of coverage, but decline among
companies with medium and high levels of coverage. Capital intensi
ty, on the other hand, measured by the capital stock per employee, is
substantially lower among nonunion than union companies, but varies
little with the extent of coverage among union companies. Value add
ed per worker is similar among nonunion and low-union companies,
but lower among companies with medium and high coverage levels.
Productivity growth, by contrast, declines sharply as one moves from
the nonunion to low-union category, and continues to decline as union
coverage increases.
In short, descriptive data on variable means for the 1968-1980 period
show that the economic performance of unionized companies has been
poor relative to the performance of nonunion companies. But simple
means cross-tabulated by union coverage category need not match closely
the partial correlations of union coverage with performance measures,
controlling for other determinants of performance. Differences in means
most definitely do not provide evidence as to the causal impact of
unionization on the economic performance of firms. That is, unions
may be more highly organized in sectors where economic performance
is expected to be poorer, independent of any direct role played by col
lective bargaining coverage. For example, average four-year industry
sales growth in firms' principal industry is significantly higher for non
union than for union firms, leading to greater profitability and market
value, investment, and productivity. The primary purpose of the em-
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pirical analysis contained in chapters 4-6 is to isolate and measure more
precisely the impact union coverage has on firm economic performance.

Estimated Union Effects on Profitability,
Investment, and Productivity
Chapter 4 probes in some detail the impact of union coverage on com
pany profitability and market value. By any measure, the negative union
impact on each is large. Holding constant detailed firm characteristics,
industry characteristics, and industry dummies, Tobin's q is estimated
to be about 20 percent lower in an average unionized company than
in a similar nonunion company. The corresponding union-nonunion dif
ferential for the rate of return on capital is about 15 percent. Estimates
of the union profit effect are smaller using a two-step estimation pro
cess that corrects for within-firm correlation of error terms across time;
estimates are larger using instrumental variable estimation attempting
to account for the possible endogeneity of union coverage. Union prof
it effects are found to be relatively stable over time, but to vary con
siderably across industries. The data do not allow us to measure direct
ly the exact sources from which unions acquire compensation gains,
but estimation of models with union interaction terms suggests that quasirents accruing to capital and R&D, profits associated with changes in
firm and industry demand (disequilibrium returns), and returns from
limited foreign competition provide the primary sources for union gains.
No evidence is found for the proposition that monopoly returns associated
with industry concentration provide a source for union gains.
The impact of labor unions on firm investment behavior is the sub
ject of chapter 5, with particular attention to investments in physical
capital and R&D. Unions are found to have both direct and indirect
effects on investment. The union "tax" on the returns to long-lived
fixed investment causes a direct decrease in the profit-maximizing in
vestment level. The lower profitability resulting from union coverage
reduces investment indirectly by lowering the internal pool of funds
that provides a preferred source for the financing of investments. Regres
sion estimates indicate that the average union firm has annual capital
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investment that is about 13 percent lower than a similar nonunion firm.
Approximately half of this effect is a direct union effect and half an
indirect effect working through the union impact on profitability.
Estimates of the union investment effect are insensitive to the addition
of highly detailed industry dummies to the equation, and relatively in
sensitive to estimation correcting for serial correlation of within-firm
error terms. As expected, the union effect on investment varies con
siderably across industries, although in no industry do we find a positive
and significant relationship between union coverage and capital
investment.
Estimates of the union impact on R&D indicate a large negative ef
fect on R&D expenditures, although the estimated magnitude of the union
effect displays sensitivity to the estimation method and measurement
of union coverage. Even low levels of union coverage are associated
with lower R&D expenditures, while extent of coverage among unionized
companies has little if any effect. Unionized companies invest about
15-20 percent less than similar nonunion companies, most of this dif
ference being a direct rather than an indirect (profitability) effect.
Estimated union-nonunion differences are not affected by the inclusion
of detailed industry dummies, but are moderately lower using the twostep estimation procedure that corrects for serially correlated withinfirm errors. Substantial differences across industries are found, including
positive estimated union effects in two industry categories.
Less detailed analysis is provided for union effects on other behavioral
variables (table 5.5). In addition to lowering investment intensities in
physical capital and R&D, union coverage is negatively associated with
the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales. The propensity to patent
(the ratio of patents filed to the R&D stock) is larger among union than
nonunion companies, suggesting that union firms are more likely to
license innovative capital as a means of protecting quasi-rents from union
appropriation (but this relationship is not estimated precisely). And the
use of debt relative to equity is higher among union than nonunion com
panies, consistent with the hypothesis of Bronars and Deere (1991) that
efficient contracting between a firm and union leads to a shift toward
debt financing. The union impact on the capital-labor mix could not
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be estimated precisely. This may result from the fact that unions may
have a relatively neutral impact on factor mix, reducing both capital
investment and employment in roughly equal proportions. Alternative
ly, it may reflect the fact that capital intensity and union coverage are
simultaneously determined, making estimation of the relationship
difficult.
In chapter 6, the effects of labor unions on productivity levels and
growth are examined. Neither theory nor previous evidence provides
unambiguous predictions as to union effects on productivity and pro
ductivity growth. Much of the poorer performance by union companies
results from the fact that unions are more likely to be organized in firms
and industries with lower productivity levels and growth, independent
of any direct impact of unionization. Thus, estimates of union produc
tivity effects are relatively sensitive to the inclusion of detailed industry
dummies and control variables. In a pooled equation with detailed in
dustry controls and dummies, value added per worker is estimated to
be 2 to 5 percent lower in union than in nonunion companies. Evidence
also is found to support the proposition that capital and R&D, and to
a lesser extent labor, inputs have lower output elasticities (i.e., are less
productive) in union than in nonunion companies. But use of a twostep estimation process, intended to purge standard error bias, results
in an estimated positive but insignificant union-productivity relation
ship. Based on the varied evidence from chapter 6, it is concluded that
union effects on productivity are, on average, rather small.
As expected, there is large interindustry variability in estimated union
productivity effects, and large standard errors attach to almost all of
the estimates. Roughly, union-nonunion productivity differences are
estimated to be positive in those same industries where negative union
profit effects are found to be small. Any negative productivity effects
appear to be more than offset by the positive effects resulting from col
lective voice aspects of unions and management response to collective
bargaining and union rent-seeking. In contrast, those industries where
union firms realize substantially lower earnings and market value ex
hibit union productivity effects that are negative or close to zero.
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The evidence on productivity growth is likewise mixed. Unionized
companies exhibit substantially slower four-year productivity growth
rates than nonunion companies, but most of this slower growth is the
result of unionized companies having firm and industry characteristics
that lead to slower growth for union and nonunion firms alike. As was
the case for productivity level estimates, a negative union effect is no
longer found when using the two-step estimation process. Withinindustry differences in productivity growth cannot be estimated with
precision. Union effects on productivity growth appear most deleterious,
however, among union companies in relatively high-growth,
technologically advanced industries.

Interpretation and Qualifications
The evidence presented in this monograph provides broad support
for the union rent-seeking model presented in chapter 2. It is argued
there that unions appropriate some portion of the returns from market
power and from the quasi-rents that make up the normal returns to longlived capital. Because the time horizon for a union (or its rank-and-file
with median preferences) is shorter than the planning horizon over which
investors evaluate long-lived capital, "efficient" labor contracts that
maximize joint (union plus shareholder) wealth imply lower investment
in fixed tangible and intangible capital than would exist in a nonunion
company. And if jointly maximizing contractual agreements do not ob
tain, as is likely, the union tax on quasi-rents and the retardation of
investment spending are expected to be even larger.
Unionized companies will reduce investment in vulnerable forms of
capital, due not only to the union "tax" that places a wedge between
gross and net rates of return, but also because company profits, which
provide a pool from which investments are frequently financed, are
lower. Union companies, therefore, are expected to exhibit lower cur
rent and future profitability, and lower investments in long-lived capital,
than their nonunion counterparts. Union rent-seeking need not have any
direct effects in the workplace on productivity (i.e., technical efficiency)
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or productivity growth. But union rent-seeking will reduce output levels
and sales growth indirectly through its effect on investment behavior
and the use of productive inputs.
Evidence presented here shows clearly that unions have distortionary
effects on firm investment behavior that lead to lower input usage and
output in unionized sectors of the economy. It is more difficult, however,
to draw inferences about union effects on economy wide efficiency based
on union-nonunion behavioral differences. Lower capital investment
among unionized firms can be offset by higher capital investment
elsewhere in the economy. If resources could costlessly flow to alter
native uses, and social rates of return were equivalent in nonunion sec
tors, there would be little effect of unions on economy wide efficiency.
Increases in union power and rent-seeking would simply cause the
relative size of the union sector to shrink. But unions could not then
have the significant long-run effects on firm profitability that are so
clearly observed. Because unions have some degree of monopoly
bargaining power, because the shifting of resources from union to non
union environments occurs slowly, and because social rates of return
differ across investment paths, union distortions at the firm level
necessarily translate into some degree of inefficiency economy wide.
Private-sector unionism has declined sharply in recent years, and non
union work environments have increasingly become the norm for most
of the workforce and in most sectors of the economy (Kochan, Katz,
and McKersie 1986; Freeman 1988). It is essential that we better under
stand the relationship between this transformation in U.S. industrial rela
tions and past union effects on firm performance. The results presented
in this monograph strongly suggest that union decline and increased
management hostility have been in no small part the direct result of
the significantly worse economic performance of union companies than
of nonunion companies during the 1970s. 1
An evaluation of this study must consider several important qualifica
tions about the empirical analyses and results, and it should outline areas
of future study that may prove fruitful. Evidence presented here and
elsewhere has established that there are significant differences in
economic behavior and performance between union and nonunion com-
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panies. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which unionization
is a causal force, and the exact routes through which union organizing
and bargaining power affect firm performance. We have provided a
rent-seeking framework in which union effects on profitability, invest
ment behavior, and productivity growth can be analyzed jointly. Yet
reservations about this study's findings remain. The most serious
statistical and methodological concerns are the possible endogeneity of
firm-level union coverage (and other variables as well), selectivity bias
engendered by an inability to observe nonsurviving firms, and the dif
ficulty in measuring the dynamic effects of union coverage.
In most of the foregoing analysis, firm-level union coverage generally
is treated as an exogenous variable, even though unionization is not
randomly distributed across firms and industries, and coverage is af
fected by profitability and capital intensity (leading to potential
simultaneity bias). As seen in chapter 4, it is technically feasible to test
for exogeneity using Hausman-type specification tests to account for
the endogeneity of key variables, or to estimate a full system of
simultaneous equations. Given the limitations of available data and
theory, however, we have little confidence in such results. Firm-level
information that would help us estimate a reduced-form union equa
tion is not readily available, although industry-level variables on
workforce characteristics could be employed. And while all equations
could be overidentified by excluding selected variables or through the
estimation of nonlinear relationships (or, for example, through the use
of stocks in one equation and flows in another), selection of instruments
would be largely arbitrary since reasonable arguments can be made that
almost any variable affecting, say, R&D, would also affect profitability.
In short, superficial treatment of union endogeneity is unlikely to be
helpful, while more detailed treatment is beyond the scope of this study.
We are confident, however, that the qualitative relationships found are
correct. Many of the biases that can be identified suggest that union
effects on economic performance are underestimated. Unions are more
likely to be successful in organizing firms with the largest potential profits
or quasi-rents; hence the negative union coefficient in the profit equa
tions may understate the true negative impact of unions on profits
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(Voos and Mishel 1986). Likewise, simultaneity bias between capital
and unionization (i.e., unions are more likely to organize in capital in
tensive industries), may result in an underestimate of the negative ef
fect of unions on capital investment. 2 Working in the opposite direc
tion may be a negative relation between opportunities for R&D invest
ment and union organizing costs. Rapidly growing firms with
technological opportunities and large white-collar workforces may be
particularly difficult to organize. Thus, the negative relationship of
unionization with R&D investment and productivity growth may
overstate the causal impact of union coverage.
The issue of union endogeneity cannot easily be resolved with available
data and techniques. Problems emanating from the nonrepresentative
distribution of union coverage across sectors is largely controlled,
however, by the inclusion of detailed firm and industry control variables.
For example, highly unionized firms are more likely to be in less prof
itable, slower-growing industries with lower rates of new investment
and productivity growth. In order to avoid overstating the effect of unions
on firm performance, conclusions expressed in this monograph are based
on regression results from specifications including 2-digit (and sometimes
3- or 4-digit) industry dummies, and industry-level variables measur
ing union density, sales growth, concentration, import penetration, and
(in the productivity growth model) energy costs. Although the magnitude
of the union coefficients are often sensitive to inclusion of industrylevel variables, sizable union effects on profitability and investment
behavior remain after accounting for measurable firm and industry
differences.
A potentially serious qualification of the results stems from selection
bias engendered by the inability to observe firms that do not survive
over time. If unions decrease profitability, investment, and growth, union
companies able to partially offset these effects through higher produc
tivity or special firm advantages are more likely to survive than the
average company that becomes unionized (moreover, successful firms
are more likely to be targets of union organizing). For this reason,
estimated negative effects of unions on profits, investment, productivi
ty, and productivity growth are likely to understate average union
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effects, since firms most adversely affected by unions are least likely
to have survived and be included in any sample of firms.
In addition, the absence of data on changes in firm-level union
coverage over time makes it difficult to analyze the dynamic relation
ship between outcomes in labor, financial, investment, and product
markets. And even if such data were available, modeling and measure
ment of these complex relationships would be difficult owing to the longterm employment relation that characterizes internal labor markets, and
the long-range planning and life span of fixed R&D and physical capital.
A final, albeit rather different, concern is that expenditures on R&D
and estimated R&D stocks may be inadequate proxies for the much
broader category of investment—innovative activity—for which we
would like to make inferences. While evidence in this area is limited,
that which exists suggests that the union effects we have uncovered apply
to innovative activity broadly, and not just to R&D. In work not shown
in this paper, use of patent stock data instead of R&D (i.e., an output
rather than an input measure of innovative activity) produced highly
similar inferences about union effects. In other studies, Hirsch and Link
(1987) analyze survey data from small- and medium-sized firms and
find that unionized firms rank product innovative activity as being
significantly less important in their strategy and performance (relative
to their competitors) than do similar nonunion firms. And Acs and
Audretsch (1988) find that both small- and large-firm innovations, defin
ed according to measured outcomes independent of R&D or patents,
have been significantly lower in more highly unionized industries.

Implications for the Future
The poor economic performance of unionized U.S. companies dur
ing the 1970s is likely to have played a role in the increased manage
ment resistance to union organizing and the marked contraction of the
union sector during the 1980s. As indicated in the previous section,
however, further study of the relationship of union coverage with
economic performance is needed. First, analysis of the performance
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of union and nonunion companies during a more current period is essen
tial. It is certainly possible that negative union effects on firm perfor
mance have been partially mitigated in the 1980s, owing to manage
ment and union response both to the forces of domestic and foreign
competition and to the poor performance outcomes in the past. But to
date, we know little about current union-nonunion differences in
economic performance. Such knowledge is a prerequisite for address
ing intelligently the policy debate over the appropriate role for U.S.
labor law, and for understanding more clearly the transformation tak
ing place in the workplace and in labor-management relations.
More specific issues should also be addressed in future research.
Substantial interindustry differences are found in union effects on wages,
profits, market value, R&D investment, capital investment, productivity,
and productivity growth. Explanations for these differences across in
dustries in relative union-nonunion outcomes, as well as an improved
knowledge of the integrated relationship among the different outcome
measures, would mark an important step in improving our understand
ing of what unions do. Further study of the complex links between labor
relations, firm governance structures, and economic performance is re
quired if we are ever to glimpse inside the black box and understand
the mechanisms through which unions impact the workplace. Finally,
the dynamic relationship between corporate restructuring (e.g., mergers,
leveraged buyouts, and downsizing), unionization, and economic per
formance warrants detailed study, although this topic extends well
beyond our capabilities given currently available data.
Debate over the appropriate role for U.S. labor law hinges crucially
on the role of unions in the workplace and union-nonunion differences
in economic performance. Weiler (1983, 1984) and others have argued
that changes in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) interpretation
of labor law, the increased number of unfair labor practices, and strategic
management behavior intended to avoid union organizing have seriously
eroded workers' right to organize. Implicit (and sometimes explicit)
in these analyses is the belief or contention that union effects in the
workplace are largely benign.
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An alternative interpretation (see Flanagan 1987; Freeman and Kleiner
1990) is that increased management resistance to unions and the increase
in labor litigation reflects profit-maximizing behavior by employers and
is due in no small part to high union wage premiums, rather than to
explicit changes in labor law or in their interpretation and enforcement.
The analysis in this monograph lends credence to this latter interpreta
tion. Evidence of the poor economic performance by union companies
supports the proposition that the restructuring in industrial relations and
increased resistance to union organizing have been a predictable response
on the part of U.S. businesses to increased domestic and foreign com
petition. In the absence of narrowing union-nonunion performance dif
ferences, modifications in labor law that substantially enhance union
organizing and bargaining power are likely to bring about a reduced
competitiveness of U.S. firms.
Labor unions are at a crucial juncture in their history. Increased foreign
competition and deregulation of highly unionized domestic industries
have denied unionized companies access to rents and quasi-rents that
have traditionally been shared by workers and shareholders. Current
rates of new union organizing are not sufficient to offset the attrition
of existing union jobs, leading to a continuing decrease in the extent
of union coverage in the economy. Faced with new and more severe
economic constraints, union leaders and rank-and-file have been relative
ly slow to adjust their expectations, strategies, and wage demands. Stated
more bluntly, large union concessions would have been necessary to
maintain union coverage at pre-1980 levels. It is not surprising that such
substantial changes in union behavior have been slow in coming (for
evidence, see Freeman 1986; Curme and Macpherson, forthcoming),
particularly given the importance of senior members in union decisionmaking. It need not follow, however, that substantial changes in union
behavior and the U.S. industrial relations system will not emerge.
An implication of this study's findings is that if unions are to main
tain membership at close to current levels, they must provide services
that workers value, while at the same time not placing companies at
a disadvantage relative to nonunion competitors (or, stated alternative
ly, not decreasing rates of return relative to alternative investment paths).
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Union enhancement of workplace communication and labor productivity
can make possible union compensation increases without concomitant
decreases in firm market value. But given the rather weak relationship
that currently exists between unionization and productivity, combined
with strong management resistance to union organizing, the possibilities
for substantial union-induced improvements in workplace productivity
appear meager. It is therefore likely that we will see a continued decline
in union coverage in the U.S. until a new steady-state is reached at a
lower but sustainable level of union density. The size of the decline
will depend on the magnitude of union effects on firm performance.
If the union-nonunion differences in economic performance found for
the 1970s have continued during the 1980s and beyond, the size of the
union sector will continue to decline. On the other hand, a substantial
diminution of union-nonunion differences in profitability, investment
behavior, productivity, and growth will allow unions to survive and
continue to play an important, albeit reduced, role in the U.S. labor
market.
NOTES
1. Linneman and Wachter (1986), Freeman (1988), and, most convincingly, Linneman, Wachter,
and Carter (1990) argue that part of the decline in union employment resulted from an increasing
union wage premium in the late 1970s (see Blanchflower and Freeman, forthcoming, for interna
tional evidence). This explanation is, of course, complementary to the one offered here. An in
creasing wage differential, if not offset by a price or productivity increase leads to a lower profit
rate. Ultimately, employment, investment, and output decisions will be based on comparative
profitability or expected rates of return, and not on the wage differential per se. In work not shown,
the change in company union coverage between 1977 and 1987 was found to be positively, but
insignificantly, related to 1968-1980 company profitability, measured by the coefficients on firm
dummies obtained in the first-step irk equation (see chapter 4).
2. Unions may be more likely to organize in capital-intensive firms owing to greater benefits
associated with collective voice in highly structured team production settings with long-lived
employer-employee relationships. For fuller discussion and evidence on unionization and capital
intensity, see Hirsch and Berger (1984) and Duncan and Stafford (1980).

Data Appendix 1
Variable Means by Union Category, 1968-1980

Variable
UN

q
*k

R&D./S
R&D2/S
PAT/S
INV/S
ADV/S
K/L
EMPLY
DEBT/EQUITY
log(K4/L)
Qt,t-4

I-CR4
I-DOMSH
I-GROWTH

All Firms
n
mean
7,727
7,456
7,457
4,693
7,727
6,802
7,513
3,879
7,270
7,324
7,425
7,173
4,616
7,727
7,727
7,727

0.333
1.358
0.083
0.025
0.015
0.060
0.062
0.020
30.277
21.799
0.435
2.995
0.025
38.899
93.398
3.379

Nonunion
n
mean
1,633
1,573
1,581
1,049
1,632
1,381
1,594
958
1,521
1,528
1,573
1,489
910
1,633
1,633
1,633

0.000
2.340
0.103
0.053
0.034
0.130
0.066
0.024
19.878
10.376
0.340
3.032
0.057
37.200
93.053
4.866

Low Union
n
mean
1,990
1,928
1,925
1,270
1,990
1,772
1,946
1,029
1,891
1,912
1,917
1,867
1,216
1,990
1,990
1,990

0.141
1.410
0.089
0.022
0.014
0.052
0.067
0.026
32.868
19.178
0.497
3.035
0.027
39.455
94.731
4.101

ts>

ON

Medium Union
n
mean
2,305
2,205
2,204
1,453
2,305
2,122
2,212
1,034
2,154
2,163
2,200
2,130
1,393
2,305
2,305
2,305

Nonunion (UN=0); Low Union (0<UN<.30); Medium Union (.30<UN<.60); High Union (UN;
UN
Proportion of firm's workforce covered by collective bargaining agreement,
q
Tobin's q\ firm market value divided by replacement cost of tangible assets.

0.454
0.992
0.075
0.016
0.010
0.046
0.057
0.017
35.165
26.875
0.450
2.979
0.014
40.482
93.250
2.798

High Union
mean
n
1,799
1,750
1,747
921
1,799
1,527
1,761
858
1,704
1,721
1,735
1,687
1,097
1,799
1,799
1,799

0.692
0.880
0.069
0.013
0.007
0.025
0.061
0.015
30.506
28.471
0.431
2.939
0.012
37.797
92.427
1.972

TT^
R&D,/S
R&D2/S
PAT/S
INV/S
ADV/S
K/L
EMPLY
DEBT/EQUITY
\og(VA/L)
Qt ,_4
I-CR4
I-DOMSH
I-GROWTH

Gross rate of return to capital; gross cash flows divided by the value of the gross inflation-adjusted capital stock.
Annual R&D expenditures divided by sales, R&D-active firms only.
Annual R&D expenditures divided by sales, sample includes nonreporting firms with R&D/S set to zero.
Patents granted per year, divided by sales (in millions of 1972$).
Annual investment expenditures divided by sales.
Annual advertising expenditures divided by sales, advertising-active firms only.
Net inflation-adjusted capital stock divided by employees (thousands 1972$).
Employees, in thousands.
Value of long-term debt adjusted for age structure, divided by equity value.
Log of value added (thousands of 1972$), divided by employees (see chapter 6).
Annualized partial productivity growth rate, years t to f-4 (see text).
Four-firm concentration ratio in firm's primary 4-digit industry.
Percentage shipments by domestic firms in firm's primary 4-digit industry.
Annualized percentage growth rate in real industry shipments, years t to t-4, in firm's primary 4-digit industry.
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Data Appendix 2
Regression Variable Definitions
UN

Proportion of firm's workforce covered by a collective bargain
ing agreement in 1977.

UN-LOW

Equals 1(0<UN<.30), 0 otherwise.

UN-MED

Equals 1 if (.30<UN<.60), 0 otherwise.

UN-HIGH

Equals 1 if (UN>.60), 0 otherwise.

UN-DUM

Equals 1 if (UN>.10), 0 otherwise.
Log of Tobin's q, where q is the market value of the firm divided
by replacement cost of tangible assets, the latter proxied by the
value of the net inflation-adjusted capital stock (Cummins et al.
1985).
Gross rate of return on capital; gross cash flows divided by the
net inflation-adjusted capital stock.

log(INV)

Log of annual capital expenditures in millions of 1972 dollars,
deflated by industry deflator adjusted for fiscal year.

log(R&D)

Log of annual R&D expenditures in millions of 1972 dollars,
deflated by index shown in Cummins et al. (1985).
Log of value added per employee, in thousands of 1972 dollars.
Value added approximated by (sales - cost of goods + labor
costs), the latter estimated by [((1 -I- .25 UN) x average industry
compensation) x EMPLY] where data on firm's labor compen
sation and pension payments not available.
Partial productivity growth, calculated as the annualized growth
rate in value added between years t and r-4, minus the growth
rate in employment times labor's share of value added (firms
assigned labor's share based on labor costs as defined above,
using midpoint of four-year period).

log(R&D-STK)

Log of R&D stock in millions of 1972 dollars; calculated based
on R&D expenditures and assumed 15 percent depreciation rate
(Body and Jaffe, no date). Deflator shown in Cummins et al.
(1985).

log(R&D-STK)(-l)

Log of R&D stock minus current R&D expenditure, in millions
of 1972 dollars. Calculated only for firms with reported stocks.

log(R&D-STK)est

Log of R&D stock in millions of 1972 dollars; actual values
used for companies with reported stocks and predicted values
for other companies (see text).

log(R&D-STKest/L)

Measured by log(R&D-STK)est minus log(L).
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R&D-STK/S
R&D-STK/Sest

log(L)

)
log(K/L)
GROWTH
I-GROWTH

I-CR4

I-DOMSH

I-UN
I-log(EARN)
I-ENERGY/VA

R&D stock, divided by sales.
R&D stock, divided by sales; actual values for companies with
reported stocks and predicted values for other companies (see
text).
Log of employment, in thousands.
Log of net inflation-adjusted capital stock, in millions of 1972
dollars, deflated by GNP investment implicit price deflator.
Log of net inflation-adjusted capital stock minus current invest
ment expenditures, in millions of 1972 dollars.
Log of net inflation-adjusted capital stock per employee, in
thousands of 1972 dollars.
Annualized growth rate in real company sales over the previous
two years; sales deflated by industry-specific price indices.
Annualized percentage growth rate in real industry shipments
between years / and t-4 in firm's primary 4-digit industry.
Shipments deflated by industry-specific price indices.
Four-firm concentration ratio in firm's primary 4-digit industry,
adjusted for regional markets and imports, available for 1972
and 1977. Pre-1972 data assigned 1972 values; post-1977 data
assiged 1977 values; 1973-1976 data assigned values based on
linear interpolation.
Domestic firms' percentage share of sales in firm's primary
4-digit industry, defined as 100(1- [IMPORTS/(SHIPMENTS +
IMPORTS-EXPORTS)]), available for 1972 and 1977.
Pre-1972 data assigned 1972 values; post-1977 data assigned
1977 values; 1973-1976 data assigned values based on linear
interpolation.
Proportion of eligible workers who are union members in firm's
primary 2- or 3-digit industry during 1976-1978.
Log of payroll per employee in firm's primary 4-digit industry,
in 1972 dollars, deflated by GNP implicit price deflator.
The proportion of energy costs to value added in the firm's
primary 4-digit industry.

NOTE: In table 6.3, variables with "d" in front represent logarithmic differences between years
/ and t-4, divided by 4. Variables with "bars" on top represent mean values of years t and t-4.
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